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This thesis studies the implications of risk spillover effects in the systemic
risk regarding financial institutions and financial system. In Chapter 3
we study the risk spillovers from sovereign CDS market to financial CDS
market and the systemic risk contributions of sovereign countries, by using
the ∆CoVaR risk measure. In Chapter 4, using a high dimensional GVAR
model, we then extend the previous study to investigate the dynamics
of sovereign risk spillovers to the sovereign bond market, sovereign
CDS market, and the national banking sectors, and we examine the
interdependence of these markets. Lastly in Chapter 5, we constuct the tail-
dependence network for the risk spillovers of global financial institutions
and study the implications of network interconnectedness of the financial
institutions as well as its contributions to systemic risk.
Our research provides further understanding regarding the systemic risk
and risk spillovers. In particular, regarding sovereign risk spillovers to
the financial system, we find evidence regarding the different roles of
state intervention measures in influencing the risk spillovers, and the
spillover impact from Italy and Spain impose great stress to the financial
stability. In addition, we find that the interconnectedness of the tail returns
of financial institutions, which is deeply under the influence of common
market conditions, contribute more to the financial systemic risk than the
initial events of risk spillovers.
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1.1 Recent development in Systemic Fragility
The global financial sector in the last decade has been characterised by the occurrence
of several financial crises, which puts into question the stability and resilience
of the domestic, regional, and global financial system. The Subprime Crisis in
2007 originated from the financial institutions’ excessive exposure to the subprime
mortgage market, which leads to distress and default of market participants. And self-
reinforced exacerbation of risk sentiment and market liquidity led by the persistence
of market distress, together with an arguably less resilient system structure, resulted
in the swift drying up of market liquidity and the collapse of several high profiled
financial institutions which triggered the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 and
the recessions of many national economies. National authorities sought to stabilise
the domestic financial markets and boost economic growth with massive bailout
packages, which in various ways transferred the distress burdens from the private
sectors to the balance sheets of national governments. The sudden accumulation
of fiscal burden, combined with pessimistic prospect of economic growth and the
1
deep-rooted problems in economic structures, resulted in a credibility crisis regarding
the fiscal sustainability in several sovereign countries in the European Sovereign
Crisis of 2010-2012. Although these crisis episodes share some commonality in the
amplification of the initial impact, the self-reinforced transmission and propagation
of risk impact, and the rapid freezing of institutional lending and market liquidity,
they are triggered from various sources but with spillover effects converged to form
massive destabilising events that endanger financial stability.
Although the inherent fragility of the financial system with has been widely
acknowledged (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Bhattacharya and Gale, 1985; Allen and
Gale, 2000), recent development in the financial institutions adds new element to the
financial fragility. Financial institutions are becoming more homogenous in the sense
that the distinction among commercial banks, broker-dealers, and insurers is blurred
with each market participants expanding their business lines to different territories.
They are also more reliant on the wholesale funding markets of inter-institutional
borrowing and lending. An increasing homogenous financial system means the risk
impact from a single source is now easier to reach any market participants at a more
rapid speed. In addition, a more densely interlinked financial system provide the
breeding environment for the emergence of financial institutions that take advantage
of the “too-interconnected-to-fail” problem, exacerbating the fragility of the financial
systems.
The systemic risk1 regarding the financial system, regarding the financial institu-
tions, or regarding a specific source of risk impact, has been gaining the attention from
academic researchers and policy-makers as an important topic in the development of
economic and financial theories, as well as a practical issue in the policy decisions
regarding the regulation of the financial system.
1The concept will be discussed in Section 2.1.
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1.2 Motivation and Outline of the Thesis
1.2.1 Research Objectives
The purpose of our research is to investigate the several issues (to be discussed in
Chapter 2) that emerge in the recent development of the financial system regarding
the systemic risk of financial institutions:
• We seek to examine the implications of risk spillovers to the systemic risk:
– The impact of sovereign risk spillovers to financial institutions.
– The driving force of sovereign risk spillovers and its underlying dynamic
effects.
– The impact of risk spillovers from the interconnectedness of financial
institutions.
• We also seek to examine how systemic risk can be measured in adequate ways:
– How individual sources of risk and their spillover effects can be represented
from the perspective of financial stability.
– How the spillovers from the distress of sovereign countries are reflected in
the financial markets and financial institutions.
– How to assess the interconnectedness in the financial network.
1.2.2 Outline
We carry out several studies addressing certain aspects of the research questions.
In Chapter 2, we discuss the background of our research, including the concepts
in systemic risk and its various sources and propagation mechanisms. Specifically,
we discuss how systemic risk and its spillovers are measured, and the two sources of
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systemic risk, sovereign risk and network risk, from which we conduct our research
later on. We also provide literature surveys on the previous studies in the specific
topics surrounding these issues, which are theoretical and technical foundations of
our research.
In Chapter 3, we study the risk spillover effects from sovereign credit risk
to financial institutions, using sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) spreads and
financial CDS spreads as indicators of credit risk in the two markets. Based on the
previous literature on measuring systemic risk in the financial markets, we use the
∆CoVaR method from Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and apply the method to
model the risk spillovers from CDS spreads. The systemic risk contributions of a
sovereign country is gauged by the overall ∆CoVaR spillovers to the systemically
important financial institutions in our sample. The risk spillovers of ∆CoVaR
estimated from the quantile regression model of Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978) allows
us to evaluate its impact in a given time period. To assess the structural stability of
the risk measures, we apply the quantile structural test from Qu (2008); Oka and Qu
(2011).
Extending our study on sovereign risk spillovers from Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 we
study the systemic risk contributions of the risk spillovers of sovereign countries by
modelling the dynamics of sovereign distress and the impact to the sovereign bond
markets, the sovereign CDS markets, and the national banking sector. We use the
Global Vector-Autoregressive (GVAR) model which allows for the high dimensional
modelling of variable interactions under domestic, regional and global settings. We
investigate the impact of shocks from debt burden and the slowing down of economic
growth to the various markets and examine the inter-dependence of these markets.
In Chapter 5, we study how the interconnectedness of financial institutions
contribute to the systemic risk and its propagation in the financial system. We
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examine the tail-dependence of the market returns of financial institutions in order
to investigate the propagation of risk impact from the distress of one financial
institutions to other market participants. We then investigate how the tail-dependence
of financial institutions has evolved during the previous episodes of financial crises
and market distress events. In addition, we examine the implications of network
interconnectedness in terms of how it affects the impact of systemic risk realisation.
Lastly, in Chapter 6, we summarise the findings in our research with its policy
implications, and discuss the limitations in our research and research opportunities.
1.3 Contribution
1.3.1 Chapter 3: Systemic Risk Spillovers – Evidence from CDS
Market
CDS has been documented as a good indicator of the credit risk of both financial
institutions (Huang, Zhou and Zhu, 2012b) and sovereign countries (Pan and Sin-
gleton, 2008). Our measure of the risk spillovers from the sovereign CDS market to
the financial CDS market using ∆CoVaR allows us to provide both a cross-sectional
comparison of the systemic riskiness of sovereign countries as well as an evaluation
of the evolutions of the spillover relationships over the time horizon. If there is a large
risk spillovers from the contingent default of a sovereign country then this event is
likely to cause huge disruption and distress in the financial system, the economic and
welfare impact of which should be taken into account when assessing whether there
should be a financial support to the distressed country, or to what extent should the
support be. In addition, Our examination on the structural stability of the quantile-
estimated ∆CoVaR is the first study to apply a quantile-based structural break test
to assess the structural stability of the risk measure and our results provide insights
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into the structural stability of the quantile-based family of risk measures that has
been gaining popularity among researchers and regulators. Lastly, we investigate
how the systemic risk contributions of sovereign countries can be explained by the
macro-financial fundamentals of the sovereign countries and their involvement in
different government intervention schemes, which complements the studies on the
determinants of CDS spreads and its component structure (Duffie, Pedersen and
Singleton, 2003; Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen and Singleton, 2011).
1.3.2 Chapter 4: Examining Cross-border Sovereign Distress Spillovers
We extend the evidence of risk spillovers from CDS markets in Chapter 3 to sovereign
bond markets and the national banking sectors, as well as discuss the multiple
scenarios of sovereign distress. The modelling of sovereign risk spillovers in the GVAR
model of Pesaran et al. (2004); Dees, Mauro, Pesaran and Smith (2007) offers a rigorous
way to investigate the impact from sovereign risk to the financial markets. The
techniques of impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions
provide insights into the dynamics of risk spillovers from sovereign risk to various
markets and assess the impact over the time horizon, as well as the decomposition of
influence from risk origins. In this way we contribute to the understanding of how
the financial market distress can be caused by the distress of sovereign countries. Our
results offer empirical evidence to the theoretical models on sovereign risk spillovers
(Drechsler, Acharya and Schnabl, 2011) and contribute to the study of risk spillovers
between markets (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009; De Bruyckere, Gerhardt, Schepens and
Vander Vennet, 2013) from a macro-financial perspective.
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1.3.3 Chapter 5: Systemic Risk Spillovers in Tail-Dependence Net-
work
From the perspective of pairwise risk spillovers, we extend the traditional systemic
risk measures of market series into the study of financial networks. Specifically, our
network extensions of ∆CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) incorporate the
interconnectedness of financial institutions by their tail-dependence. In addition, our
implementation of rolling window models to investigate the time-varying structure of
the tail-dependence network which allows us to assess the impact of different crisis
periods to the financial network and systemic risk. While previous studies on the
tail-dependence network of market series are often limited by the sample size of the
pairwise relationships, we contribute to the literature of tail-dependence network
(Billio, Getmansky, Lo and Pelizzon, 2012; Hautsch, Schaumburg and Schienle,
2012; Härdle, Wang and Yu, 2016) by considering a larger sample size of pairwise
relationships of commercial banks, broker-dealers, and insurance companies in the
global financial systems. Our investigations on the topological characteristics (such as
the centrality measures of nodes) of the network system also contribute to the further
understanding of financial network theory in terms of how the interconnectedness of




Background of the Research
2.1 Concept and Theory of Systemic Risk
2.1.1 Defining the Concept
We summarise the definitions and concepts regarding “systemic risk” discussed in
previous survey literature in Table 2.1. With the definitions in the literature, here
we refer to systemic risk as the risk that undermines the financial stability which
results in heavy losses in the economy and social welfare. Financial instability
undermines the process of financial intermediation, and distress of the financial
system causes negative externality to other economic systems, and thus the severe
impact of which warrants efforts to safeguard financial stability and contain systemic
risk. For example, in the database for banking crises from 1970 to 2009 organised by
Laeven and Valencia (2010), the authors estimate that the Global Financial Crisis costs
output losses for various sovereign economies: 25% GDP loss for the United States,
24% for the United Kingdom, 39% for Spain, and so on. The two most important
elements of systemic risk are its sources and its propagation mechanisms.
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Table 2.1: Definitions and Concepts of Systemic Risk in Survey Literature
De Bandt and Hartmann (2000)
• The risk associated with systemic events.
• Systemic events can be triggered by idiosyncratic shocks or systematic shocks
• Systemic events are characterised by the propagation of initial impact.
European Central Bank (2010)
• The risk of experiencing a systemic event.
• Systemic events are events that lead to the impairement of the financial
intermediation process and the losses of economic growth and welfare.
Allen and Carletti (2012)
• Types of systemic risk: 1. Common exposures to asset bubbles; 2. Liquidity shocks
of price volatility 3. Panics and bank runs 4. Contagion; 5. Sovereign default; 6.
Currency shocks.
Bisias, Flood, Lo and Valavanis (2011)
• No single clear common definition yet, as systemic risk can be attributed to many
aspects.
• “Systemic risk may be hard to define but they[regulators] know it when they see
it.”
Benoit, Colliard, Hurlin and Pérignon (2016)
• Systemic risk can be minimally defined as the risk that many market participants
are simultaneously affected by severe losses, which then spread through the
system.
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2.1.2 Sources of Systemic Risk
Here we follow the approach of Smaga (2014) and define two categories of risk sources:
endogenous sources and exogenous sources. Endogenous sources refer to the risks
triggered within the financial market and exogenous sources are the risks triggered in
other sectors of the economy.
Endogenous Sources
The endogenous sources often concern with financial institutions risk taking be-
haviours, which are usually associated with moral hazard problems. As noted by
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), initial excessive risk-taking of financial institutions
during the build-up period of systemic events generates the first component of
systemic risk. The risk of correlated exposure in financial institutions is one such
endogenous sources. Bhattacharya and Gale (1985) discusses the free-riding problem
of banks over-investing in illiquid assets as banks can rely on the common pool of
the interbank market for liquid assets, which lead to a market-wide shortage of liquid
assets thus making all banks vulnerable to liquidity shocks.
“Systemically important financial institutions” (SIFIs) is a related concept, where a
financial institution1 is considered systemically important if its distress or failure can
be expected to trigger a systemic event. The concerns of regulators and policy-makers
regarding SIFIs includes how these institutions should be regulated, how to designate
one institution to be systemically important, as well as how to prevent market
participants from becoming “too-systemically-important-to-fail” in the system.
1The Financial Stability Board currently recognises 30 banks/bank holding companies, and 9




Researchers have been long studying the inherent fragility of the financial systems,
however the recent evidence regarding financial crisis documents the importance of
external sources of macroeconomic risk. The collapse of US securitised mortgage
market in 2007 not only create massive losses to financial institutions, but also reveal
many problems in these institutions which result in a general loss of confidence in
the market by market participants. The asset bubbles and the bursting of them in
real estate sector has been documented to be an important destabilising factor to the
financial system, by Allen and Carletti (2009) for economies like the US, Spain and
Ireland. Before the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis, the systemic effects of sovereign risk
spillovers, in terms of the ways of impacting the financial sector as well as other


























Figure 2.1: Elements of Systemic Risk
Source: based on Aikman et al. (2009)
2.1.3 Propagation Mechanisms of Systemic Risk
Counterparty Exposures
The most intuitous propagation mechanism of systemic risk concerns with counter-
party exposures. Consider the simplified case of an interbank cross-holding network
of lending/borrowing relationships. The initial failure of a bank due to its asset losses
exceeding its capital reserve could lead to the losses of its creditor banks. Losses then
propagate to other banks through the mutual lending/borrowing relationships as long
as some banks face distress in the propagation process. Studies in the interbank market
argue that the impact of such propagation would be limited when financial institutions
can fully diversify its counterparty exposures, when there exists a complete network
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of mutual lending relationships so that the initial impact is diversified away (Freixas,
Parigi and Rochet, 2000; Allen, Babus and Carletti, 2012). However, studies in financial
network theory show that the stability of the counterparty exposure network will be
ultimately determined by the magnitude of the initial impact, and when such impact
is sufficiently large enough, the direct linkages of counterparty exposures will serve as
a destabilising factor of financial stability (Elliott, Golub and Jackson, 2014; Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015).
Fire-sales
Market signals of individual distress and fire-sales of assets, as well as market-
wide price increase of credit risk can all lead to indirect losses of external assets
of market participants. The fire sale of the assets of a distressed institution leads
to negative impact on their prices, which in turn results in a negative impact on
other institutions with similar exposures, and impose systemic vulnerability to other
institutions. Brunnermeier (2009) discusses the interaction between the “loss spiral”
of fire-sales and the “margin spiral” of margin requirements, when losses in assets
and depletion of liquidity prompt higher margin requirements by market participants
which in turn not only exacerbates the pressure on asset prices but also spreads
the contagion to other asset classes. In addition, the signal of fire-sales creates a
coordination problem as it prompts institutions to liquidate their positions out of the
fear that asset prices will be depressed by other institutions (Lagunoff and Schreft,
2001). As discussed in Haldane and May (2011) and Benoit et al. (2016), in contrast to
the form of propagation via mutual debt holding where the impact attenuates due to
sufficient diversification of initial impact, the impact of propagation via external asset
losses amplifies when more and more individuals are involved in the process, leading
to a self-reinforced loss of confidence in the market.
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Liquidity Freeze
Another propagation mechanism takes the form of the freeze in funding liquidity,
or “liquidity hoarding”. As the evidence in the recent episodes of Global Financial
Crisis and the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis shows, interbank lending market and repo
market suffer substantially when transaction activity slow down and liquidity quickly
dry up as financial institutions fear their own exposures to others which in turn
exacerbates the impact of the initial distress signal. As discussed in Brunnermeier
(2009) and Caballero and Simsek (2013), one of the contributing factor is a “gridlock
risk” that financial institutions have no full information regarding the risk position of
the counterparties of their counterparties along the direct route of exposure impact,
and therefore stop their mutual lending after severe shocks. Solvent but illiquid
financial institutions thus need the support from a lender of last resort to prevent them
from distress.
However, it is important to note that systemic risk propagation rarely takes a
specific form, but rather the combination of several channels reinforcing each other. As
argued in Longstaff (2010), there is a significant distinction between the 2007 Subprime
Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis that the Subprime Crisis is characterised by
a “credit-risk-induced illiquidity” phenomenon, while the Global Financial Crisis is
characterised by a “illiquidity-induced credit risk” phenomenon.
2.2 Measuring Systemic Risk in Financial Market
There are generally three broad categories of measures2 regarding the systemic risk
contributions of financial markets, as well as their exposures to systemic risk, namely
statement-based measures which mainly rely on the financial statement information
2Many studies, though favouring one approach to the others, often combine elements from all
categories of risk measures.
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Table 2.2: Literature Strands on Systemic Risk
Diamond and Dybvig (1983); Bhattacharya and Gale (1985); Allen and Gale (2000)
• Theoretical studies on contagion in the financial market.
• Financial fragility: in the absence of full information, (bank) runs can be self-
fulfilling and self-reinforcing.
Bisias, Flood, Lo and Valavanis (2011); Benoit, Colliard, Hurlin and Pérignon (2016)
• Literature surveys on the theories and applications of systemic risk.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011); Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2012b); Acharya, Engle and
Richardson (2012); Brownlees and Engle (2012)
• Theoretical/empirical frameworks for systemic risk measurement.
Alessandri, Gai, Kapadia, Mora and Puhr (2009); Drechsler, Acharya and Schnabl (2011)
• Theorectial frameworks on sovereign risk spillovers to the financial system.
Gai and Kapadia (2010); Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015); Elliott, Golub
and Jackson (2014)
• Theoretical frameworks on the financial interconnectedness and systemic risk.
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from institutions, market-based measures where the main sources of information
are obtained from market series, and network-based measures. Network-based risk
measures are generally extensions of the former two categories with the incorporation
of network information. Network extensions of statement-based measures examine
the mutual exposures of financial institutions and the cascading effect of defaults,
whereas network extensions of market-based measures incorporate the network
interactions of market series into the risk measures. We focus on the comparisons
between statement-based measures and market-based measures in Section 2.2 and
leave the discussion of variants of network-based measures in Section 2.4.
2.2.1 Market-based Systemic Measures
As discussed in Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2010), Bisias et al.
(2011) and Benoit et al. (2016), market-based systemic measures have been gaining
popularity by researchers and policy-makers since the outbreak of the Global Financial
Crisis. Lehar (2005) extends the contingent claim analysis of Merton (1974) with
the probability of a systemic event of simultaneous defaults calculated from the
correlation of banks’ portfolios, which is later adopted in Gray, Merton and Bodie
(2008) for a regulatory framework regarding systemic macro-financial risks. Huang
et al. (2012a,b) construct a distress insurance premium (DIP) framework based on
the aggregate systemic risk measures calculated from equity return correlations and
CDS spreads, for the Asian-Pacific financial system (Huang et al., 2012a) and the US
financial system (Huang et al., 2012b). Based on earlier studies on Conditional Value-
at-Risk models in Chernozhukov and Umantsev (2001) and Engle and Manganelli
(2004), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) studies the tail-dependence of entities, and
proposes ∆CoVaR as a risk measure for systemic risk spillovers. Acharya et al. (2010)
extends the concept of expected shortfall to “marginal expected shortfall” (MES) to
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study the capitalisation needs for a financial institution when the market is in distress
and propose a “systemic expected shortfall” SES measure as a composite measure for
systemic risk, which is later extended in Brownlees and Engle (2012) with a dynamic
estimates of MES.
One of the advantages of market-based systemic measures is that they provide
consistent systemic measures. Since the main source of information of market-based
measures comes from long-running market risk indicators (from the stock/bond
prices and CDS spreads regarding individual institutions to interbank lending rates
and market volatility indicators regarding the market), these sources provide stan-
dardised and high-frequency risk estimates. Bisias et al. (2011) comments on the
ineffectiveness of statement-based measures in providing consistent risk estimates,
as on one hand the risk exposures of newly emerged contingent contracts could not
be adequately captured by financial reports, on the other hand the supervisors could
not access to consistent and regular update of industry information such as sizes of
market segments. In addition, differences in accounting and supervisory standards
make it difficult to have a cross-border assessment of systemic risk status in different
economic regions.
Another advantage of market-based measures is that they allow for the capturing
of indirect spillover effects of market contagion as well as assessing the overall
systemic risk status of the market. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, the sources from
where systemic risk originates not only include the mutual contractual links, but also
the indirect spillovers due to mark-to-market asset losses, deterioration of market
confidence. Drehmann and Tarashev (2011) shows that, while statement-based mea-
sures can provide parsimonious indicators that are good approximations to market-
based measures in terms of assessing the systemic importance of individual financial
institutions, they could not provide good measures regarding the aggregate systemic
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risk in the financial market. A common exogenous shock, such as from sovereign
credit risk, would simultaneously affect all market participants with similar portfolio
and lead to the potential scenario of multiple defaults, which require examining the
“bigger-picture” for risk assessment. Therefore, market-based measures can provide
assessment of the systemic risk contribution of a financial institution to the entirety of
the system, as well as the overall state of systemic risk regarding the market.
Another advantage is that given the high frequency of the indicator series, market-
based measures provide timely risk estimates, which enables policy-makers to gain
insights into the current stability status of the financial system. In addition, the
forward-looking nature of the financial market indicators allow for the development
of early warning systems from market-based measures. For example, the CDS spreads
contains the average expected default probability during the life of the contract,
whereas balance-sheet data provides only backward-looking measures indicating past
information rather than “what is expected to happen in the future”. As critisised in
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), contemporaneous measures of systemic risk which
relies on volatility as a proxy for risk could the capture the build-up of volatility
over the time horizon, since financial institutions take on excessive risk in when
the market is in moderate conditions, and therefore extreme market conditions are
the consequences of systemic risk, rather than the cause of it. Brownlees and Engle
(2012) shows that the SRISK measure of systemic risk is found to granger-cause
industrial production, where the authors argue that the risk measure can correctly
proxy the capital shortages in the financial market, and the deterioration of which
impairs industrial production and the real economy and is successfully depicted in
their model.
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2.2.2 CDS Spreads as A Systemic Risk Indicator
Mechanism of Credit Default Swaps
A credit default swaps (CDS) contract is a swaps contract on the credit risk of the
contingent default (or other “credit events”) of the reference entity. In contrast to
a bond contract where the investor needs to have risk position on the reference
entity’s credit risk, a CDS contract between the protection buyer and the protection
seller allows their risk positions to be managed independently of the reference entity.
Therefore, the CDS on the reference entity serves as an insurance contract which
transfer the credit risk of default from the protection buyer to the protection seller
in exchange for an annual fee payment (spread). When the reference entity fails to
meet its debt obligations, a credit event is triggered and the protection buyer receives
from the protection seller an insurance payment equal to the difference between the
notional principal and the loss upon default of the underlying reference obligation
(Duffie, 1999; Augustin, 2012).
Protection Buyer Protection Seller
CDS Spreads
Reference Entity
Payment in Credit Event
Figure 2.2: Credit Default Swaps Mechanism
Source: Weistroffer et al. (2009)
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From the perspective of the protection seller, it is exposed to the risk of default by
the reference entity and the contingent payment of the protection contract. Therefore,
the major component of the CDS spreads charged by the protection seller should
generally reflect the market perception regarding the credit risk of the reference entity,
which in turn provides a market indicator of credit risk. In the theoretical pricing
models of CDS spreads (Duffie, 1999; Tarashev and Zhu, 2006), the spreads of a T-year















where Ri,t is the recovery rate, rt is the risk-free interest rate, qi,t is the risk-neutral
default intensity and 1 −
∫ τ
t qi,udu denotes the risk-neutral probability of bank i’s
survival over the τ years. The one-year risk-neutral probability of default is derived












LGDi,t = (1− Ri,t)
Therefore, as discussed in Huang et al. (2012b), the probability of default implied
by the credit risk spreads contains three elements: the compensation (premium)
for expected default losses, the compensation for bearing the default risk, and the
compensation for bearing other types of risk, such as liquidity risk or uncertainty risk.
The increase in CDS spreads can thus be attributed to the increases in the default and
liquidity risk premium components. In addition, Lahmann and Kaserer (2011) also
demonstrate the effectiveness of CDS spreads in indicating the credit risk level by
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showing that the spreads are a first-order approximation of the constructed expected
systemic shortfall estimates.
Empirical Applications of CDS Spreads
Empirical studies document the effective evidence of CDS spreads as an instrument
of credit risk monitoring. As noted by Rodriguez-Moreno and Pena (2012), stock
prices data lacks the inherent direct measure of default probability in CDS market
and thus it needs specific structural model to provide risk estimates measures, such as
the implied credit spread model by Forte (2011). Comparing the indicators of credit
risk, the advantage of CDS series over corporate bond rates is its liquidity: CDS series
are calculated from standardized CDS contracts which are traded in large volumes,
whereas corporate bond markets are segmented and not standardized. As noted by
Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005), CDS market provides the easiest place where the
trading of credit risk can take place without suffering from the various short-sales
constraints in the bond market.
In terms of the empirical findings regarding the effectiveness of information in
different market series, several studies show that CDS market lead other markets, such
as Blanco et al. (2005) for the comparisons between corporate investment-grade bonds
and CDS spreads, and Fontana and Scheicher (2010) and Ammer and Cai (2011) for
sovereign bond market and sovereign CDS market. In addition, Rodriguez-Moreno
and Pena (2012) compares the performance of market-based methods using interbank
rates, stock prices, and CDS series. The authors show that risk measures calculated
from CDS data outperform others as for macro-prudential measures the first principal
component of a portfolio of CDS spreads provides the best estimates whereas for
micro-prudential measures multivariate densities of CDS spreads is the best measure.
Therefore, CDS series including financial institutions CDS, sovereign CDS, and
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CDS indices has now been widely used in the measuring of systemic risk. The DIP
measures of Huang et al. (2012a,b) rely on CDS spreads to calculate the probability of
defaults for financial institutions. Acharya et al. (2010) discuss an implementation of
their MES method using CDS data and find that the risk measures can explain more
of the tail behaviour of the systemic risk estimates. Wong and Fong (2011) calculates
the ∆CoVaR estimates for Asia-Pasific sovereign economies using their sovereign
CDS, and Fong and Wong (2012) ∆CoVaR is also implemented using CDS data for
Asia-Pacific sovereign economies (Wong and Fong, 2011) and European Sovereign
economies (Fong and Wong, 2012). Betz, Hautsch, Peltonen and Schienle (2015)
proposes a network model regarding the risk spillovers of sovereign and bank CDS
series.
2.2.3 Market-based Systemic Risk Measures
Here we discuss the two market-based measures that are mostly adopted3 in systemic
risk measures: ∆CoVaR by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and Adrian and Brunner-
meier (2016), and marginal expected shortfall by Acharya et al. (2010) and Brownlees
and Engle (2012).
∆CoVaR
As a systemic risk measure, ∆CoVaR calculates the risk spillovers from the “origina-
tor” entity to the “receptor” entity, i.e. the contributions of the origin’s distress to
the distress of the receptor. ∆CoVaR builds upon the concept of “Conditional Value-
at-Risk”, which is the receptor’s level of distress as quantified by its value-at-risk
3Bisias et al. (2011) and Benoit et al. (2016) provide comprehensive surveys on systemic risk and the
techniques measuring systemic risk. Among the risk measures in the surveys, ∆CoVaR and MES are
the two methods most cited in Google Scholar. As of 05/November/2016, Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2011, 2016) are cited 1398 times, Acharya et al. (2010) 1161 times, and Brownlees and Engle (2012) 506
times.
22
conditional on the realised event of the originator experiencing a loss as quantified its
value-at-risk. The difference of, 1) the receptor’s qth-quantile value-at-risk conditional
on the originator’s qth-quantile value-at-risk, and 2) the receptor’s qth-quantile value-
at-risk conditional on the originator’s median state, thus measures the spillovers of
risk transferred from the originator’s distress to the receiver. Therefore, the spillovers
from one financial institution’s distress to the systemic index measures its systemic risk
contribution, and a large risk spillovers from an originator institution should therefore
prompt actions from regulators to prevent the potential scenario of a systemic event.
Formally, the qth-quantile value-at-risk of a series X of institution i can be expressed
as the following, where the quantile q denotes the rarity of the event:
Pr(Xi ≤ VaRiq) = q (2.3)
CoVaRj|C(X
i)
q then measures the qth-quantile value-at-risk of institution j condi-
tional on event C(Xi) regarding institution i:
Pr(X j|C(Xi) ≤ CoVaRj|C(X
i)
q ) = q (2.4)






In a simplified Gaussian case, suppose the structure of returns of institutions i and
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th VaR of institution j conditional on the pth VaR of institution i, as
defined in (2.4), is then as the following, where Φ is the standard Gaussian CDF:
Pr
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Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) provide two approaches to estimate CoVaR,
using quantile regression models of Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978) and using bivariate
diagonal vec GARCH(1, 1) models, and show that the backtest performance of
quantile regression models are better than GARCH(1, 1) models. For other extensions,
Lopez-Espinosa, Moreno, Rubia and Valderrama (2012) provides a CoVaR quantile
model which takes account of the asymmetric information of the tails, Cao (2012)
provides a CoVaR estimator based on Sharpley values, and Girardi and Tolga Ergün
(2013) use a multivariate GARCH(1, 1) model to estimate CoVaR.
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Marginal Expected Shortfall
Margin expected shortfall is defined as the expected loss in equity of a financial
institution when the market declines substantially in a crisis situation. Denote Ri =
∑j yjrj to be the return of an entity i where rj is the return of the jth group and yj being












where VaRiq is the qth-quantile value-at-risk. In Acharya et al. (2010), the marginal
expected shortfall MESj of group j is then defined as the sensitivity of the entity’s









When we treat the entity as a systemic portfolio, in the context of a systemic
events, MESiq, the margin expected shortfall for institution i, conditional on the market








where (wit=1 − wit=0)/wit=0 is the net equity returns of institution i and Iq is the
indicator for the market return being in its lower left qth quantile. In Acharya et al.




#days ∑ Ri,t (2.14)
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Acharya et al. (2010) then defines the systemic risk contribution of institution i as







+ kMESiq + ∆
i (2.15)
where the term za
i−wi0
wi0
denotes the insitution’s leverage level, k is a scale factor, and
∆i is an adjustment term.
As an extension, Brownlees and Engle (2012) develops a dynamic version of MES
which provides multi-step ahead forecast capability as an early warning system.
Denote Ri,t and RM,t to be the return of institution i and the return of a market
index, and they are assumed to follow the bivariate process:
RM,t = σM,tε1M,t








where σM,t and σi,t are the conditional volatilities of the market return and
institutions i, and ρi,t is their conditional correlation. Innovations are introduced















for n ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {i, M} and zero covariance.
The one-period-ahead MES for a systemic event S can be calculated as












Denote Rki,t:t+h−1 and R
k
M,t:t+h−1 to be the k
th simulated cumulative return of
26
institution i and the market, the h-step ahead dynamic MES can then be estimated











2.3 Sovereign Risk as A Source of Systemic Risk
2.3.1 Determinants of Sovereign Risk Spillovers
Several studies show that the market series regarding sovereign credit risk, i.e.
sovereign CDS spreads and bond yields, do incorporate the information of the risk
of defaults or fiscal distress of the sovereign countries. Arghyrou, Kontonikas et al.
(2011) uses a regime switching model to analyse the varying impact of different factor
groups to the sovereign bond yields, and finds that when in a crisis regime, country-
specific macro-fundamentals have greater influence to the pricing of sovereign debt.
This finding regarding the shift in explanatory powers is also supported in Caceres,
Guzzo and Segoviano Basurto (2010), where the authors document the shifts of
explanatory powers regarding Sovereign CDS from global risk aversion to country-
specific economic fundamentals. Aizenman, Hutchison and Jinjarak (2013) carries a
study regarding how the fiscal space of sovereign countries influence their sovereign
CDS spreads over 60 countries from 2005 to 2010, in which the study finds that the
fiscal space proxies such as deficit-to-tax and public debt-to-tax ratios have good
explanation powers in explaining sovereign CDS spreads. In terms of the forward-
looking nature of market series, Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) investigates the effect
of credit rating events on the CDS spreads of sovereign countries, and the authors
find that the CDS spreads of high grade countries respond more strongly to rating
upgrades and the spreads of low grade countries respond more strongly to rating
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downgrades. In addition, they find that CDS spreads have good forward-looking
property as the information of negative rating events is anticipated and incorporated
into CDS spreads before the rating announcements.
However, to what extent does the sovereign risk spillovers reflect the credit risk of
the sovereign countries? As noted in Augustin (2012), there has been a long debate
in the literature regarding whether the spillover effects from sovereign risk series
such as sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads, are predominantly explained by the
country-specific factors, or by the factors representing the global risk environment
and the co-movement of markets. Several studies document the roles of global
factors in influencing sovereign risk series, as well as the co-movement of market
series in lead-lag relationships, which provide mechanism of risk spillovers via risk
premium channels and price discovery channels. Pan and Singleton (2008) constructs
a theoretical pricing model of the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads, and show
that the risk premium component of the spreads can be well explained by global
volatility index as well as other financial variables. Longstaff et al. (2011) examines
the effects of variable groups of global factors and variable groups of local factors on
the components of sovereign CDS spreads, and the study shows that both the CDS
spreads and its components are strongly affected by global determinants such as US
equity returns, volatility and bond market risk premia. Therefore, sovereign risk is
also strongly subjected to spillovers from global risk environment and from other
markets, and the channels of which also allow risk spillovers from sovereign risk to
financial institutions.
2.3.2 Dynamics of Sovereign Risk Spillovers
There exists several channels of risk transmission between sovereign risk and financial
risk. As shown in the theoretical models of Gray et al. (2008), Drechsler et al. (2011),
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and Merton, Billio, Getmansky, Gray, Lo and Pelizzon (2013), explicit and implicit
guarantees of the sovereign countries create several potential linkages from sovereign
countries to financial institutions. As financial institutions hold public bonds and
general collateral on their balance sheet, a depreciation in value of the government
bonds can therefore affect financial institutions through the asset holding channel.
Downgrades of sovereign bonds can also adversely affect the funding conditions of
financial institutions. The value of the implicit guarantees provided by sovereign
countries can be diminished when the fiscal condition of the sovereign countries
are under distress. In addition, the presence of high systemic risk in the financial
sector creates pressure for recession in the real economy, which in turns strains public





A. Mark-to-market fall in value of govt bonds
B. Increase in bank funding costs







D. Mark-to-market fall in value of govt bonds
I. Increase in contingent liabilities of govt.
F. Equivalent to {A, B, C}
G. Counterparty
credit risk
H. Withdrawal of funding
I. Increase in contingent liabilities of govt.
Figure 2.3: Sovereign – Financial Institution Systemic Risk Spllovers
Source: Merton et al. (2013)
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Drechsler et al. (2011) documents the two-way feedback effect between sovereign
risk and the financial sector: government bailouts negatively impact the fiscal strength
of the sovereign, which in turn reduces the value of the government guarantees
implicit in the financial institutions and causes collateral damage to the banks’
public bond holdings. As a consequence, the CDS spreads of sovereign countries
and financial companies co-move strongly once the government has committed
excessively to financial guarantees. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) examine the excess
correlations of market series for banks and sovereign countries, and they find that
there is a stronger relationship of excess correlations between banks and their home
country, especially for GIIPS countries. The excess correlation is stronger when the
banks are undercapitalised, reliant on wholesale funding, or with higher proportion
of non-interest income. Gerlach, Schulz and Wolff (2010) and Dieckmann and
Plank (2012) find the evidence of such spillover effects of sovereign debt holding
and government contingent liabilities from the linkages of bank and sovereign CDS
series. In addition, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) finds that given the spillover
relationships from sovereign countries to financial institutions, the fiscal weakness
of sovereign countries can be manifested in the valuation of their domestic financial
institutions to be negatively correlated with their size, which instead of making them
“too-big-to-fail”, the fiscal weakness of sovereign countries make them “too-big-to-
save”. From the aspects of bilateral linkage spillovers of lead-lag relationships, Alter
and Schüler (2012) shows that prior to the financial sector bailout programs, changes
in the bank CDS spreads precede changes in the sovereign CDS spreads, whereas
after the bailout programs, this lead-lag relationship reverses in general, which
suggests the presence of sovereign spillovers. From the perspective of sovereign-
to-sovereign spillovers, Bai, Julliard and Yuan (2012) provides a model regarding
domestic and aggregate credit and liquidity shocks to economic fundamentals of
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sovereign countries. They find the shocks to economic fundamentals in the Global
Financial Crisis are triggered by liquidity risk while the shocks in the Eurozone
Sovereign Crisis are triggered by credit risk. In addition, from the dynamics of shocks
they find a “flight-to-liquidity” phenomenon as foreign liquidity shocks have negative
impact on the domestic liquidity, and domestic liquidity shocks also have negative
impacts on foreign liquidity level.
2.3.3 Measuring Sovereign Risk Spillovers
In terms of the theoretical and empirical frameworks of measuring the systemic
risk spillovers from the credit risk of sovereign countries, Drechsler et al. (2011)
constructs a theoretical model of interactions among a government, a financial sector
and a corporate sector, which models the dynamics of feedback loops between
distress of financial institutions and distress of sovereign countries. In a Global
Vector-Autoregressive (GVAR) model of Pesaran et al. (2004), Alessandri et al. (2009)
studies the systemic risk to the UK banking system and the macroeconomy from the
perspective of investigating the impact of default cascades of financial institutions.
From the perspective of the impact to sovereign distress, Caporale and Girardi (2013)
extends the GVAR model to study the dynamics of fiscal spillovers to sovereign
countries. In addition, in terms of how one market series is affected by another market
series, several studies analyse the transmission of information and risk between
markets using price discovery analysis and Granger causality analysis (Fontana and
Scheicher, 2010; Ammer and Cai, 2011; Palladini and Portes, 2011).
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2.4 Network Risk as A Source of Systemic Risk
2.4.1 Systemic Risk in Financial Network
Interconnectedness and Contagion
Network theory and studies on financial networks attempt to address the shortcom-
ings of the traditional approaches from the perspectives of direct pairwise links,
indirect interconnectedness, and network structures. Contagion is one of the most
important aspect of financial network regarding systemic risk. Studies on financial
networks address the dynamics of contagion by examining the interconnectedness
of institutions and markets. Although interconnectedness has been widely acknowl-
edged to be an important element of systemic risk, as discussed in Acemoglu et al.
(2015), there are conflicting views in earlier literature about the roles of network
interconnectedness in systemic risk. On one hand, under the same conditions, a
more interconnected financial network could diversify the negative impact to each
individual node (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Allen and Gale, 2000; Freixas et al.,
2000). On the other hand, with the evidence of recent financial crises, intercon-
nectedness is capable of facilitating the propagation of contagion and destabilising
the system (Vivier-Lirimont, 2006; Blume, Easley, Kleinberg, Kleinberg and Tardos,
2013). Elliott et al. (2014) discusses the three ingredients of risk cascades, first failures,
contagion (second round direct failures), and interconnection (subsequent rounds of
stresses), and two aspects of network topology: “integration” (the magnitude of which
institutions are exposed to each other) and “diversification” (the extent of which
the links are spread out). Different levels of integration and diversification affect
the three ingredients differently. Greater integration lowers the likelihood of first
failure of an institution as it reduces the dependence on the primitive assets of the
institution, where lower integration reduces the probability and extent of contagion.
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High diversification mitigates contagion impact on individual institutions as their
portfolios become close to market portfolios, as long as the impact of first failures
stays below a destabilising threshold. The argument about a critical threshold is also
supported by Acemoglu et al. (2015), which also shows that in the presence of a large
shock, it would be counterproductive for regulators to try to limit the extent and
nature of interbank linkages, whereas providing liquidity injection to the systemically
important financial institutions at the times of crisis would help contain the extent
of contagion. From an empirical perspective, Mistrulli (2011) also supports that a
complete market with high diversification are not always resilient to contagion shocks.
Network-induced Panics
Another aspect of financial networks in systemic risk concerns with the fact that
from a contractual perspective, a market player i can only know the direct contract
positions with i’s counterparties but not the contract positions of i’s counterparties
with their counterparties. However, these contracts are still indirectly linked back to
i. Brunnermeier (2009) discusses this problem of a “network gridlock risk” where
market players have no full knowledge about the indirect exposures that they face.
It creates extra funding needs or even creates self-fulfilling counterparty credit risk
when, without full knowledge of indirect network risk exposures, market participants
worry about their risk exposures to counterparties not being fully hedged due to
market distress. In a similar way, Freixas et al. (2000) shows that the payment system
is also vulnerable to gridlock risk. Babus (2016) discusses the mechanism of market
freeze in a network formation game and shows that the presence of frictions causes
small exogenous changes to end up with greater effects, which results in all agents
withdrawing from the network in equilibrium.
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2.4.2 Empirical Applications and Evidence
Country Aggregate Networks
The empirical researches on financial interconnectedness rely on the information
regarding the risk positions of nodes as well as the strength of pairwise linkages,
the data of which is often available from sector level or country level. The Bank
of International Settlements publishes yearly consolidated banking statistics which
provides aggregate cross-border holdings of lending/borrowing claims of the banking
industry of each country. Elliott et al. (2014) studies the cross holdings of six European
countries from the 2011 BIS consolidated data and find that under a scenario of Greece
distress, for the GIIPS countries Portugal is the first country to fail when contagion
occurs, whereas Italy would be the last of the six EU countries to fall due to its debt
holding portfolios are mostly debt of France and Germany. Said (2016) studies On a
country aggregate perspective, financial centers like the United States and the United
Kingdom form central hubs in the network, and distress of such hubs will result in the
collapse of the financial markets in all other countries. For applications of aggregate
cross-holdings using other types of data sets, Dehmamy, Buldyrev, Havlin, Stanley
and Vodenska (2014) uses the stress test exposure data from European Bank Authority
and studies a bipartite networks4 of financial institutions and assets in the context of
Eurozone Sovereign Crisis in 2011, and shows a herding effect where individual nodes
select the same set of parameters and behave similarity.
Interbank Cross-Holding Networks
Battiston, Puliga, Kaushik, Tasca and Caldarelli (2012) studies the network of debt
holding and equity investment for the top United States banks which received the
4A bipartite network is a network system with two distinctive sets of nodes. In the case of Dehmamy
et al. (2014), financial institutions constitute one set of nodes, whereas debts of sovereign countries
constitute the other set of nodes.
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emergency loans programs from 2008 to 2010, which shows that the debt holding
relationships of big commercial banks lead to a densely interconnected market where
each node is 1-2 steps away. Cont, Moussa and Santos (2013) studies the interbank
contagion dynamics using a dedicated dataset about the Brazilian banking system
regarding the mutual exposures of interbank participants in six snapshots from 2007
to 2008, where the authors find that systemic risk is concentrated on a few banks and
the outcome of contagion is heavily influenced by the heterogeneity of individual
banks. Other studies include Martinez-Jaramillo, Pérez, Embriz and Dey (2010) for
the Mexican interbank market and Bonaldi, Hortaçsu and Kastl (2015) for the auction
bids of participating banks in the main refinancing operations of the European Central
Bank. One of the limitations of these studies is that it requires specifically mandated
dataset to obtain the particular exposure positions for individual participants, and
often restricted to several discrete market snapshots and certain types of exposures,
limiting the replicability of their works. As previously documented network effect
is not limited to the tangible interbank borrowing/lending relationships, but also
through movements in mark-to-market asset prices as well as market confidence by
credit risk and liquidity funding risk, and to a wider range of market participants,
including broker-dealers and insurance companies.
Reconstructed Networks
Since financial institutions do not disclose their mutual exposures due to confiden-
tiality issues, it is difficult for researchers to obtain the data for institutions’ actual
pairwise lending and borrowing positions without private and specially mandated
datasets, meaning that the actual network structure remains partially known or un-
known. However, there are simulation-based approaches which try to “reconstruct”
the network structure using partial information such as aggregated positions of
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institutions, sectors, or countries in the network. The Maximum Entropy method and
its variants (Upper and Worms, 2004; Anand, Craig and Von Peter, 2015; Musmeci,
Battiston, Caldarelli, Puliga and Gabrielli, 2013), which assumes a dense and fully con-
nected network where co-dependence of nodes are generally homogeneous, generates
simulated adjacency matrices under constraints such as aggregate borrowing/lending
positions, and reconstruct the underlying adjacency matrix using a matrix that can
minimise the divergence distance between the guess matrix and the target matrix.
Recent applications using Maximum Entropy method include Mistrulli (2011) with
Italian banks, Anand et al. (2015) with Germany banks, and Di Gangi, Lillo and Pirino
(2015) with US commercial banks. However, as discussed in Cont et al. (2013) and
Roukny (2016) for interbank contractual links, and in Said (2016) for cross-border
aggregate markets, exhibits high heterogeneity among nodes, with links not highly
sparse for the assumptions of Maximum Entropy method to hold. Hałaj and Kok
(2013) also notes that Maximum Entropy methods would underestimate contagion
risk when the tail characteristics are not represented due to the model’s averaging tail
values.
Correlation Networks
Another branch of studies that is more closely linked to the systemic risk measures
concerns with the network linkage aspect of market indicators, i.e. the formulation of
spillover linkages by market co-movement. Billio, Getmansky, Lo and Pelizzon (2012)
studies the such a network formulation of equity market prices revealed by linear and
nonlinear Granger Causality Analysis, among institutions in the four major sectors of
the US financial market: commercial banks, broker-dealers, insurers, and hedge funds.
The study shows that there exists a massive increase in interconnectedness during
crisis when individual institutions respond to market distress synchronously, and
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such increase in interconnectedness further provides good predictive power for the
loss of market capitalisation. Billio, Getmansky, Gray, Lo, Merton and Pelizzon (2012)
proposes a Contingent Claim Analysis framework to study the network interactions
of sovereign countries, commercial banks and insurance companies in the CDS
market, in which the network formulation is also conducted by Granger Causality
Analysis. Hautsch et al. (2012) and Betz et al. (2015) study the tail dependence
network formulated by the co-dependence of value-at-risk series where the value-at-
risk network is constructed using a variable selection mechanism based on the “least
absolute shrinkage and selection operator” (LASSO) method (Tibshirani, 1996). In
a similar approach, Demirer, Diebold, Liu and Yilmaz (2015) constructs a globalised
banking network of stock returns with a VAR model regularised by the LASSO
method. In the absence of direct knowledge of bilateral exposures and channels
of linkages, statistical pairwise correlation relationships provide valuable indirect
information about the network aspects of systemic spillovers. Additionally, given the
forwarding looking nature of financial markets, econometric methods provide more
immediate and actionable measures of systemic risk.
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Chapter 3
Systemic Risk Spillovers – Evidence
from CDS Market
3.1 Introduction
The past decade has witnessed a massive surge in the turbulence of the global financial
system, triggered by a series of financial and economic crises, e.g. the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, the Global Financial Crisis, and the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis.
Extensive research on defining, measuring and regulating systemic risk from financial
institutions and sovereign countries has been undertaken since then. One aspect
of the studies on systemic risk is the risk spillover effects, as empirical evidence
shows that both financial distresses in financial institutions and sovereign credit
risk can transcend national borders rapidly, reflecting an extremely high degree of
interconnectedness among financial institutions as well as sovereign countries within
a larger system.
Policy-makers and regulators are working on identifying the financial institutions
that could contribute the most to the overall risk of the financial system that can
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impose great threat to the safe-and sound-running of the financial system. These
institutions can be “too-big-to-fail” or “too-interconnected-to-fail” when they are
under distress, so policy-makers are also designing a new regulatory framework for
these institutions to ensure global financial stability and to prevent, or mitigate, future
episodes of systemic risk spillovers.
In this study, we focus on a particular aspect of the systemic risk of the financial
market – the systemic risk spillover effects from sovereign countries to the financial
institutions, in the context of the Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Sovereign
Crisis. The primary interest of our research is to investigate the interlinkage between
the sovereign countries and the major financial institutions (including insurance
companies and banks) in the financial system, specifically the systemic risk spillover
effects and the measure of their interconnectedness.
Our research strategy is two-fold. In the first stage, we construct risk measures
of systemic risk spillovers in a system comprised by sovereign countries as well as
financial institutions and examine the spillover patterns of our risk measure. We
then investigate the potential determinants of risk spillovers from the credit risk of
sovereign countries to the financial institutions. We use “Conditional Value-at-Risk”
to measure the risk dependencies and spillovers which is proposed by Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011, 2016) in their studies of the systemic risk spillovers among bank
holding companies in the United States, and we extend this methodology to the study
of spillovers between sovereign countries and financial institutions.
We define the risk of default of an entity in the system as the entity’s own “credit
risk”, and the risk of influencing other entities to default as the entity’s “systemic
risk”. Specifically, the entity i’s “systemic risk spillovers” to entity j are constructed
as the Conditional Value-at-Risk of j from the median state of the risk of i to the
distressed state of i, which is measured as ∆CoVaRj|i. We then construct CoRisk as
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the measure for the “overall systemic contributions” of i as the weighted sum of all
the risk spillovers from i to all js.
In order to measure the idiosyncratic credit risk of both the sovereign countries
and financial institutions, we use credit default swaps series as the main subjects of
our study. Specifically, we construct ∆CoVaRreceptor|originator as the measure of the
marginal risk spillovers from an “originator” entity to a “receptor” entity. In our
study, ∆CoVaRFI|SOV measures marginal systemic risk contributions of a sovereign
country to a financial institution. We first construct our risk measures for sovereign
countries and financial institutions with quantile regression of Koenker (2005) and has
been applied to constructing value-at-risk type of measures pioneered by Engle and
Manganelli (2004) followed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and others.
We contribute to the literature in the following ways:
Firstly, previous studies on the sovereign and financial CDS market focus on
the risk components and determinants of spreads, as in Pan and Singleton (2008);
Longstaff et al. (2011), or the interactions between the bond market and the CDS
market, as in Ammer and Cai (2011); Palladini and Portes (2011). We address the
problem of distinguishing the default risk of market entities and the spillovers of
default risk with the ∆CoVaR framework, which models the risk spillovers from the
tail distributions of market series. We extend the ∆CoVaR approach to the studies of
CDS spreads, in order to understand the effects of risk spillovers from sovereign CDS
market to the financial CDS market.
Secondly, we investigate the influence of state intervention measures in influencing
the risk spillover dynamics from sovereign countries to financial institutions. The
impact of the distress financial institutions to the sovereign countries by the interven-
tion channels is briefly discussed in the studies of De Bruyckere et al. (2013), and our
analysis on the sovereign-to-corporate path complements De Bruyckere et al. (2013)
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in understanding the consequences of state intervention measures in the Eurozone
Sovereign Crisis.
Thirdly, we contribute to the CoVaR literature that is one of the key analytical
framework in systemic risk analysis by examining the structural stability of the
quantile-based CoVaR risk measures from the quantile structural stability test of Qu
(2008) and Oka and Qu (2011).
The rest of the sections are organised as follows. In Section 3.2 we discuss the
related literature and our contributions. In Section 3.3 we discuss the methodology
framework used to construct systemic risk spillover measures and estimation strategy.
In Section 3.4, we report the sources of data and construction of variables. In
Section 3.5, we discuss the results related to the construction of the systemic risk
measures. In Section 3.7, we examined the potential determinants of the sovereign
countries’ systemic risk contributions. In Section 3.8, as a robustness check, we discuss
the structural stability of the risk measures. In Section 3.9 we discuss the conclusions
of this study and offer policy implications.
3.2 Related Literature
Our study relates to the literature of measuring systemic risk using market-based
information. The risk spillovers measure of ∆CoVaR by Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2011, 2016) has inspired a series of studies regarding the systemic risk contribution
of financial institutions and their exposures to systemic risk. Sharifova (2012) studies
the cross-border spillover effects of US and European banks by their equity returns
and shows that the firm-specific characteristics such as asset size and leverage level to
have positive impacts on the risk spillovers. Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012) and López-
Espinosa, Rubia, Valderrama and Antón (2013) examine the risk contributions of major
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financial institutions and find that the institution’s reliance on short-term wholesale
funding plays an important role in determining its systemic risk contributions. Weiß
and Mühlnickel (2014) studies the systemic contributions and exposures of insurance
companies and find that an insurer’s exposures to systemic risk can be largely
explained by its reliance on investment income and non-policyholder liabilities,
and the insurer’s size is found to be the major factor in determining its systemic
contributions. Brunnermeier, Dong and Palia (2012) studies the impact of non-
interest income of the banks to their contributions of systemic risk and find banks
with higher non-interest income and rely on non-interest operations contribute more
systemic risk than other banks, and among the different categories of non-interest
income, investment banking income and trading income contribute most to the bank’s
systemic risk. We contribute to this strand of literature by analysing the systemic risk
exposure of financial institutions from the perspective of spillovers from sovereign
risk.
In addition, our study relates to the theoretical and empirical studies of quantile
regression models. Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978) lays the theoretical framework
and statistical properties of quantile regression techniques, and Chernozhukov (2005)
extends the statistical properties of quantile models to extreme quantiles. Cher-
nozhukov and Umantsev (2001) and Chernozhukov and Du (2006) provide theoretical
background of Conditional Value-at-Risk techniques using quantile models. Kupiec
(1995), Christoffersen, Hahn and Inoue (2001), and Christoffersen and Pelletier
(2004) provide the backtesting techniques for value-at-risk models, and Engle and
Manganelli (2004) provides the value-at-risk backtest for quantile models. Engle
and Manganelli (2004) also proposes a dynamic quantile-based value-at-risk method,
which is extended to the case of conditional value at risk by White, Kim and
Manganelli (2015). Qu (2008) and Oka and Qu (2011) apply the structural change test
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of Bai and Perron (1998) to quantile regression models, and its effect in detecting the
locations of breaks and the impacts on regression coefficients have been documented
in Oka and Qu (2011) with the time series models for US real GDP growth rate and
in Furno and Vistocco (2013) with the panel quantile models of OECD-PISA student
tests. We contribute to the literature of quantile regression models by examining the
structural stability of the quantile-based ∆CoVaR risk measures.
Lastly, our study also relates to the studies on CDS market and risk spillovers.
Duffie (1999) provide the theoretical pricing model for CDS spreads, how the credit
risk of the underlying entity can be measured by its CDS spreads. Duffie et al. (2003)
then expands the theoretical model to the case of sovereign CDS spreads and Longstaff
et al. (2011) provide the empirical evidence about the effects of macro-financial factors
on different components of sovereign CDS. Chan-Lau and Gregoriou (2008) and Chan-
Lau (2010) propose a systemic risk measure CoRisk with CDS spreads as a proxy for
the probability of defaults, and is estimated using a quantile regression model setting,
which is later generalised in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and is also implemented
in our study. Huang et al. (2012b,a) propose a distress insurance premium where the
probability of default is also estimated from the CDS spreads of financial institutions.
There are other studies whose measures of the probability of default are constructed
in composite ways such as Forte (2011) and Merton et al. (2013) also rely on CDS
information to supplement other indicators, such as stock prices or balance-sheet
information. Based on the theoretical and methodological frameworks of previous
studies, we contribute to the analysis of systemic defaults in the CDS market by
providing evidence of risk spillovers from sovereign CDS series to financial CDS
series. In addition, we provide evidence on how the economic fundamentals and




3.3.1 ∆CoVaR as a measure for risk spillovers
∆CoVaR by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016)
provides a way of measuring the risk spillovers between two series1. In the context of
our study, denote sit as the CDS spreads of an entity (financial institution or sovereign
country) i, thus an unusually high sit suggests a high probability of default for i, which
can be represented by the value-at-risk VaRiq at the qth-quantile.
Pr(sit ≥ VaRiq) = q (3.1)
In contrast to the VaR of asset returns, where the lower tail of asset returns are
the quantiles of interest, we are interested in the upper tail (95% or 99%) of CDS
spread, i.e. the probability of default given an event of (1 − q) rarity. We can then
use “Conditional Value-at-Risk” or CoVaR, from Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), to
represent the distress scenario of entity j conditional on the event of entity i’s distress.
Pr(sjt ≥ CoVaR
j|i
q | sit = VaRiq) = q (3.2)
∆CoVaRj|iq , the difference between the CoVaR conditional on VaRiq and the CoVaR
conditional on the median state of i, then measures the increment in CoVaRj|iq when
i moves from its median state to its value-at-risk state. In our case ∆CoVaRj|iq is the






1 We discuss the concept behind ∆CoVaR in Section 2.2.3.
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Therefore in the context of our study, we use ∆CoVaRj|iq as the measure of spillovers
of risk from the distress of country i to financial institution j.
3.3.2 Estimation of Time-varying ∆CoVaR
Quantile Regression Modelling of CoVaR
In a linear quantile model setting, we assume the returns for institution j have a linear
factor structure as the following, where sj and si are the CDS spreads of j and i, Mt is
the vector of conditioning state variables, and ∆Zjt+1 is the N(0, 1) disturbance term:
sjt+1 = φ0 + Mtφ1 + s
i
t+1φ2 + (φ3 + Mtφ4)∆Z
j
t+1 (3.4)
From the definition of value-at-risk, CoVaRj|iq can then be expressed as the inverse






(q|Mt, sit+1 = VaRiq,t+1) (3.5)
F−1
sjt+1





= αq + Mtγq + sit+1βq (3.7)
We can then use quantile regression model of Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978) to solve





∣∣∣sjt+1 − αq −Mtγq − sit+1βq∣∣∣ when (sjt+1 − αq −Mtγq − sit+1βq) ≥ 0
(1− q)




We estimate CoVaR using quantile regressions which provides time-varying measures
of VaR and CoVaR. The basic estimation strategy is implemented as follows: 1) we
first estimate the VaRs for a pair of “originator”(an entity that is potentially causing
systemic risk spillovers) and “receptor”(an entity that is likely to receive the spillovers
from “originator”) from their CDS series respectively; 2) we than estimate the CoVaR
for the “receptor” conditional on the VaR of the “originator”; 3) the ∆CoVaR for the
“receptor | originator” pair will then be calculated; 4) after calculating ∆CoVaR for
each pair of “receptor | originator” in the sample2, we calculate the weighted sum
of all the sovereign “originators” to measure the overall systemic spillovers from one
sovereign country to all financial institutions in the sample.
Specifically, for a “originator” entity in a “receptor | originator” pair, we estimate
the following equation using quantile regression estimation, where sjt is the CDS
spread for institution j. In the following text, we denote the “receptor | originator”







t−1 + εt (3.9)
where sit is the CDS spreads for the i entity, Mt−1 is the set of lagged state variables
(discussed in Section 3.4). The coefficients α̂iq and γ̂iq are obtained under a specific








2a “originator” in one pair can be the “receptor” in another, as well as the “receptor” where the
“originator” is the “receptor” in the first pair
3We are interested in the upper quantiles of the CDS spreads, because an increase in the CDS spreads
indicates a worsening of the credit risk of the entity which is also likely to cause risk spillovers. In
the literature where asset returns are used to estimate the VaRs and CoVaRs the downside risks are
considered.
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For a j|i pair, we then estimate the CDS spreads for the j entity with the set of state









t−1 + εt (3.11)




q from estimating the equation above, and calculate









As the measure of the marginal increase in the Conditional Value-at-Risk for j en-










In the last step, in order to understand the systemic risk spillovers from sovereign
countries to financial institutions, following the approach in Chan-Lau (2010), we
construct an indicator measuring the systemic risk contributions for the sovereign















We use the total assets of the j financial institutions as the weights in the equation
above.
47
3.4 Data and Variables
3.4.1 CDS Data
We included 30 sovereign countries and 49 financial institutions in our study sample.
The Thomson Reuters CDS database from Datastream contains both the sovereign and
corporate credit default swaps data from December 2007. The sovereign countries
included in our studies contain: 1) countries that are considered as European “core”
countries in the Eurozone (Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands); 2)
countries that are considered as “distress” sometimes during the Eurozone Sovereign
Crises (Cyprus, Greece4, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain); 3) other member states in
the European Union or in the Scandinavian region (Denmark, Sweden, Norway,
Finland, Iceland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia); and 4) other major financial centres in the world
economies (US, UK, Japan, China). We focus on the first two groups of countries
while using the last two groups as comparisons. The financial institutions included in
our study consists of the institutions that are defined as the “Systemically Important
Financial Institutions” by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), including insurance
companies and banks/bank holding companies (Financial Stability Board, 2013a,b).
We also expand this set of institutions with a set of banks that are included in the
study of Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012).
4the sovereign CDS for Greece discontinued in early 2012 after a dramatic climb in the series which
concluded in a “credit event” that the sovereign debt restructuring of the Greek government bond by
the EU and IMF and the repayment to the protection buyers. To construct a continuous series for the
Greek sovereign CDS, we follow the approach of Buchholz and Tonzer (2013) to splice it with the CDS
for the National Bank of Greece.
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3.4.2 State Variables
For the state variables to be included in the first stage construction of risk measures, we
collect variables that reflects the movement in the financial markets in order to account
for the fluctuations of the CDS series. The state variables represent factors in the
financial markets that influence the movement of the credit default spread series. The
choice of state variables are widely adopted in the previous studies regarding other
market-based systemic risk measures (Chan-Lau and Gregoriou (2008), and Huang
et al. (2012a)) and specifically measures involving CoVaR methodology (Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011), Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012) and Girardi and Tolga Ergün
(2013)5), and has been applied to the studies of sovereign credit default swaps (Fong
and Wong (2012),Pan and Singleton (2008), and Heinz and Sun (2014)). For descriptive
statistics of the state variables, see Table 3.1.
The state variables are divided into 7 categories:
1. Financial Market Volatility, proxied by stock market volatility indices:
(a) VIX (sv vix): volatility index for S&P500 index
(b) VDAX (sv vdax): volatility index for DAX index
2. Financial Market Liquidity, proxied by the difference between 3m repo rate and
3m bond rate:
(a) Liquidity in US Market (sv liq us)
(b) Liquidity in Europe Market (sv liq eu)
3. Changes in the short-term government bond yield spread:
5 in Girardi and Tolga Ergün (2013), the authors’ primary analysis is done using Multivariate
GARCH to construct CoVaR and they also use Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011)’s choice of state
variables for comparisons.
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(a) Changes in the 3 month US government bill rate (sv d3m us)
(b) Changes in the 3 month weighted Eurozone government bond yield spread
(sv d3m eu), obtained from the European Central Bank
4. Term Premium, proxied by the changes in the slope of the yield curve, measured
as the yield spread between 10 year bond rate and 3 month bond rate:
(a) Term Premium of the US government bond (sv trm us)
(b) Term Premium of the Eurozone government bond (sv trm eu)
5. Financial Market Credit Risk Premium (sv crt), measured as the spread between
Moody’s BAA corporate index and 10yr US government bond
6. Financial market return
(a) Financial market return of the US market (sv mkt us), proxied by the return
of the S & P 500 index
(b) Financial market return of the EU market (sv mkt eu), proxied by the return
of the FTSEEU100 index
7. Volatility of the currency (sv cv gbp, sv cv eur, sv cv cny, sv cv jpy), measured
as the Implied volatility for the currency options
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for State Variables
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the state variables to be included in the quantile regression
estimation of VaR and CoVaR. The constructed variables of risk measures starts from January 2008 to
October 2014 in weekly frequency. For the definition of the variables see discussions in Section 3.4.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
sv l vix 23.82 10.76 312
sv l vdax 25.78 10.21 312
sv l liq us 0.19 0.16 312
sv l liq eu 0.07 0.09 312
sv l d3m us -0.01 0.03 312
sv l d3m eu 0.00 0.02 312
sv l trm us 2.51 0.69 312
sv l trm eu 2.16 0.88 312
sv l crt 3.25 0.83 312
sv l mkt us 0.27 0.38 312
sv l mkt eu 0.84 0.58 312
sv l cv gbp 10.77 3.65 312
sv l cv eur 11.85 3.29 312
sv l cv cny 2.72 1.35 312
sv l cv jpy 11.93 2.81 312
3.4.3 Macroeconomic and State Intervention Variables
In the second stage of our analysis, we investigate the determinants of the systemic
risk contributions of the sovereign countries during the Global Financial Crisis and
Eurozone Sovereign Crisis. Specifically, we examine two categories of variables:
the sovereign countries’ macroeconomic characteristics(including the debt to GDP
ratio, fiscal surplus/deficit to GDP ratio, GDP growth rate), and the European
countries’ intervention schemes to “bail out” troubled financial institutions. The data
for state intervention schemes is reported by European Commission and fall into
four categories: guarantee on liabilities, recapitalisation, direct short term liquidity
support, and asset relief measures.
The guarantee on liabilities is a public support against the potential losses of
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the newly issued or renewed debt instruments(excluding subordinated debt) of the
financial institutions which help restore the financial stability and provision of credit
and lending to the real economy by alleviating the fire sales and liquidity constraints
in times of distress. The recapitalisation schemes include capital injections from a
national scheme or an ad hoc with the acquisitions of stakes by the fiscal authority.
Asset relief measures aim at relieving the toxic or impaired assets of the financial
institutions in the form of purchasing the assets or offering guarantee against the losses
of the assets. Direct short term liquidity support refer to the measures to provide direct
liquidity to financial institutions.
3.4.4 Data frequencies and Sample period
In terms of data frequencies, in the first stage of our analysis, the credit default swaps
data are collected in daily frequencies and converted to weekly frequencies. For
other data that are not available in weekly frequencies we use spline interpolation
technique to create continuous series. In the second stage where our regression
consists of the CoRisk measures and macroeconomic characteristics, we collapse the
CoRisk and sovereign CDS data to quarterly frequency in order to be compatible with
the macroeconomic variables that are in lower frequencies.
For the estimation of risk measures, our sample starts from January 2008 to October
2014 with 312 weekly observations.
3.5 Estimation Results
In the first stage of our analysis, we construct the risk measures discussed in
Section 3.3. Then we discussed the estimation results and the relative characteristics
of these risk measures.
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3.5.1 Quantile Model Fit
Firstly, we report the summarised results on the using quantile regression estimation
for fitting VaR and CoVaR in Table 3.2 of all the equations. For the 79 VaR models
(with respect to each entity) and 6162 CoVaR models (with respect to each receptor-
originator pair), we report the median values of fitted coefficients, the standard
errors (using Huber Sandwich Heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators), as well as the
pseudo-R2 goodness-of-fit of these models. As discussed in Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2016) and earlier in Chernozhukov and Umantsev (2001), the state variables are
included in the quantile models as conditioning variables to control for the mean and
volatility of the risk measures, and different entities are exposed to these factors in
different ways. Therefore the median values can only summarise the entities’ general
exposures to state variables.
We divide the statistics into SOV group for sovereign countries and FI group for
financial institutions. As in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), we find factors regarding
market volatility, liquidity risk and changes in short term government bond rates to
have positive impact on the risk measures. The risk measures of financial institutions
are more exposed to changes in the US bond rate whereas the measures for sovereign
countries are more exposed to the EU bond rate. In addition, the levels of pseudo-R2
of the fitted models in our model specifications are consistent with those reported in
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016, p.1721).
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Table 3.2: Summary For Quantile Fit:: VaR and CoVaR.
Table 3.2 reports the regression fit summary for VaR and CoVaR. Values are reported in median values
of all estimated equations. The columns for VaR/CoVaR report the median of coefficient values and
t-statistics of all estimated equations, and the columns for VaRSOV/CoVaRSOV and VaRFI/CoVaRFI
report equations where the receptor entity is a sovereign country/financial institution respectivelly.
Variable VaR VaRSOV VaRFI CoVaR CoVaRSOV CoVaRFI
constant -8.63 -16.51 4.12 -5.05 -14.70 10.95
(-0.19) (-0.64) ( 0.09) (-0.13) (-0.52) ( 0.20)
spillover 0.34 0.25 0.45
( 3.19) ( 2.99) ( 3.20)
sv l vix 0.92 0.21 1.16 0.47 0.06 0.81
(-1.87) (-1.83) (-1.84) (-2.06) (-2.16) (-1.42)
sv l vdax 1.28 0.67 1.64 0.87 0.48 1.21
( 2.47) ( 2.00) ( 2.92) ( 1.95) ( 1.38) ( 2.37)
sv l liq us 1.82 2.76 3.85 2.89 3.04 0.46
( 2.13) ( 1.41) ( 2.18) ( 1.23) ( 1.36) ( 1.03)
sv l liq eu 12.20 6.39 19.73 4.32 3.85 9.43
( 2.42) ( 2.37) ( 2.54) ( 2.25) ( 2.19) ( 2.34)
sv l d3m us 62.60 1.94 128.78 28.70 7.22 95.18
(-1.82) (-1.19) (-2.16) (-1.56) ( 1.22) (-2.43)
sv l d3m eu 61.12 111.16 11.19 45.74 65.69 13.66
(-1.83) (-1.19) (-1.81) (-1.63) (-1.97) (-1.18)
sv l trm us -2.27 -2.18 -4.63 -1.25 -1.06 -2.61
(-1.89) (-1.92) (-1.47) (-1.51) (-1.48) (-1.90)
sv l trm eu -0.87 1.16 -2.70 0.35 1.05 -0.36
(-0.21) ( 0.48) (-0.58) ( 0.09) ( 0.38) (-0.11)
sv l crt -2.18 -0.52 -5.67 -0.97 -0.16 -1.09
(-0.56) (-0.27) (-1.29) (-0.26) (-0.04) (-0.30)
sv l mkt us 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00
( 0.23) ( 0.68) ( 0.21) ( 0.16) ( 0.74) (-0.08)
sv l mkt eu -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(-0.14) (-0.38) (-0.35) (-0.16) (-0.21) (-0.32)
sv l cv gbp -0.20 -0.09 -0.05 -0.24 0.06 -0.16
(-0.19) (-0.03) (-0.05) (-0.21) ( 0.05) (-0.11)
sv l cv eur 0.98 1.26 0.59 0.61 0.68 -0.01
( 0.91) ( 1.03) ( 0.56) ( 0.59) ( 0.83) (-0.01)
sv l cv cny 0.85 0.05 0.83 0.74 0.03 1.39
( 0.53) ( 0.01) ( 0.52) ( 0.44) ( 0.02) ( 0.66)
sv l cv jpy 0.12 -0.19 0.31 0.06 -0.19 0.26
( 0.22) (-0.50) ( 0.47) ( 0.08) (-0.36) ( 0.32)
Pseudo R2 0.38 0.41 0.37 0.45 0.46 0.46
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3.5.2 Likelihood-ratio Tests
In order to further assess the specifications of state variables, In table 3.3 we report the
proportions of models where the p-values of which are below the respective levels
of significance in likelihood-ratio tests. For each of the state variables, we use a
likelihood-ratio test to compare the goodness-of-fit of the unconstrained model using
full state variable specifications with a nested model where the specified variable
is removed. We report the proportions of models that reject the null hypothesis of
indifference between the two models, thus a high proportion suggests the significance
of the variable in the model fit and justify its presence in the model specifications.
Overall we find most of the variables have good explanatory powers, among which
the volatility measures have the greatest effect in the model specifications.
Table 3.3: Summary of Likelihood Ratio Tests for Quantile Regression Models
Table 3.3 reports the proportion of likelihood ratio tests that are under the specified level of significance.
The test is conducted between the full unrestricted model and the nested restricted model with the
specified variable removed. The test null hypothesis states indifference in goodness-of-fit between the
two models. The rejection of the null then suggests the removal of the specified variable has significant
effect on the model fit.
Variable VaR CoVaR
≤ 0.10 ≤ 0.05 ≤ 0.01 ≤ 0.10 ≤ 0.05 ≤ 0.01
sv l vix 0.7692 0.6795 0.5897 0.7058 0.6382 0.5168
sv l vdax 0.9103 0.8974 0.8462 0.8125 0.7712 0.6963
sv l liq us 0.4359 0.3974 0.3077 0.4985 0.4199 0.2809
sv l liq eu 0.3205 0.2436 0.1282 0.4331 0.3332 0.2053
sv l d3m us 0.5897 0.5385 0.4103 0.5871 0.5098 0.3751
sv l d3m eu 0.5897 0.5385 0.3590 0.5513 0.4822 0.3535
sv l trm us 0.6410 0.6282 0.4615 0.6029 0.5251 0.3958
sv l trm eu 0.4231 0.3205 0.2051 0.4557 0.3615 0.2274
sv l crt 0.6923 0.6410 0.4872 0.6414 0.5808 0.4564
sv l mkt us 0.5000 0.4359 0.2949 0.5538 0.4740 0.3283
sv l mkt eu 0.3462 0.2692 0.2308 0.4560 0.3691 0.2431
sv l cv gbp 0.5385 0.4231 0.2821 0.5543 0.4764 0.3355
sv l cv eur 0.6154 0.4744 0.3846 0.6099 0.5373 0.4224
sv l cv cny 0.4487 0.3718 0.2949 0.4978 0.4098 0.2822
sv l cv jpy 0.5128 0.4231 0.3333 0.4752 0.3828 0.2572
No. models 79 6162
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3.6 Credit Risk and Systemic Risk Spillovers
3.6.1 VaR, CoVaR, and ∆CoVaR
As discussed in previous Section 2.2.2 and Section 3.3, the VaR of the entity’s
CDS spreads measures the credit risk level of the underlying sovereign/corporate
bond, whereas CoVaRj|i adjusts entity j’s value-at-risk conditioning on i’s value-at-
risk. ∆CoVaRj|i then measures the increments in CoVaRj|i with the shifting in the
conditioning event.
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics Of Fitted Variables.
Table 3.4 reports the descriptive statistics of the risk measures using quantile regression. The
construction method is described in Section 3.3
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Obs.
VaR 24.35 34.01 24,336
CoVaR 30.41 38.19 1,873,872
CoVaRSOV 28.25 33.47 696,696
CoVaRFI 31.69 40.66 1,177,176
∆CoVaR 7.97 10.62 1,873,872
∆CoVaRSOV 8.70 11.16 696,696
∆CoVaRFI 6.73 9.52 1,177,176
Table 3.4 reports the descriptive statistics for the respective estimated risk mea-
sures. In our sample, we observe that on average the 0.95th-quantile VaR for CDS
spreads in 24.35 basis points6. When accounting for the event of the distress of the
“originator”, the CoVaR of a “receptor” is higher than its VaR. Lastly, we observe that
the average risk spillovers from a sovereign country ∆CoVaRj|SOV (8.7 bp) is higher
than that from a financial institution ∆CoVaRj|FI (6.73 bp).
61 basis point (bp) in the CDS spread accounts for 0.01% of the per-annum notional fee of the CDS
contract. An investor A that buys a $1,000 worth of CDS contract on the underlying bond value of
entity B from C at 5 bp pays the entity of issuance (C) $5 as an annual fee. Should B defaults on its debt,
A is repaid by $1,000 from C. Therefore, when B has a high chance of defaults, C demands high CDS
spreads.
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In Figure 3.1, we report the VaR measures of financial institutions and sovereign
countries, and the risk spillovers of CoVaR and ∆CoVaR from the sovereign countries
to financial institutions. As the figures show, the VaRs of financial institutions peak
around late 2008 during the Global Financial Crisis whereas the VaRs of sovereign
countries increase in late 2008 but climb up again in around late 2011 to early 2012
for some countries (especially Italy and Spain in the figure, including other European
sovereign countries that are considered to be “distressed” at certain stages during
the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis). In terms of the CoVaRs, the fluctuations around
the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis increase as the risks and distresses of the sovereign
countries are incorporated into the risk measures, though the influence varies from
country to country.
As for the risk spillovers measured as ∆CoVaRs from sovereign countries to finan-
cial institutions, patterns vary as Germany’s risk contributions are only prominent
for a very short time around 2009 whereas Spain, Italy as well as France all had
large increase in risk spillovers to the financial institutions. For France and Italy,
risk contributions during the Financial Crisis are comparatively smaller than the
contributions around the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis which peaked around 2012 when
the outlooks for the economic and political status of the European Union were at the
most uncertain level. As the several rounds of bail out packages from the European
Commission and IMF started help stabilise the distressed economies, combined with
the efforts of ECB in providing continuous liquidity support to boost interbank
lending, the ∆CoVaR risk measures started decreasing and stabilising till the end of
































































































































































Delta CoVaR, Financial Institutions conditional on Italy's VaR
Figure 3.1: Examples Of Systemic Risk Contribution.
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3.6.2 CoRisk
We calculate the weighted sum of the ∆CoVaRs from the same country i to all other
financial institution js in the sample, as country i’s overall risk spillovers and systemic
contributions of CoRisk. In Table 3.5 we report the summary statistics for the risk
measures. We observe that Italy, Portugal and Spain have the largest median spillover
effects (5 bp), followed by Germany and France (4 bp).
Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics for CoRisk.
obs. mean sd median min max
Austria 312 3 2 2 0 9
Belgium 312 3 2 3 1 10
Bulgaria 312 3 2 2 0 13
Croatia 312 3 2 2 0 12
Cyprus 312 1 1 1 0 4
Czech Republic 312 1 2 1 0 9
Denmark 312 3 3 3 1 17
Estonia 312 3 3 1 0 15
France 312 4 2 4 0 10
Germany 312 4 2 4 0 15
Greece 312 2 1 2 0 5
Hungary 312 3 2 2 1 12
Iceland 312 3 4 2 0 27
Ireland 312 4 3 4 0 12
Italy 312 5 3 5 2 14
Latvia 312 3 3 2 0 17
Lithuania 312 4 4 3 1 21
Netherlands 312 3 2 3 0 12
Norway 312 2 2 2 0 12
Poland 312 2 1 2 0 9
Portugal 312 6 4 5 1 16
Slovakia 312 3 3 2 2 17
Slovenia 312 3 1 2 0 7
Spain 312 5 2 5 0 13
Sweden 312 3 3 2 0 14
UK 312 3 2 3 1 11
US 312 2 1 2 1 6
Japan 312 3 1 3 0 8
China 312 2 2 2 0 13
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In Figure 3.2 we compare the evolutions of these risk measures between two groups
of countries: the “core” European countries7 that are traditionally considered as the
central structure of the European Union without signals of default level distress of
their economies; and the “distressed” European countries8 that have received any
forms of financial aid or considered as in economic distresses during the period of our
study. In Figure 3.3 we compare the VaR of sovereign countries and their CoRisk as the
comparison between sovereign risk and systemic risk spillovers. In Figure 3.2 we find
that there is a positive response of CoRisk to the outbreak of Global Financial Crisis
in October 2008 which help push up CoRisk which decline at the beginning of 2009.
CoRisk levels rise up again for three consecutive waves following the distresses of
the government debts of Greece, Ireland, and Italy, and declines following the bailout
packages and austerity measures in May 2010 for Greece, November 2010 for Ireland,
and November 2011 for Italy. Comparing CoRisk measures within their country
groups, the risk contributions of the “core” countries during the Global Financial
Crisis and the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis are in a comparable order of magnitude
whereas the contributions of the “distressed” group of countries grow significantly
higher during the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis than during the Global Financial Crisis,
with the exceptions of Greece and Cyprus.
A country’s own sovereign risk does not necessarily fully reflected in its risk
spillovers, as we find in the case of Greece. In Figure 3.3 we can see the VaR of
Greece surpassing other VaRs by a large degree, signifying the extraordinary level
of sovereign risk in Greek government bond and the market fear about the fiscal
unsustainability in Greece. However its CoRisk level is relatively moderate comparing
with other distressed countries such as Italy and Portugal.
7Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and UK
8the “GIIPS” countries of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, with the addition of Cyprus due
to the Cypriot Banking Crisis of 2012-2013
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Systemic Risk Contributions of Core Countries in Europe






















Systemic Risk Contributions of Distressed Countries in Europe
Figure 3.2: Evolution Of Systemic Risk Contribution For Different Sovereign Countries.




















































































































































































Measuring systemic risk spillovers of sovereign countries
Figure 3.3: Comparing Sovereign Credit Risk And Systemic Risk Contribution.
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3.7 Disentangling Sovereign Systemic Risk Spillovers
In this section, we investigate the relationships between the systemic risk spillovers of
sovereign countries and their macro-financial states, and examine that to what extent
can the macro-financial variables of sovereign countries influence their systemic risk
spillovers to financial institutions.
We select the corisk measures of 23 countries9 that are member states of the
Economic and Monetary Union and collect the respective macro-financial variables
regarding these countries.
The specification takes the form of:
coriski,t =β1gdp growthi,t + β2debti,t + β3deci f it surplusi,t + β4interest expensesi,t
+ β5asset relie fi,t + β6guaranteesi,t + β7liquidityi,t + β8recapitalisationi,t
+ αi + γt + ui,t (3.15)
We consider the following country-specific macro-financial variables:
• Macroeconomic indicators regarding economic fundamentals and fiscal sustain-
ability (real GDP growth “gdp growth”, interest expenses “interest expenses”,
deficit/surplus “deficit surplus”, government debt “debt”). Deficit/surplus
and government debt level are measured as proportional to the national GDP
level. Interest expenses are measured as proportional to the government
revenues, which represents the “cash flow” sustainability of government debt
(De Bruyckere et al., 2013). We expect higher levels of these measures would
correlate with higher levels of risk spillovers, except “gdp growth” is expected
be negatively correlated with risk spillovers.
9Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the
Netherlands, and UK.
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• Government intervention measures (“asset relief”, “guarantees”, “recapitalisation”,
“liquidity”) in the context of financial crisis. European Commission (2013)
publishes the government intervention by each member states during the
financial crisis in the form of state aid measures, and we use these state aid
measures10 to assess the actual involvement of sovereign countries in supporting
and bailing out distressed financial institutions. Asset relief refers to the
relief of impaired assets by the public authority to strengthen the institution’s
balance sheet in order to enable its access to liquidity funding. Guarantees
refers to the government guarantees schemes including deposit protection
and liability guarantees. Recapitalisation refers to the government injection
of equity provisions to boost the capital base of the institutions. Liquidity
refers to the liquidity measures “other than guarantees on liabilities” (European
Commission, 2013), including the liquidity support provided by the ECB.
As these measures signify the direct involvement of sovereign countries in
supporting their financial markets, we expect greater involvement to be reflected
in greater risk spillovers from sovereign countries.
The variables are collected at quarterly frequencies which spans from 2008Q1 to
2013Q4 consisting of 24 quarters. Table 3.6 reports the summary descriptives for these
variables.
10 The technical definitions and implementations of state aid measures are covered in Lannoo and
Napoli (2010).
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Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics for Panel Estimation.
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev.
corisk 552 0.0549 0.0260
debt 552 0.0253 0.0573
deficitsurplus 552 -4.7084 5.9497
interestrevenue 552 0.0580 0.0337
gdp growth 552 -0.1211 2.5840
assetrelief 552 0.0018 0.0059
guarantees 552 0.0636 0.1962
recapitalisation 552 0.0111 0.0316
liquidity 552 0.0050 0.0110
In Table 3.7 we report the regression results for the full sample of EMU countries
and in Table 3.8 we report the regression results for the sub-sample of distressed
countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). We also report the regression
results on selected individual countries in Table 3.9 for cross-country comparisons. In
Table 3.14 we report the diagnostic tests for the model specifications in Table 3.7. Ac-
cording to the model diagnostics we use Newey-west robust estimators for standard
errors, and we use fixed effect models in favour of random effect models.
From the results we find that although the level of public debt and GDP growth
have significant explanatory power with expected signs in the full sample, they do not
have explanatory power for the distressed country sub-sample, whereas the level of
interest expenses has similar explanatory power in both model sets. These findings
suggest that although economic fundamentals are risk drivers generally reflected in
the risk spillovers from sovereign countries to financial institutions, the spillover
effects from distressed countries are reflected more by the market concerns about their
fiscal sustainability, of which interest expenses is a more direct measure. For state aid
measures, we find the involvement of impaired asset relief by sovereign countries
to have a stronger positive effect on the risk spillover relationship than interest
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expenses, whereas governments’ liquidity support in the form of recapitalisation
reduces risk spillovers, while other forms of state aid do not have significant effects.
The results suggest that recapitalisation is a more effective way in stabilising interbank
lending and mitigating market participants’ fear about systemic risk. Our findings
regarding the fiscal sustainability and state aid measures are in line with the findings
in De Bruyckere et al. (2013) where the authors show the existence of sovereign
risk spillovers through government intervention channels. In addition, results from
individual countries show more significant coefficients for the four state aid measures,
though their coefficient values and signs vary by individual cases.
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Table 3.7: Panel Model for Systemic Risk Contributions of Sovereign Countries -
Full Sample
Table 3.7 reports the fixed effect panel regression results on corisk. Newey-West heteroskedasticity-
autocorrelation-robust estimates of standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable: corisk
(a1) (a2) (a3) (a4) (a5) (a6)
debt 0.062∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
deficit surplus −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
gdp growth −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
interest expenses 0.218∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.073) (0.067) (0.068)








id FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 529 529 529 529 529 529
R2 0.145 0.149 0.145 0.148 0.151 0.157
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.141 0.138 0.141 0.143 0.148
F Statistic 21.260∗∗∗ 17.490∗∗∗ 17.050∗∗∗ 17.460∗∗∗ 17.780∗∗∗ 11.590∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.8: Panel Model for Systemic Risk Contributions of Sovereign Countries -
Distressed Countries
Table 3.8 reports the fixed effect panel regression results on corisk. Newey-West heteroskedasticity-
autocorrelation-robust estimates of standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable: corisk
(b1) (b2) (b3) (b4) (b5) (b6)
debt 0.037 0.037 0.044 0.037 0.030 0.039
(0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037)
deficit surplus −0.0001 −0.0001 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0004 −0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
gdp growth −0.003 −0.002 −0.003∗ −0.003 −0.002 −0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
interest expenses 0.219∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.082) (0.084) (0.085) (0.073) (0.071)








id FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 138 138 138 138 138 138
R2 0.163 0.169 0.187 0.163 0.225 0.261
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.155 0.172 0.150 0.207 0.234
F Statistic 6.240∗∗∗ 5.150∗∗∗ 5.826∗∗∗ 4.957∗∗∗ 7.361∗∗∗ 5.470∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.9: Systemic Risk Contributions of Sovereign Countries - Individual Cases
Table 3.9 reports the individual regression results on corisk. Newey-West heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-robust estimates of standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable: corisk
(c1) (c2) (c3) (c4) (c5) (c6) (c7) (c8) (c9)
Germany France UK Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Cyprus
debt 0.119 0.097 0.011 −0.014 0.218∗∗ −0.121 −0.034 0.242 −0.018
(0.073) (0.127) (0.051) (0.024) (0.110) (0.118) (0.051) (0.178) (0.015)
deficit surplus 0.00001 −0.001 0.00005 0.00002 0.001 0.001 −0.0005 −0.0001 0.0004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
gdp growth −0.004∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.006∗ −0.001 −0.003∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.020 −0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.013) (0.001)
interest expenses −1.309 −0.888 0.087 0.047∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.025 0.233 0.545 0.067
(1.015) (1.168) (0.198) (0.018) (0.153) (0.113) (0.518) (0.601) (0.093)
asset relief 5.577∗∗ 15.870 1.935∗∗∗ 0.384 −0.320 7.775∗∗∗
(2.584) (24.810) (0.534) (0.848) (1.569) (2.462)
guarantees 1.464 −0.313 0.169∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.332∗∗∗ −0.625∗∗∗ −0.646∗∗∗ −0.039
(1.012) (0.265) (0.037) (0.021) (0.010) (0.015) (0.222) (0.138) (0.044)
liquidity 6.300∗ 4.367∗∗∗ −0.874∗∗∗ 0.436 −0.020 −1.580∗∗∗
(4.560) (0.791) (0.242) (5.987) (0.371) (0.212)
recapitalisation −2.305∗∗ 1.041 3.140∗∗∗ −0.097 0.091 −9.009∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗ 5.594∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗
(1.057) (1.516) (0.455) (0.074) (0.209) (0.913) (0.344) (2.020) (0.033)
intercept −0.029 0.006 −0.032∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.054) (0.018) (0.005) (0.015) (0.014) (0.035) (0.031) (0.008)
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
R2 0.724 0.467 0.800 0.775 0.830 0.773 0.598 0.745 0.373
Adjusted R2 0.567 0.219 0.686 0.670 0.734 0.688 0.368 0.600 0.138
Residual Std. Error 0.011 0.018 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.014 0.015 0.011
F Statistic 4.595∗∗∗ 1.881 7.017∗∗∗ 7.393∗∗∗ 8.570∗∗∗ 9.091∗∗∗ 2.599∗ 5.120∗∗∗ 1.586
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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3.8 Structural Stability of the CoVaR Risk Measures
As part of our study on the sovereign risk spillovers from sovereign countries to the
financial institutions, we investigate the potential existence of shifting patterns in the
risk relationship. Specifically, we consider the existence of structural breaks on the
0.5 and 0.95 quantiles of our models of conditional value of risk based on quantile
regressions. We follow the method of Oka and Qu (2011) which extends the structural
break analysis of Bai and Perron (1998) to quantile models and estimating multiple
structural changes occurring at unknown points in the conditional quantile functions.
The test statistics in Oka and Qu (2011) are provided by Qu (2008), which develops the
test statistics of structural breaks under a quantile regression framework of Koenker
and Bassett Jr (1978).
3.8.1 Methodology
Here we provide a brief overview of the quantile structural break test procedure, and
how we incorporate the quantile structural break test into our analysis.
In Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978)’s quantile regression framework, for quantiles q ∈
(0, 1), the qth-quantile conditional distribution function of a random variable y given
regressors x, Qy(q|x) can be formulated as a function of linear parameters:
Qy(q|x) = X′β(q) (3.16)







ρq(yi − x′ib) (3.17)
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where ρq(.) is the check function ρq = u(q − 1(u < 0)). Assuming that this
conditional quantile function is affected by m structural changes at unknown points
(T01 , . . . , T
0










2(q), t = T
0







m+1(q), t = T
0
m + 1, . . . , TT,
(3.18)
The break points T̂b = (T01 , . . . , T
0
m) and coefficients β̂(q) = (β̂1(q), . . . , β̂m+1(q))′
in the function structure can be estimated by solving:







βq(yt − xqt β j+1(q)) (3.19)
(β̂(q), T̂b) = arg min
β(q),Tb∈Λε
ST(q, β(q), Tb) (3.20)




(T1, . . . , Tm) : Tj − Tj−1 ≥ εT(j = 2, . . . , m), T1 ≥ εT, Tm ≤ (1− ε)T
}
(3.21)
We use the SQq statistics provided by Qu (2008) as the test statistics for testing
structural breaks under a specific quantile. Denote ‖Z‖∞ = max(z1, . . . , zk) for a
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vector z = (z1, . . . , zk), and the SQq statistics is constructed as:
SQq = sup
λ∈[0,1]











xtψq(yt − x′t β̂(q)) (3.22)
As for the SQq(l + 1|l) statistics for testing l breaks against l + 1 breaks, denote
SQq,j as the SQq statistics from the jth segment:
SQq,j = sup
λ∈[0,1]







xtψq(yt − x′t β̂(q))
SQq(l + 1|l) = max
1≤j≤l+1
SQq,j (3.23)
Similar to the approaches in Bai and Perron (1998), the SQq assumes that under the
qth-quantile, in an arbitrary partition, there are no structural breaks, and when the test
statistics yields a sufficiently large value (compared to the simulated critical values
provided in Qu (2008)) the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the existence of 1
structural break occurring at the partition location. The test against more breaks l + 1
in any sub-partitions of the current l partitions is then carried out until the maximum
number of breaks is found (SQq(l + 1|l) falls below the critical value) in the sample
period.
3.8.2 Implementation Strategy
Using the method discussed above, we examine the 1470 CoVaR series representing
the systemic risk spillover effects from 30 sovereign countries to the 49 financial
72
institutions in our study sample. Specifically for the purpose of examining the
occurrence of structural breaks, we estimate the CoVaR series that are estimated
from the Thomson Reuters CDS data from January 200811 to October 2014 in weekly
frequency with 357 observations for each series.
In order to incorporate the analysis of quantile structural change into our main
framework, we first conduct the SQq test on all regression models in order to identify
the existence and location of structural regimes, as well as the estimates of coefficient
parameters inside each regime. Specifically, we examine the existence of structural
breaks over quantiles q ∈ {0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 0.95, 0.95}, as the quantile estimates at q = 0.50
and q = 0.95 are the interests of analysis in ∆CoVaR and we use other quantiles for
comparisons.
3.8.3 Results
We carry out quantile structural break analysis on the regression equations for all
combinations of “financial institution | sovereign country” pairs and the five upper
quantiles. In the cross-section dimension, we report the number of break occurrence
in our sample in Table 3.10 and the occurrence breakdown by originator countries in
Figure 3.4. In the time-horizon dimension, we report the occurrence of breaks over
the sample period in Figure 3.5 by the nth occurrence and Figure 3.6 by the originator
countries.
11As discussed earlier in Section 3.4, the CDS series in our sample are spliced from two sources using
the technique provided by Thomson Reuters CDS and is discussed in Buchholz and Tonzer (2013). Here
we examine the structural break occurrence from the one data source in order to avoid introducing
breaks by our splicing of the series.
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Table 3.10: Distribution of breaks over quantiles
Quantile No. of total Eqs with 1 break with 2 breaks with 3 breaks
0.50 1,470 41 18 6
0.75 1,470 47 12 5
0.90 1,470 39 26 16
0.95 1,470 45 40 38
0.99 1,470 1 0 0
Figure 3.4: distribution of breaks over source countries
Figure 3.5: distribution of breaks over sample period - nth occurrence
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Figure 3.6: distribution of breaks over sample period - source of spillovers
As reported in Table 3.10, the test routine found 41 equations on the median
quantile to be affected by at least 1 break, and 45 equations with at least 1 break on
the 0.95 quantile. The occurrence of breaks are relatively similar in other quantiles as
well. However it is worth noting that for models that are found to contain breaks, it
is easier to be detected under 0.95 quantile to have more than one breaks. The results
from Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show that the structural breaks occur more often in
models related to Nordic countries than other countries, and around the two periods:
January 2009 - April 2009, and April 2010 - July 2010. The first period is related to
the spreading of impact from the Global Financial Crisis whereas the second period is
related to the initial outbreak of the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis with the first bailout
of Greece. Therefore the occurrence of structural breaks which imply the shift in the
relationships of risk spillovers of CoVaR relate to the peak periods of market distress,
which suggests that common market distress has an impact on the risk spillovers
between sovereign countries and financial institutions, the external shifting effect of
which is more apparent the CoVaRs from country groups such as the Nordic countries.
The general findings from our examination of the potential occurrence of structural
75
breaks in the quantile models of CoVaR suggest that only very minor portions (2.7%
in the median state and 3.1% under 0.95 quantile) are subjected to the shifting of risk
patterns during the sample period. Therefore according to the findings there is no
need for us to control for systematic structural changes in our model settings, and the
findings confirm that our risk measures are robust.
3.9 Conclusions
In this study, we examine the systemic risk spillovers from sovereign countries to
financial institutions. Towards this end, we use Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016)’s
Conditional Value-at-Risk and ∆CoVaR methodology to measure the systemic risk
spillovers from sovereign CDS market to the CDS market for financial institutions. We
construct risk measures around the ∆CoVaR methodology using credit default swaps
data of sovereign countries and financial institutions. We then further investigate
the macro-financial determinants of the systemic risk spillovers by examining the
relationship between CoRisk measures and the macroeconomic and financial health
of the sovereign economies, as well as the countries’ involvement in bailing out the
financial institutions.
In our analytical framework of CDS market spillovers, the ∆CoVaR approach
allows us to measure the impact of the sovereign distress, as revealed by the sovereign
CDS spreads, on the CDS spreads of the financial institutions. One of the advantages
in using the ∆CoVaR risk measures is that it distinguishes the effects of risk spillovers
from entity i (as measured by ∆CoVaRj|i and the weighted ∆CoRiski), from effects
of financial collapse of entity i (as measured by VaRi). As our results show, in the
case of Greece, while the VaR of its CDS spreads is high, the potential effects of
the default of Greece sovereign bonds are limited as compared with other distressed
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countries such as Italy and Spain, during their respective distressed event periods.
Since the outbreak of distress event of Greek government bonds in May 2010, financial
institutions had tried to limit their exposures to Greek government bonds and are
required to publicly report their exposures to the European sovereign countries in
financial reports and stress tests. Therefore, despite the high default risk for the
Greek government bonds, the exposures from private investors have been effectively
reduced and we also observe no major market disruption during the technical default
for the Greek government bonds during March 2012. Nevertheless, the substantial
evidence of the risk spillovers from Spain and Italy from our results justify the bailout
package support from the “troika” (European Commission, ECB and IMF) in order to
prevent the potential market collapse from sovereign credit risk. This range of results
is also supported by previous studies in sovereign risk spillovers such as Fong and
Wong (2012); Gray (2013) as well as in the studies on the economic fundamentals
and contagion components in risk spreads such as Gibson, Hall and Tavlas (2012);
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013); Meine, Supper and Weiß (2016). As our findings
suggest systemic risk spillovers decline as soon as market confidence recover, efforts
in stabilising economies and financial markets help reduce the market’s perception of
the riskiness of the entities as well as the risk spillovers among the entities. In this
sense our findings support the bailout packages by the “troika” in stabilising market
confidence and promoting fiscal sustainability by austerity measures.
In terms of policy implications, we support De Bruyckere et al. (2013)’s call to
establish union-level distress response mechanisms as individual country’s response
to troubles in its financial market is found to increase systemic risk spillovers
as market’s fear about its fiscal sustainability intensify. Therefore our findings
support establishing union-level financial safety net and resolution mechanisms in the
European Union such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European
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Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM).
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Appendix 3.A Appendix
Table 3.11: CDS Series for Sovereign Country CDS Spreads
series name groups
scds ger spl Germany EU core
scds fra spl France EU core
scds aus spl Austria EU core
scds bel spl Belgium EU core
scds neth spl Netherlands EU core
scds cyp spl Cyprus EU distressed
scds gre spl Greece EU distressed
scds ice spl Iceland EU distressed
scds ita spl Italy EU distressed
scds por spl Portugal EU distressed
scds spa spl Spain EU distressed
scds ire spl Ireland EU distressed
scds den spl Denmark EU Nordic
scds swe spl Sweden EU Nordic
scds nor spl Norway EU Nordic
scds bul spl Bulgaria EU others
scds cro spl Croatia EU others
scds cze spl CzechRepublic EU others
scds lat spl Latvia EU others
scds est spl Estonia EU others
scds hun spl Hungary EU others
scds lit spl Lithuania EU others
scds pol spl Poland EU others
scds slk spl Slovakia EU others
scds slv spl Slovenia EU others
scds uk spl UK EU core
scds us spl US others
scds jp spl Japan others
scds chn spl China others
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Table 3.12: CDS Series for Corporate CDS Spreads
Series Name Groups Home country
ccds i alvff spl Allianz insurer Germany
ccds i gmi spl Assicurazioni Generali insurer Italy
ccds i avln spl Aviva insurer UK
ccds i csfr spl AXA insurer UK
ccds i pruln spl Prudential UK insurer UK
ccds i aign spl AIG insurer US
ccds i metn spl Metlife insurer US
ccds i prun spl Prudential US insurer US
ccds b cbaau spl Commonwealth Bank Of Australia bank Australia
ccds b ebsvi spl Erste Group Bank - Australia bank Australia
ccds b nabau spl National Australia Bank Limited bank Australia
ccds b kbcbt spl KBC GROEP NV - Belgium bank Belgium
ccds b bocsh spl Bank of China bank China
ccds b dansko spl DANSKE BANK A/S - Denmark bank Denmark
ccds b acafr spl Credit Agricole bank France
ccds b bnpfr spl BNP Paribas bank France
ccds b glefr spl Societe Generale bank France
ccds b cbkff spl Commerzbank AG - Germany bank Germany
ccds b dbkff spl Deutsche Bank bank Germany
ccds b bmpsmi spl Banca Monte Dei Paschi - Italy bank Italy
ccds b ispmi spl Intesa Sanpaolo - Italy bank Italy
ccds b ucgmi spl Unicredito Italiano bank Italy
ccds b daiwto spl Daiwa Securities Group Inc - Japan bank Japan
ccds b mizhto spl Mizuho bank Japan
ccds b sumito spl Sumitomo Mitsui bank Japan
ccds b ingaae spl ING Bank bank Netherlands
ccds b wbcau spl Westpac Banking Corp - New Zealand bank New Zealand
ccds b bbvamc spl BBVA bank Spain
ccds b popmc spl Banco Popular Espanol SA - Spain bank Spain
ccds b sanmc spl Banco Santander bank Spain
ccds b ndask spl Nordea Bank - Sweden bank Sweden
ccds b shbask spl Svenska Handelsbanken AB - Sweden bank Sweden
ccds b swedask spl Swedbank AB - Sweden bank Sweden
ccds b csgnvx spl Credit Suisse bank Switzerland
ccds b ubsnvx spl UBS - Switzerland bank Switzerland
ccds b barcln spl Barclays bank UK
ccds b hsbaln spl HSBC Bank bank UK
ccds b lloyln spl LLoyds Banking group bank UK
ccds b rbsln spl RBS bank UK
ccds b stanln spl Standard Chartered bank UK
Continued on next page
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Table 3.12 – Continued from previous page
Series Name Groups Home country
ccds b bacn spl Bank of America bank US
ccds b citin spl Citigroup bank US
ccds b cofn spl Capital One Financial bank US
ccds b gsn spl Goldman Sachs bank US
ccds b jpmjn spl JP Morgan bank US
ccds b msn spl Morgan Stanley bank US
ccds b wfcn spl Wells Fargo bank US
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Table 3.13: Variable Correlations
Table 3.13 reports the correlation tables for the variables used in the panel regressions in Section 3.7.
Variable symbols are listed below: A: spillovers; B: debt; C: deficitsurplus; D: gdp growth; E:
interestrevenue; F1: assetrelief; F2: guarantees; F3: liquidity; F4: recapitalisation.
A B C D E F1 F2 F3 F4
A 1 0.155 -0.007 -0.223 0.085 0.048 -0.020 -0.032 -0.134
B 0.155 1 -0.298 -0.327 0.053 0.042 0.173 0.138 0.102
C -0.007 -0.298 1 0.097 0.340 -0.188 -0.182 -0.158 -0.386
D -0.223 -0.327 0.097 1 0.033 0.039 -0.067 -0.163 -0.063
E 0.085 0.053 0.340 0.033 1 -0.083 -0.142 -0.131 -0.263
F1 0.048 0.042 -0.188 0.039 -0.083 1 0.012 0.122 0.160
F2 -0.020 0.173 -0.182 -0.067 -0.142 0.012 1 -0.025 0.304
F3 -0.032 0.138 -0.158 -0.163 -0.131 0.122 -0.025 1 0.024
F4 -0.134 0.102 -0.386 -0.063 -0.263 0.160 0.304 0.024 1
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Table 3.14: Diagnostic Tests for Panel Models
Table 3.14 reports the diagnostic test results for panel model specifications used in Table 3.7. We
use Breusch-Pagan tests to examine the presence of heteroskedasticity and Hausman tests for the
consistency of random effect estimators versus fixed effect estimators.
Breusch-Pagan Homoskedasticity Test H0: Model error is homoskedastic
(a1) BP = 82, d f = 5, p = 3e− 16
(a2) BP = 85, d f = 6, p = 4e− 16
(a3) BP = 83, d f = 6, p = 8e− 16
(a4) BP = 83, d f = 6, p = 8e− 16
(a5) BP = 85, d f = 6, p = 3e− 16
(a6) BP = 88, d f = 9, p = 4e− 15
Hausman test for fixed effects H0: fixed and random effect estimates are
both consistent; prefers random model
(a1) chisq = 158.2, d f = 5, p = 2.336e− 32
(a2) chisq = 148.3, d f = 6, p = 1.787e− 29
(a3) chisq = 160.6, d f = 6, p = 4.523e− 32
(a4) chisq = 158.9, d f = 6, p = 1.03e− 31
(a5) chisq = 164.4, d f = 6, p = 6.816e− 33






As a greatest social, political and economic integration in modern Europe, the
European Union has witnessed the shocks of both the Global Financial Crisis in 2008
and the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis in 2011. Both crises tested the robustness of such
a grand project and also revealed the problems of a politically driven integration,
among which, the differences of economic structures of different regions in the EU.
Ireland bailed out its banking sector during the Global Financial Crisis at massive
cost, and the sudden economic downturn caused the financial markets to question
the fiscal sustainability of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain given the high levels of
public debts and/or competence of their economies, which triggered the Eurozone
Sovereign Crisis, putting the said countries at a downward spiral as contagion spread
and financial liquidity dried up, also tested the resolve of the member countries in
terms of supporting the Union. The Union is formed based on the member countries’
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shared socio-political values and economic interdependencies, however the crises
revealed the heterogeneity among the member countries which might turn out to be
greater than previously imagined by policy-makers and academics. Despite this, the
crisis episodes provide a precious opportunity for policy-makers and academics to
explore the dynamics of economics downturn and spillovers within a cross-economy
framework, from a developed economies perspective.
In this study we aim at contributing to the literature on transmission of shocks and
spillovers of different financial markets by exploring the dynamics of the fiscal distress
in the European Union using a global framework that can allow for full dynamics
within countries, between different countries and markets, and in the entire global
system as a whole. To this end, we adopt the Global Vector-Autoregressive model
(GVAR) proposed by Pesaran et al. (2004) and Dees et al. (2007), and examine the
dynamics of risk transmissions of fiscal distress of the European Union countries to
three destinations: the sovereign bonds market, the sovereign credit default swaps
market, and the national banking sector.
The GVAR framework is proposed by Pesaran et al. (2004) and with empirical
development followed by Dees et al. (2007). As individual economies in a wider
system are interlinked through various channels (resources, political and technological
developments, cross-border flows of goods, services and financial assets) in a complex
way, it is crucial for economic models to take these interlinked effects into account and
the GVAR provides an appealing approach. Comparing with other large dimensional
modelling systems, such as the factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR, Bernanke, Boivin and
Eliasz 2004; Stock and Watson 2005), the GVAR modelling approach, which consists
of country-specific VARX∗ models with foreign influences as unobserved common
factors in a multi-country framework, provides a simple, compact and economicly-
intuitive approach for high dimensional modelling (Chudik and Pesaran, 2014).
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Our research strategy is as follows. First we construct a VARX∗ model for
each country of our sample with their country-specific endogenous variables as
well as foreign counterparts treated as weakly exogenous variables. These VARX∗
models will be used to construct the global model (GVAR). We then explore
the dynamics of risk transmissions through different scenarios in dynamic analysis
using generalised impulse response functions (GIRFs) and generalised forecast error
variance decompositions (GFEVDs).
The contribution of our study is as follows:
Firstly, traditional studies on the market price discovery as in Ammer and Cai
(2011); Aizenman et al. (2013); Delatte, Gex and López-Villavicencio (2012) focus on
the time series properties of the market series of several categories (CDS market, bond
market and stock market). In addition, previous studies are often limited by their
research scope in country level or in market level, without a unifying framework for
policy-makers to extend their findings to alternative scenarios. We investigate the
dynamic impact of these markets from country level, country group level as well as
system level, using the high dimensional analytical framework of GVAR in Pesaran
et al. (2004); Dees et al. (2007), which allows us to understand the sovereign risk impact
in the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis in a multi-layered yet sensible approach.
Secondly, the previous studies in the GVAR framework are mostly conducted
from a macroeconomic perspective where the countries in the model system are
represented by the relative weights of trade volumes, and this approach is continued
to the analyses from a financial perspective (Caporale and Girardi, 2013, such as). We
address this with a continuous weighting scheme where markets and countries are
represented by their pairwise financial claims, which better capture the dynamics in
risk spillovers from the sovereign CDS markets, sovereign bond markets, and equity
markets.
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The rest of the sections are structured as below: We discuss the strands of
literature that is relevant to our study in Section 4.2. We describe the methodology
implementation of the GVAR model in Section 4.3, and describe the selection of data
and samples in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5 we discuss the preliminary empirical results
and diagnostics of the model and in Section 4.6 we conduct dynamic analysis based
on model results. Lastly, in Section 4.7 we summarise the findings of our research.
4.2 Related Literature
The GVAR model has been widely adopted in the macroeconomic literature to study
the dynamic effects when domestic, foreign and global impact needs to be taken into
consideration. For relevant studies in the literature of sovereign risk spillovers, Gray
(2013) analyses interactions between banking sector risk, sovereign risk, corporate
sector risk and others for European economies and the United States in a CCA −
GVAR model and investigate the impact of sovereign distress in Spain and Italy.
Gross and Kok (2013) uses a mixed-cross-section sample of countries and banks to
investigate contagion among sovereign countries and banks and showed that the
system of banks and states has become closely connected over time. Favero (2013)
investigates the government bond spreads of the Euro area comparing the results
using a traditional VAR-based model and a GVAR model, and the study shows that
the GVAR model captures exchange rate depreciation fluctuations as another factor
which is not captured by the traditional VAR model. We contribute to the literature
by examining the three financial markets (sovereign bond markets, sovereign CDS
markets and country-specific banking sector), their dynamics and interactions, and
also the interconnectedness of countries in these markets.
In terms of relevant studies using the GVAR model in the context of sovereign
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spillovers to financial markets, Alessandri et al. (2009) examines the impact of the
defaults of financial institutions to the economic output. However the study is limited
to the UK economy and we extend the scope to examine the impact of fiscal distress
to the financial sector in the context of a European Union setting. Caporale and
Girardi (2013) studies the interactions of sovereign distress represented by the shocks
to national bond yield, and we provide an extension to their studies by considering
the realisation of systemic risk in the financial sector from macroeconomic shocks.
In addition, whereas Caporale and Girardi (2013) and other studies that focus on the
macroeconomic aspects of country dynamics use bilateral trade as weighting matrices,
we use the time-varying bilateral exposures of the banking sector as the weighting
matrices which allows the model to better capture the dynamics in the financial
markets. We also contribute to the literature of market risk spillovers (Longstaff et al.,
2011; De Bruyckere et al., 2013) by providing evidence to the dynamics of financial
market interactions and risk transmissions in the context of sovereign risk spillovers.
4.3 Methodology
Constructing the GVAR framework can be summarised as a two-step approach. In
the first step, we construct a country-specific VARX∗ structure with the country-
specific variables as the endogenous variables and weighted foreign variables from
other countries as the exogenous variables. In the second step, each individual VARX∗
models are stacked as solved simultaneously as one large GVAR system.
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4.3.1 Country-specific VARX∗ models
In the GVAR system we consider i = 0, 1, ..., N countries, each represented by a













i,t−l + uit (4.1)
where xit is a ki × 1 vector of ki domestic variables and x∗it is a k∗i × 1 vector of k∗i
associated foreign variables. x∗it is the cross-sectional weighted average of the other
domestic variables as x∗it = ∑
N
j=1 wijxit; wij ≤ 0, ∑Nj=1 wij = 1, wii = 0. uit ∼ N(0, Σii);
for t = s, E(uit,u′js) = Σij, and for t 6= s, E(uit,u′js) = 0. In essence, the country-
specific endogenous “domestic variables” depend on their previous values as well
as foreign influences represented by “foreign variables”, which are treated as weakly
exogenous1.
The VARX∗(pi, qi) can be rewritten into an error correction form VECMX∗(pi, qi)
to allow the possibility of co-integration relationships within the domestic variables.
The lag orders pi and qi will be selected according to Akaike information criteria (AIC)
for each VECMX∗(pi, qi) structure. The country-specific VECMX∗(pi, qi) model can
then be estimated conditional on the weakly exogenous variables x∗it using reduced
rank regression (Harbo, Johansen, Nielsen and Rahbek, 1998; Pesaran, Shin and Smith,
2000).




Hil∆zi,t−1 + εit (4.2)
where zit ≡ (x′it,x∗it
′)′ is the domestic-foreign variable pair for country i.
1 The weak exogeneity assumption of the VARX∗ model imply the foreign equivalents of the
domestic variables do not have long-term influences from the domestic variables, which means that
the foreign variables are weakly exogenous to domestic variables in the long-run.
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4.3.2 GVAR model
Given the country-specific VECMX∗ models in (4.2), a “link” matrix Wi will then be
used to establish the link between the country-specific pair zit, and the collection of
all the domestic variables in the system xt = (x′0t,x
′
1t, . . . ,x
′
Nt)
′. Wi is a (ki + k∗i )× k
matrix constructed using cross-country weights wij, ∀i, j = 0, 1, ..., N which satisfies:
zit =Wixt (4.3)
The link matrixWi contains the weight wij which reflects the relative importance of
country j for country i’s economy, and all cross-sectionally weighted foreign variables
enter the country-specific VARXpi,qi structure by the link matrix. Pooling foreign
variables by the link matrix serves as proxies of unobserved common factors, which,
as discussed by Chudik and Pesaran (2014), provides a “relatively simple yet effective
way of modelling complex high-dimensional systems”, something that standard VAR
procedures cannot accommodate. With the link matrix, the country-specific structure
can be written as:
Ai0Wixt = ai0 +Ai1Wixt−1 + ... +AipiWixt−pi , i = 0, 1, 2, ...N (4.4)
Stacking up the N + 1 structures leads to a global GVAR equation, where the
weakly exogenous foreign variables of each country-specific structure are treated as
endogenous within the GVAR system:




Glxt−l + ut, p = max(pi), ∀i (4.5)
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Further transformation leads to (4.6) and its compact form in (4.7):
xt = b0 +F1xt−1 + · · ·+Fpxt−p + εt (4.6)
b0 = G
−1
0 a0, Fj = G
−1
0 Gj, j = 1, . . . , p, εt = G
−1
0 ut
Xt = FXt−1 +Et (4.7)
4.3.3 Modelling Dynamics
Pesaran and Shin (1998) provides a generalised impulse response analysis (GIRF)
method that is invariant to the ordering of variables in the VAR model. As discussed
in Chudik and Pesaran (2014), in order to identify all k × 1 orthogonal shocks,
a large number of restrictions O(k2) is required, however current literature on
macroeconomics does not provide a comprehensive guidance on how the origins
of all the shocks should be identified in all sectors of the economic system. The
GIRF approach does not rely on structural identification exercises, but considers a
counterfactual exercise where the historical correlations of shocks are assumed to be
given. This method is well suited for the GVAR model since the model allows for
the contemporaneous correlations between uit and uj 6=i,t, the shocks to each country-
specific VARX∗ structure.
Given the model in (4.5), the n-step ahead GIRFs of one standard error shock at
period t to the lth VARX∗ structure on the jth variable is defined as:








, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . ; l, j = 1, 2, . . . , k (4.8)
Specifically, the generalised forecast error variance decomposition (GFEVD) is
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defined as the proportion of the n-step ahead forecast error variance of the lth element
of xt due to the innovations in the jth element of xt.
















, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . ; l = 1, . . . , k (4.9)
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Choice of Countries
For the purpose of this study we select 14 countries that are members of the European
Union2 including: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
Among these 14 countries, 11 of them are members of the European Monetary
Union, with the rest (Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom) having their own
currencies. Specifically, we consider two country groups for the purpose of our
study: “core countries” consisting of Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Netherlands,
and United Kingdom; and “distressed countries” consisting of Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain.
4.4.2 Choice of Variables
For each country-specific model VARX∗pi,qi , there are three types of variables. “do-
mestic” variables are country-specific variables that are treated to be endogenous in
the model, “foreign” variables are constructed using weighted-averaged values of
2 We select the sample according to the definition criteria of “EU15”,
except Luxembourg, according to Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Glossary:EU enlargements). “EU15” country groups are the member state
countries that joined the European Union prior to EU’s 2004 enlargement. We exclude Luxembourg
from the sample, due to the relative small size of its economy and lack of diversity in its financial sector
such as no credit default swaps on its sovereign bonds available.
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the “domestic” variables of other countries and are treated as weakly-exogenous, and
“global” variables are variables reflecting global trends which are not country-specific
and are also treated as weakly-exogenous.
For “domestic” variables of each Country i, with i = 0, ..., 13, we include its
economic growth (measured by growth of GDP, yi,t ), fiscal sustainability (measured
by debt/GDP ratio, debti,t ), and three channels of sovereign distress: sovereign bond
market, sovereign CDS market, and banking sector equity market (measured by long-
term sovereign bond spreads, ri,t, 5-year sovereign CDS spreads, scds, and the returns
of equity index of the banking sector, seqi,t).




i,t), are constructed from
the weighted-averaged values of equivalent “domestic” variables of other countries
(excluding Country i ) in the sample. As the purpose of our study is to investigate
the financial linkages among countries, we choose Country i’s banking sector risk
exposure to another Country j’s banking sector exposure obtained from Bank of
International Settlements3 as wij. wij is then normalised for all js so that the weights are
summed to unity when constructing the “foreign” variables. Different from classical
GVAR literature that use bilateral trade flows as cross-sectional static weights, our use
of cross-country exposure of banks as time-varying weights will allow us to better
explore the dynamics of the financial sector and the changing nature of the relative
positions of countries in the GVAR system.
As for “global” variables, we select variables that proxy risk aversion sentiment in
the global and regional financial markets including the VDAX implied volatility index
(vdaxt), the spread between 3 month EURIBOR interbank offering rate and EONIA
overnight risk free rate (euribor − oist), and the spread between Moody’s BAA and
3 We collect data from the “Consolidated Banking Statistics” section of the BIS website. We use
“Foreign claims by nationality of reporting banks, immediate borrower basis” as the definition of the
claim exposure of the banking sector of countries i− j pair.
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AAA corporate indices (baat).
We include monthly data from 2004M01 to 2014M09 (129 periods) for ri,t, seqi,t,
vdaxt, euribor − oist, and baat. We include quarterly data from 2004Q1 to 2014Q3 (43
periods) for yi,t and debti,t, then convert them into monthly series using cubic spline
interpolation. For sovereign CDS spreads scds, series are available for 13 countries
except for Greece4. To represent the country-specific banking sector, we construct the
sovereign banking sector equity returns seqs from the equity returns of commercial
banks that are publicly listed on Country i’s stock exchange markets, weighted by





























































Figure 4.1: Cross-country Flows: Banking Sector versus Trade
This figure reports the comparisons between cross-country exposure of the banking sector(left) and
trade-flows(right). The bank exposure data is obtained from Bank of International Settlements website
and the trade-flows data from OECD database. Note that the bank exposure data for Ireland is only
available after 2006, and in our study we expand the 2006 values to previous periods.
4On 9 March 2012 the Greece government announced its acceptance of the terms for its second round
bail-out package including massive write-off of Greek debt from private investors. The International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) declared this a triggering credit event and subsequently






































































































































































































Long−term Govt Bond Yield Spreads wrt. Germany
Figure 4.2: Time-series Data description
Figure 4.2 plots the time series evolutions in our sample5. The quarter-on-quarter
real economies in the EU countries enjoyed relatively stable and moderate growth
prior to the global financial crisis, and experienced different degrees of declines
around 2008 (especially the UK) and 2011 (especially Greece). Germany’s debt
level remains roughly around the debt level criterion of the Maastricht treaty (60%)
throughout the sample periods and its economy regained relatively higher level of
growth compared to other peer countries. As shown from the figure, Greece and
Italy are the two countries whose debt levels remained high throughout the sample
periods. As for UK, the dramatic fluctuation of its economic growth was due to the
fact that a large proportion of its economy is related to financial services and therefore
its economic indicators are prone to macro-financial climate in the world. As for
Greece, as the source of the Greek debt crisis, its government bond yield spreads
with respect to Germany’s climbed sharply during the debt crisis, and although it
enjoyed the debt write-off from its second round bailout package on 2012, its debt level
remained high and climbing whereas the economy went through a prolonged episode
5To be consistent with the literature, we use real GDP growth instead of quarter-on-quarter GDP
growth.
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of massive decline. The rest of the “distressed countries” all showed certain degrees of
similarities of their economic characteristics: their debt levels were either high and/or
climbing (especially Ireland before 2013), they went through economic declines during
the two crises and their bond yields/sovereign CDS spreads with respect to Germany
all climbed up rapidly during the sovereign debt crisis6 as the market concern about
the fiscal health and sustainability of the European Union rose but gradually calmed
down in recent periods.
4.5 Empirical Results and Diagnostics
4.5.1 Country-specific VARX∗ Model
We specify each VARX∗(pi, qi) model such as the lag order of its endogenous/exogenous
variables and long-run relationships based on diagnostic tests so that our models
satisfy the theoretical prerequisites of the GVAR framework as discussed in Dees et al.
(2007) and Chudik and Pesaran (2014). For stationarity conditions, we perform unit
root tests based Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests and report standard ADF statistics
as well as Weighted-Symmetric ADF statistics introduced by Park and Fuller (1995).
The WS statistics, as discussed in Dees et al. (2007), exploit the time reversibility of
stationary autoregressive processes in order to increase their power performance. The
lag length in the unit root tests are based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
As the GVAR model at most can accommodate integration up to order 1, we need
to confirm that all of our variables are at most I(1). For each variable, their levels
with/without trend as well as first-differences are reported. As shown by the results
of Tables 4.1 and 4.2, with a few exceptions, most variables show the presence of unit
roots at level and all variables become stationary after first difference.
6 Also in a smaller degree, during the financial crisis, as shown by their sovereign CDS spreads.
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We then consider the specification of each country-specific model in order to fully
explore the potential interactions that can be allowed in the system. Variable selection
is done based on weak exogeneity test of Johansen (1992b) and persistence profile
results. As our sample cover the periods of two economic crises, our primary interest
is on the short-run dynamics of the model rather than the long-run relationships
of the error-correction component. We select the lag length of the country-specific
models based on AIC results and set the lag length of the endogenous and exogenous
variables, pi and qi to be 2 and 1 for all countries. Using Johansen techniques
on VECM models, we found that there are co-integration ranks of 2 for Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, ranks 0 for Germany and France. As for “distressed
countries” group, we found ranks 1 for most countries except for Greece and Ireland.
Considering the violent reactions in bond and CDS markets during crisis episodes in
these countries, we restrict the ranks to 0 for these countries, as exploring the long-run
structure using crisis observations would not yield correct result and this is not our
primary interest of research.
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Table 4.1: Unit Root Test Results - Augmented Dicky Fuller Tests
Table 4.1 reports the Augmented Dicky Fuller unit root test results for domestic and global variables
used in the model. For each variable, results for level as well as first differenced versions are provided.
The null hypothesis of the test indicate unit root. Test statistics being greater than critical values implies
the presence of unit root.
Domestic Variables Critical Value AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE
y (with trend) -03.45 -02.05 -02.13 -01.17 -02.28 -02.83 -02.80 -01.95
y (no trend) -02.89 -01.50 -01.40 -01.44 -02.57 -01.69 -01.48 -00.23
∆y -02.89 -04.18 -03.98 -03.66 -03.77 -03.62 -03.75 -02.85
debt (with trend) -03.45 -01.76 -02.84 -02.33 -01.59 -01.77 -01.42 -02.11
debt (no trend) -02.89 -01.37 -01.07 -01.35 -00.07 00.53 -01.12 -00.03
∆debt -02.89 -08.85 -08.63 -04.16 -06.29 -04.67 -04.76 -05.93
scds (with trend) -03.45 -01.84 -01.39 -02.98 -02.48 -01.58 -01.94
scds (no trend) -02.89 -01.87 -01.53 -02.77 -02.15 -01.49 -01.80
∆scds -02.89 -05.41 -05.30 -07.54 -07.58 -07.11 -07.39
r (with trend) -03.45 -01.73 -00.96 -02.12 -01.99 -02.08 -02.41 -01.44
r (no trend) -02.89 00.06 00.14 -00.72 -00.48 -00.58 -00.66 -01.48
∆r -02.89 -09.44 -10.02 -05.63 -05.64 -08.03 -05.58 -06.29
seq (with trend) -03.45 -02.53 -02.02 -01.74 -01.48 -02.07 -01.85 -02.14
seq (no trend) -02.89 -00.72 -01.59 -01.62 -00.15 -01.51 -01.65 00.71
∆seq -02.89 -04.01 -05.10 -06.45 -08.41 -07.51 -08.24 -07.90
Domestic Variables Critical Value IRELAND ITALY NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK
y (with trend) -03.45 -02.41 -02.57 -01.60 -01.73 -02.63 -01.34 -01.02
y (no trend) -02.89 -02.57 -01.32 -02.33 -01.08 -02.70 -01.62 -01.46
∆y -02.89 -04.43 -03.23 -02.92 -03.53 -02.74 -03.60 -03.64
debt (with trend) -03.45 -01.99 -01.83 -02.12 -01.38 -02.22 -00.96 -01.92
debt (no trend) -02.89 -00.58 00.61 -00.51 01.30 00.17 -02.33 -01.32
∆debt -02.89 -03.67 -06.77 -04.16 -04.26 -02.45 -07.96 -02.30
scds (with trend) -03.45 -01.28 -02.13 -02.51 -01.61 -00.45 -03.22 -01.88
scds (no trend) -02.89 -01.56 -01.46 -02.17 -01.46 -01.21 -02.91 -01.95
∆scds -02.89 -04.30 -05.65 -06.00 -03.51 -05.28 -10.57 -05.75
r (with trend) -03.45 -00.74 -01.41 -01.99 -01.16 -00.71 -03.14 -02.61
r (no trend) -02.89 -01.09 -01.65 -00.45 -01.48 -01.16 -01.61 -01.33
∆r -02.89 -07.81 -08.65 -05.65 -06.36 -07.71 -05.21 -06.27
seq (with trend) -03.45 -01.71 -02.40 -02.42 -02.15 -01.97 -01.68 -01.54
seq (no trend) -02.89 -00.67 -01.04 -01.68 -00.81 -01.48 -01.65 -01.12
∆seq -02.89 -06.42 -03.89 -04.06 -06.83 -08.35 -07.16 -06.08
Global Variables Critical Value Statistic
vdax (with trend) -03.45 -02.67
vdax (no trend) -02.89 -02.65
∆vdax -02.89 -09.89
euribor− ois (with trend) -03.45 -02.25
euribor− ois (no trend) -02.89 -01.24
∆euribor− ois -02.89 -03.79
baa (with trend) -03.45 -02.44
baa (no trend) -02.89 -02.51
∆baa -02.89 -06.25
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Table 4.2: Unit Root Test Results - Weighted-Symmetric Augmented Dicky Fuller
Tests
Table 4.2 reports the Weighted-Symmetric Augmented Dicky Fuller unit root test results for domestic
and global variables used in the model. For each variable, results for level as well as first differenced
versions are provided. The null hypothesis of the test indicate unit root. Test statistics being greater
than critical values implies the presence of unit root.
Domestic Variables Critical Value AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE
y (with trend) -03.24 -01.78 -00.99 -01.32 -01.53 -02.38 -03.00 -00.94
y (no trend) -02.55 00.30 01.46 -01.66 -01.13 00.06 -00.78 -00.83
∆y -02.55 -04.22 -03.69 -03.70 -03.91 -03.72 -03.96 -02.99
debt (with trend) -03.24 -02.04 -01.61 -01.42 -00.84 -01.02 -01.66 -01.68
debt (no trend) -02.55 -01.04 -01.29 -01.35 -00.70 00.25 -00.86 -00.23
∆debt -02.55 -09.07 -09.12 -04.29 -06.53 -04.87 -04.97 -06.13
scds (with trend) -03.24 -02.11 -01.75 -03.18 -02.71 -01.82 -02.17
scds (no trend) -02.55 -01.91 -01.57 -02.83 -02.21 -01.51 -01.89
∆scds -02.55 -05.62 -05.51 -07.73 -07.73 -07.26 -07.55
r (with trend) -03.24 -01.93 -01.29 -02.35 -02.13 -02.28 -02.54 -01.74
r (no trend) -02.55 -00.08 -00.11 -00.61 -00.55 -00.59 -00.60 -01.72
∆r -02.55 -09.54 -10.14 -05.80 -05.81 -08.14 -05.76 -06.50
seq (with trend) -03.24 -01.84 -02.10 -01.81 -01.07 -02.02 -02.08 -00.81
seq (no trend) -02.55 -01.12 -01.88 -01.94 -00.72 -01.80 -01.84 00.10
∆seq -02.55 -04.15 -05.27 -06.60 -08.53 -07.67 -08.37 -08.05
Domestic Variables Critical Value IRELAND ITALY NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK
y (with trend) -03.24 -01.67 -01.89 -01.05 -01.10 -01.57 -01.54 -01.29
y (no trend) -02.55 -01.26 -01.63 -00.27 -01.21 -01.31 -01.93 -01.72
∆y -02.55 -04.62 -03.37 -03.11 -03.53 -02.90 -03.60 -03.73
debt (with trend) -03.24 -01.25 -01.36 -01.64 -00.73 -01.03 -00.93 -01.63
debt (no trend) -02.55 -00.82 00.12 -00.88 00.85 -00.55 -00.36 -01.17
∆debt -02.55 -03.85 -06.89 -04.35 -04.39 -02.56 -08.17 -02.56
scds (with trend) -03.24 -01.65 -02.36 -02.72 -01.84 -00.79 -03.42 -02.20
scds (no trend) -02.55 -01.64 -01.43 -02.17 -01.52 -01.16 -02.94 -01.96
∆scds -02.55 -04.48 -05.86 -06.21 -03.72 -05.46 -10.75 -05.95
r (with trend) -03.24 -01.14 -01.72 -02.15 -01.48 -01.04 -03.33 -02.77
r (no trend) -02.55 -01.38 -01.88 -00.48 -01.72 -01.42 -01.07 -01.31
∆r -02.55 -07.95 -08.77 -05.82 -06.50 -07.85 -05.38 -06.39
seq (with trend) -03.24 -01.38 -02.13 -02.48 -01.99 -02.02 -01.94 -01.73
seq (no trend) -02.55 -00.73 -01.30 -01.92 -01.01 -01.67 -01.85 -00.98
∆seq -02.55 -06.58 -04.09 -04.25 -06.96 -08.51 -07.31 -06.22
Global Variables Critical Value Statistic
vdax (with trend) -03.45 -02.82
vdax (no trend) -02.89 -02.85
∆vdax -02.89 -10.05
euribor− ois (with trend) -03.45 -02.07
euribor− ois (no trend) -02.89 -01.58
∆euribor− ois -02.89 -03.98
baa (with trend) -03.45 -02.64
baa (no trend) -02.89 -02.66
∆baa -02.89 -06.33
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Table 4.3: Model Specifications
Country pi qi Coint. Ranks Variable Specifications
y debt scds r seq scds∗ r∗ seq∗ vdax euribor− ois baa
AUSTRIA 2 1 2 X X X X X X X X X X X
BELGIUM 2 1 2 X X X X X X X X X X X
DENMARK 2 1 2 X X X X X X X X X X X
FINLAND 2 1 2 X X X X X X X X X X X
FRANCE 2 1 0 X X X X X X X X X X X
GERMANY 2 1 0 X X X X X X X X X X X
GREECE 2 1 0 X X - X X X X X X X X
IRELAND 2 1 0 X X X X X X X X X X X
ITALY 2 1 0 X X X X X X X X X X X
NETHERLANDS 2 1 1 X X X X X X X X X X X
PORTUGAL 2 1 0 X X X X X X X X X X X
SPAIN 2 1 0 X X X X X X X X X X X
SWEDEN 2 1 2 X X X X X X X X X X X
UK 2 1 2 X X X X X X X X X X X
4.5.2 Global Model: Properties of the GVAR
For the GVAR model to be stable, there are two conditions that needs to be satisfied:
the eigenvalues of the matrix F from (4.7) would be either inside the unit circle or on
the unit circle in the presence of I(1) variables, and the persistence profiles derived
from a VMA (vector moving average) form of the model would converge to zero over
the time horizons. There are 144 eigenvalues for matrix F7. For the model to be stable,
it requires at least 72 − 15 = 57 eigenvalues to lie on the unit circle given that we
have 72 endogenous variables and 15 ranks (cointegrating relationships) in the global
model. Among the 144 eigenvalues of matrix F there are 57 that lies on the unit circle
and 87 inside the unit circle, which confirms the stationarity condition of matrix F.
We then examine the long-run properties of the model by looking at the persistence
profiles proposed by (Pesaran and Shin, 1996) of the GVAR model. The persistence
profiles are derived using moving average representation of the VARX∗ structure and
7 Matrix F is a kp × 1 matrix, where k is the number of endogenous variables and p is the highest
value of pis in each country-specific VARX∗(pi, qi) structure. In our case, we have 72 endogenous
variables (k = 72) and the highest order of lags is 2 (p = 2).
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compare the responses of the step-n error term with the responses at step-0 given a
shock of unit one at step-0. This technique provides information on the speed with
which the cointegrating relationships of the country-specific models converge to their
equilibrium states. In the case of a stable system where the cointegrating vectors are
stationary, the profiles would converge to zero while in the case of an unstable system
they might behave in an explosive way. Therefore if the GVAR model is correctly
specified, we should observe the convergence of shocks within the time horizon. As
shown from Figure 4.3, we show that the responses would return to 0 after about 10
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Figure 4.3: Persistence Profile
The pairwise cross-section correlations (Table 4.4) allow us to examine whether
incorporating foreign effects as good proxies of unobserved common factors. One
of the key assumptions of the GVAR framework is the “idiosyncratic” shocks to
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country-specific models should be “weakly correlated” so that the foreign variables
incorporated in to the models would be weakly exogenous. For each variable,
the pairwise cross-section correlation is computed by averaging the correlations of
the specific variable in the specific country against the equivalent variable in other
countries. As shown from Table 4.4, the levels and the first differences of the
variables show high levels of correlations whereas the correlations of the residuals
drop significantly due to the incorporation of foreign effects in the country-specific
model. The different degrees of remaining effects, as Di Mauro and Pesaran (2013)
notes, might reflect policy and spillover effects. From another perspective, Table 4.5
reports the contemporaneous effects of changes of domestic variables due to changes
in their foreign counterparts. We report the estimated coefficients with Newey-West
type HAC standard errors and t-values, for r, scds, and seq. The results show that for
the sovereign risk indicators in the “distressed countries” (Greece, Portugal, Spain),
the one unit change in their foreign counterparts would often produce more than one
unit responses, giving clear evidence that these countries are prone to external shocks.
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Table 4.4: Average Pairwise Cross-section Correlations
Table 4.4 reports the pairwise cross-section correlations of the domestic variables (in level as well as
in first differences), and the pairwise cross-section correlations of the model residuals. The pairwise
cross-section correlation of a domestic variable is the correlation between the domestic variable of one
country with the same domestic variables of another country, which will then be averaged across all
countries. The purpose of calculating the cross-section correlations of variables and residuals is to
show the effectiveness of reducing cross-sectional dependence of a group of variables across different
countries by including weighted foreign variables as proxies of common factors.
Level First VECMX∗ Level First VECMX∗
Coefs Differences Residuals Coefs Differences Residuals
y AUSTRIA 0.28 0.43 0.10 r AUSTRIA 0.54 0.53 0.18
BELGIUM 0.27 0.62 0.20 BELGIUM 0.59 0.53 0.03
DENMARK 0.08 0.49 0.23 DENMARK 0.48 0.48 0.04
FINLAND 0.50 0.58 0.11 FINLAND 0.50 0.57 0.02
FRANCE 0.31 0.60 0.25 FRANCE 0.55 0.60 0.25
GERMANY 0.29 0.62 0.28 GERMANY 0.47 0.56 0.22
GREECE 0.08 0.28 0.06 GREECE –0.12 0.06 0.02
IRELAND 0.48 0.28 -0.01 IRELAND 0.22 0.39 -0.02
ITALY 0.28 0.64 0.26 ITALY 0.27 0.38 -0.03
NETHERLANDS 0.35 0.53 0.08 NETHERLANDS 0.50 0.58 0.00
PORTUGAL 0.26 0.49 0.15 PORTUGAL –0.02 0.23 0.00
SPAIN 0.43 0.53 0.06 SPAIN 0.14 0.42 0.01
SWEDEN 0.18 0.50 0.21 SWEDEN 0.42 0.50 -0.04
UK 0.11 0.49 0.23 UK 0.42 0.43 0.12
debt AUSTRIA 0.74 0.19 0.02 seq AUSTRIA 0.79 0.51 0.05
BELGIUM 0.76 0.23 -0.05 BELGIUM 0.81 0.60 0.05
DENMARK 0.63 0.31 0.08 DENMARK 0.77 0.56 0.04
FINLAND 0.80 0.14 -0.04 FINLAND 0.54 0.19 -0.02
FRANCE 0.80 0.31 0.08 FRANCE 0.85 0.67 0.20
GERMANY 0.76 0.16 0.05 GERMANY 0.80 0.60 0.14
GREECE 0.79 0.09 -0.02 GREECE 0.70 0.50 0.08
IRELAND 0.80 0.20 -0.11 IRELAND 0.81 0.55 0.12
ITALY 0.80 0.27 0.04 ITALY 0.85 0.66 0.17
NETHERLANDS 0.81 0.28 0.12 NETHERLANDS 0.83 0.62 -0.01
PORTUGAL 0.78 0.18 0.01 PORTUGAL 0.82 0.50 0.10
SPAIN 0.80 0.32 0.02 SPAIN 0.85 0.62 0.12
SWEDEN -0.42 0.00 -0.02 SWEDEN 0.28 0.57 0.05
UK 0.78 0.26 -0.03 UK 0.81 0.58 0.13
scds AUSTRIA 0.88 0.68 0.01
BELGIUM 0.89 0.68 0.00
DENMARK 0.81 0.46 0.02
FINLAND 0.89 0.65 0.13
FRANCE 0.89 0.71 0.23
GERMANY 0.91 0.67 0.21
GREECE
IRELAND 0.87 0.58 0.00
ITALY 0.86 0.65 0.00
NETHERLANDS 0.90 0.69 0.00
PORTUGAL 0.82 0.47 0.11
SPAIN 0.85 0.62 0.04
SWEDEN 0.63 0.32 -0.07
UK 0.83 0.65 0.16
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Table 4.5: Contemporaneous Effects
Table 4.5 reports the contemporaneous effects of foreign variables on the counterpart domestic
variables, with Newey-West heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and t-statistics. Coefficient value
indicates reaction of domestic variables due to changes of counterpart foreign variables.
countries r scds seq countries r scds seq
Coefficient AUSTRIA 1.12 1.07 0.39 IRELAND 1.37 1.13 0.63
(se) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) (0.30) (0.21) (0.31)
t-ratio 3.20 8.61 5.12 4.54 5.45 2.01
Coefficient BELGIUM 1.10 1.10 0.82 ITALY 0.97 1.09 0.37
(se) (0.14) (0.09) (0.14) (0.16) (0.19) (0.24)
t-ratio 8.05 12.19 5.80 5.96 5.83 1.57
Coefficient DENMARK 1.21 0.76 0.82 NETHERLANDS 0.90 0.69 1.02
(se) (0.09) (0.31) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.18)
t-ratio 13.17 2.42 5.41 12.23 9.75 5.75
Coefficient FINLAND 0.88 0.30 0.00 PORTUGAL 1.25 0.64 0.38
(se) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.16) (0.12) (0.14)
t-ratio 23.31 3.34 0.03 7.82 1.50 2.72
Coefficient FRANCE 1.13 0.66 0.21 SPAIN 0.99 1.19 0.50
(se) (0.05) (0.25) (0.35) (0.13) (0.18) (0.10)
t-ratio 5.38 3.20 4.08 7.48 6.70 4.78
Coefficient GERMANY 0.65 1.20 1.05 SWEDEN 0.88 0.74 0.73
(se) (0.12) (0.15) (0.24) (0.05) (0.25) (0.12)
t-ratio 10.05 3.20 5.80 19.59 2.92 5.98
Coefficient GREECE 1.48 0.79 UNITED KINGDOM 1.09 1.06 0.81
(se) (1.17) (0.25) (0.15) (0.20) (0.10)
t-ratio 1.27 3.15 4.38 2.20 4.58
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Weak Exogeneity Test
Lastly, We report the formal results for weak exogeneity tests. Following the concept
by Johansen (1992a), the weak exogeneity assumption of the VECMX models implies
that there should be no long run feedback from xit to x∗it, so that the α coefficients of x
∗
it
could be treated as zero, meaning that in the case of GVAR, the effects of the foreign
variables remain in the short-run and would not have long-run effects. Formally, the
test model for the weak exogeneity of x∗it is constructed as:














i,t−s + ηit,l (4.10)
Then the weak exogeneity test is an F − test of the joint significance of the
coefficients δij,l of the ECM components when regressing the vector of foreign
variables to the ECM components, and if the coefficients are jointly insignificant
we confirm the weak exogeneity of the foreign variables. Table 4.6 reports the test
results and we confirm weak exogeneity for most of the foreign variables in out model
specifications.
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Table 4.6: Weak Exogeneity Tests
Table 4.6 reports the results of weak exogeneity tests for foreign variables and global variables. The null
hypothesis of the test indicates weak exogeneity of the variables (treating their adjustment coefficients
as zero in the error-correction component). Test statistics being lower than critical values implies weak
exogeneity.
Country Critical Value scds∗ r∗ seq∗ vdax euribor− ois baa
AUSTRIA 3.08 0.79 0.88 0.37 1.45 3.12 0.25
BELGIUM 2.69 0.74 1.02 2.21 0.07 1.09 0.64
DENMARK 3.08 0.28 0.84 1.13 3.62 1.15 1.96
FINLAND 3.08 2.03 0.65 1.22 0.22 0.12 0.34
FRANCE 3.93 0.47 0.70 0.94 0.68 0.23 0.91
GERMANY 3.08 0.54 1.01 0.65 1.05 0.28 0.26
GREECE 3.08 1.13 1.18 0.60 1.14 0.32 0.49
IRELAND 3.08 0.69 0.48 0.72 0.46 1.16 0.57
ITALY 3.93 0.71 0.67 0.62 0.61 0.93 0.47
NETHERLANDS 3.93 0.22 0.01 0.24 1.08 0.11 0.01
PORTUGAL 3.93 1.06 0.98 0.73 1.09 1.20 0.54
SPAIN 3.08 0.27 0.37 0.66 0.87 1.02 1.17
SWEDEN 3.08 0.01 0.39 0.45 0.87 1.20 2.63
UK 3.08 1.16 0.57 0.94 0.33 0.19 1.39
4.6 Dynamic Analysis
In order to investigate the dynamic effects of sovereign distress in our study, we
conduct dynamic analysis based on various scenarios. We use generalised impulse
response functions (GIRFs) to investigate how an unexpected shock of one standard
deviation from the variables of interest in specific countries can influence other
variables and other countries. We then employ network plots based on the GIRFs
to visually depict the interconnectedness relationship of the countries in the sample.
Lastly We use generalised forecast error variance decompositions (GFEVDs) to
investigate the geographical origins of shocks to various variables of interest8. Our
8 Utilising generalised IRF and FEVD techniques allows us to avoid the problem of choosing
orthogonal variable orderings which need to be consistent with theoretical considerations or are
otherwise widely accepted. Choosing orthogonal identifications are particularly difficult in a multi-
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variables of interest will focus on the three potential channels of contagion, r, scds,
and seq. The dynamic simulation results are generated from 1000 bootstrap repetitions
over the horizon of 40 periods (three years).
4.6.1 Generalised Impulse Responses
In terms of generating generalised impulse responses to the variables of interest, we
discuss three scenarios: 1. Increase in the fiscal distress represented by one standard
error positive shock to the national debt/GDP ratio; 2. Slowdown in economic
output represented by one standard error negative shock to the real GDP growth; 3.
Downturn in market sentiment represented by one standard error positive shock to
the three global variables: market volatility (vdax), interbank lending rate (euribor),
and credit risk spread (baa).
Increase in Government Debt
Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 report the impulse response results from a +1 se shock to debt.
Comparing the responses from both indicators of sovereign credit risk, we find that
sovereign CDS spreads scds is more responsive to shocks in national debt level than
sovereign bond yields r. The sovereign bond yields of Greece has visible responses
to national debt shocks, especially in the case of a one standard error positive shock
to its domestic debt level, which results in 1% increase in the bond yields. In the case
of sovereign CDS spreads, positive shocks to debt will trigger roughly 1% increase in
CDS spreads in most of the cases. We can also see that domestic shocks can be expected
to have greater responses in domestic variables than cross-border transmissions. In
the case of responses from the banking sector, shocks from Germany, Italy and Ireland
have the greatest impact to the banking sectors in all countries, for example a positive
country high-dimensional setting.
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shock to national debt level will result in 1% loss in the banking sectors of Greece and
Italy, and a positive shock to German debt level will result in losses in all countries
by various degrees. The banking sector of Ireland is also found to be sensitive to
sovereign debt changes as shocks in the German and UK debt levels result in 2% and
4% losses in the Irish banking sector respectively.

















































Figure 4.4: GIRFs: +1 se shock from debt to sovereign bond yields
The impulse responses of a (X, Y) pair, where X is the country/variable from which the shock is
originated, and Y is the country/variable responding to the shock in X.
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Figure 4.5: GIRFs: +1 se shock from debt to sovereign CDS spreads
The impulse responses of a (X, Y) pair, where X is the country/variable from which the shock is
originated, and Y is the country/variable responding to the shock in X.


























































Figure 4.6: GIRFs: +1 se shock from debt to sovereign banking-sector equity returns
The impulse responses of a (X, Y) pair, where X is the country/variable from which the shock is
originated, and Y is the country/variable responding to the shock in X.
As shown from the GIRF figures, there exist heterogenous responses for coun-
tries/variables to shocks which will be difficult to summarise. In order to present the
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impact of shocks in a clear view, we construct network plots to illustrate the overall
responses from GIRFs and to show the relative proximity of the countries/variables.
Each of the nodes in the network plots represents a country-variable that trans-
mits/receives the risk spillovers, with the width of the edges represents the mean
average of the responses. The plots are drawn with the Fruchterman-Reigngold force-
directed layout, which calculates the coordinates of the nodes based on the numbers of
in/out links as well as the strength of the links. If there is a strong connection between
two country-variables they will be placed close to each other when accounting for
influences from other neighbours.
Figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 show the summarised network plots of the one positive
standard error shock from debt to r, scds and seq. We label the spillover effects
from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, as well as Germany and France
using distinct colours. There is a strong spillover effects from Germany to others
countries, regardless of whether they are in distress or not. Portugal (all figures),
Ireland (Figure 4.8) and Italy (Figure 4.9) are also shown to be strong originators of
risk spillovers in different markets. Comparatively, there is weak evidence regarding
spillover effects from Greece, which is more regarded as a receptor of spillovers in all
three of the summarised network plots. In addition, UK is also mostly a receptor of
spillovers, especially in the case of its banking sector in Figure 4.9, which implies a
strong foreign sovereign risk influence to the UK banking sector and an undeniable































































































Figure 4.9: GIRFs network: +1 se shock from debt to sovereign banking-sector
equity returns
Slow Down in GDP Growth
We then consider the scenario of a one standard error negative shock to GDP growth as
an alternative scenario of a macroeconomic shock. Comparing with previous results in
shocks to debt in Figure 4.10, most of the findings regarding the responses from r, scds
and seq still hold. One of the exceptions is that there is a 0.1% increase in the sovereign
bond yields of France following the shock to its GDP growth. In the case of scds in
Figure 4.11, it is less sensitive to shocks in GDP growth and shocks to national debt
level, with the exceptions of the shocks from Ireland to Ireland, from UK to Ireland,
and from Germany to UK. In the case of seq in Figure 4.12, the responses from banking
sector equity returns is greater from shocks of economic slowdowns than from debt
level changes in Figure 4.5.
In the summarised network plots of Figures 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15, we find that there
are more pair-specific heterogeneity and the overall spillover relationships are less
clear-cut than previous results in shocks to debt. Nevertheless, we still observe the
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strong risk spillover effects from Germany and Portugal being visible. We also record
minor spillover effects from economic slowdowns in Greece to the sovereign default
spreads in other countries in Figure 4.14. In addition, there are also strong spillover
effects from France to the banking sectors of other countries in Figure 4.15.
























































Figure 4.10: GIRFs: -1 se shock from GDP growth to sovereign bond yields
The impulse responses of a (X, Y) pair, where X is the country/variable from which the shock is
originated, and Y is the country/variable responding to the shock in X.
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Figure 4.11: GIRFs: -1 se shock from GDP growth to sovereign CDS spreads
The impulse responses of a (X, Y) pair, where X is the country/variable from which the shock is
originated, and Y is the country/variable responding to the shock in X.























































Figure 4.12: GIRFs: -1 se shock from GDP growth to sovereign banking-sector
equity returns
The impulse responses of a (X, Y) pair, where X is the country/variable from which the shock is






























































































Figure 4.15: GIRFs network: -1 se shock from GDP growth to sovereign banking-
sector equity returns
Downturn in Market Risk Climate
We then examine the responses of variables from shocks originated from global indices
representing global financial risk sentiment. baa is the spread between Moody’s BAA
index and AAA index which is used as a proxy for credit risk in the financial market
(Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; Hautsch et al., 2012), euribor − ois is the spreads
between short-term interbank lending rate and overnight risk free rate which proxies
the liquidity premium in the market (Caporale and Girardi, 2013), and vdax is the
volatility index of the German stock index which proxies the volatility in asset returns
in the stock market (Sharifova, 2012). Figure 4.16 illustrates the relative responses of
r, scds, and seq from one positive standard deviation shock of global market indices
(representing worsening market conditions). We find that sovereign bond yields do
not respond to the financial market shocks, whereas there are short term increases in
sovereign CDS spreads which recover in 10 periods, especially for the scds of Italy
and Ireland. In terms of responses from banking sector equity returns, they are also
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affected negatively in the short term by the shocks to global financial indices in various
degrees. Our results show that market volatility and credit risk create more impact
to banking sector than liquidity risk. Given the fact that most of the countries we
examine are Eurozone countries, this finding shows that the market distress during the
Eurozone sovereign crisis is more dominated by the credit risk and market volatility










































Figure 4.16: GIRFs: +1 se shock from global indices to sovereign bond yields, CDS
spreads, and banking-sector equity returns
Variables on the vertical axis are variables that shocks originate from, whereas variables on the
horizontal axis are variables where shocks are received.
4.6.2 Generalised Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
From another perspective, we consider the origins of shocks to r, scds, and seq and
the contributions from domestic/foreign variables using generalised forecast error
variance decompositions. Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 report GFEVD results and Figures
4.17, 4.18, and 4.19 report graphically the relative contribution of variables over the
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horizons. We group the variance decompositions into “self”, “core”, “distressed”, and
“global” groups containing the summed values of the variables in the groups.
In terms of shocks to sovereign bond yields and sovereign SCDS spreads, the
contributions from the countries’ own debt levels are relatively small except for the
bond yields of Greece. For “core countries” of France, Germany, and UK, their own
sovereign bond yields contribute as much to their own r and scds as these variables
from other countries in the “core countries” group. Shocks of sovereign CDS spreads
of France and Germany also share these similarities whereas the sovereign CDS
spreads of UK are under greater influences from global financial factors baa and vdax.
In the cases of “distressed countries”, Ireland and Italy shared similar characteristics
with other countries, except that influence from other “distressed countries” is also
visible. Therefore we find a clear evidence that contagion from other country-variable
as well as financial market factors help contribute to the increase of Greek sovereign
bond yields.
As for the banking sectors, using France as a benchmark, a shock to its seq can be
largely attributed to its own banking sector, its sovereign CDS spreads, the banking
sector indices for other core/distressed countries. Comparing to France, the German
seq is less under the influence of its own banking sector and its own CDS spreads,
but more under the influence from other core countries. Greece and Ireland are under
more influences from other distressed countries, whereas Italy’s own banking sector
contribute more to its own shock. In the case of UK, the global financial climate
represented by credit risk premium, liquidity risk premium and market volatility
contribute more to the shock to UK’s banking sector, which is less influenced by the
macroeconomic risk in other European Countries.
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Table 4.7: Generalised Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Sovereign Long-term Bond Yields (r)
This table reports the generalised forecast error variance decomposition for long-term bond yields by shocks from other variables at a given
horizon. GFEVD values are normalised to 100. Shocks from other variables are categorised into variables of the country itself, variables of other
countries in “core” country group or “distressed” country group. The specific country is excluded from the country group (core/distressed)
that it belongs to.
Horizon Panel [A]: Self Panel [B]: Core Panel [C]: Distressed Panel [D]: Global
debt r scds seq y debt r scds seq y debt r scds seq y baa euribor-ois vdax
FRANCE
1 0.32 25.63 0.25 0.74 0.14 0.58 40.10 0.97 1.51 1.42 1.10 9.65 1.12 2.92 0.75 0.40 0.87 0.80
2 0.32 25.38 0.31 1.27 0.23 0.68 39.47 0.94 1.50 1.24 1.07 9.28 1.18 3.06 0.70 0.49 1.02 1.24
4 0.38 24.93 0.36 2.01 0.50 0.85 38.24 0.95 1.48 1.09 1.08 8.95 1.26 3.23 0.66 0.56 1.17 1.75
8 0.53 24.32 0.38 2.63 1.30 1.12 36.87 0.98 1.52 1.16 1.19 8.86 1.27 3.43 0.70 0.44 1.08 1.73
12 0.69 23.77 0.39 2.85 2.09 1.38 35.84 1.02 1.59 1.35 1.36 8.86 1.25 3.50 0.77 0.35 0.93 1.51
GERMANY
1 0.12 20.95 0.29 0.72 0.20 1.24 36.77 1.70 3.76 1.08 0.66 1.92 1.87 1.27 0.58 3.36 3.94 5.25
2 0.26 19.40 0.42 1.00 0.19 1.30 34.17 2.17 4.25 1.20 0.76 1.85 1.77 1.36 0.61 4.53 4.82 6.19
4 0.60 17.98 0.50 1.06 0.26 1.35 32.12 2.48 4.48 1.45 0.92 1.87 1.64 1.37 0.69 5.58 5.42 7.05
8 1.07 17.81 0.42 0.83 0.71 1.34 32.60 2.24 4.11 2.02 1.12 2.09 1.54 1.27 0.97 5.28 4.67 6.59
12 1.17 18.36 0.42 0.71 1.23 1.30 34.22 1.95 3.62 2.41 1.17 2.36 1.54 1.19 1.22 4.27 3.67 5.29
GREECE
1 2.87 40.19 - 0.87 0.23 1.46 2.39 11.54 6.26 1.27 1.15 10.41 5.89 3.61 1.03 0.90 2.29 1.36
2 5.28 34.45 - 1.98 0.36 1.59 2.74 10.77 7.15 1.72 1.34 10.06 5.00 3.64 1.58 1.23 3.22 1.16
4 10.00 25.99 - 4.08 0.70 1.75 3.12 9.01 7.60 2.39 1.63 9.80 4.25 3.57 2.36 1.49 4.27 1.02
8 15.04 18.13 - 6.44 1.36 1.88 3.18 6.70 6.81 3.24 1.86 9.56 3.34 3.29 3.04 2.12 5.86 1.25
12 16.76 14.81 - 7.31 1.71 1.93 3.21 5.57 6.17 3.61 1.99 9.20 2.98 3.04 3.33 2.82 6.99 1.59
ITALY
1 0.11 23.14 4.37 2.35 0.14 1.01 19.70 5.29 4.79 1.82 3.63 17.73 3.44 3.09 1.46 1.00 0.52 1.53
2 0.15 23.38 4.28 2.30 0.16 1.07 19.78 4.88 4.64 1.91 3.63 17.88 3.44 3.08 1.48 0.90 0.81 1.37
4 0.21 23.52 4.14 2.20 0.21 1.21 19.81 4.23 4.36 2.12 3.68 17.82 3.35 3.07 1.54 0.93 1.54 1.15
8 0.33 23.22 3.81 1.98 0.32 1.44 19.50 3.49 4.19 2.44 3.73 17.21 3.13 3.09 1.61 1.09 2.76 1.35
12 0.42 22.78 3.61 1.80 0.45 1.50 19.33 3.12 4.20 2.66 3.72 16.76 2.91 3.08 1.62 1.30 3.65 1.57
UK
1 0.24 33.33 0.44 0.39 0.25 1.28 37.70 1.18 2.45 1.57 1.01 1.61 1.92 0.78 0.80 0.58 0.40 0.92
2 0.32 32.70 0.50 0.43 0.27 1.36 37.14 1.30 2.70 1.66 1.02 1.56 2.04 0.79 0.84 0.75 0.51 1.16
4 0.42 31.82 0.59 0.49 0.35 1.47 36.74 1.49 2.76 1.87 1.06 1.57 2.12 0.83 0.92 0.83 0.64 1.18
8 0.53 30.54 0.72 0.59 0.55 1.64 35.86 1.71 2.67 2.16 1.16 1.66 2.08 0.83 0.97 1.14 1.07 1.21
12 0.60 30.09 0.86 0.61 0.65 1.72 34.89 1.90 2.56 2.24 1.17 1.73 2.07 0.84 1.00 1.39 1.36 1.29
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Table 4.8: Generalised Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (scds)
Table 4.8 reports the generalised forecast error variance decomposition for sovereign credit default swaps by shocks from other variables
at a given horizon. GFEVD values are normalised to 100. Shocks from other variables are categorised into variables of the country itself,
variables of other countries in “core” country group or “distressed” country group. The specific country is excluded from the country group
(core/distressed) that it belongs to.
Horizon Panel [A]: Self Panel [B]: Core Panel [C]: Distressed Panel [D]: Global
debt r scds seq y debt r scds seq y debt r scds seq y baa euribor-ois vdax
FRANCE
1 0.24 0.21 23.97 10.11 0.27 1.04 1.46 22.91 5.60 1.53 0.84 2.21 8.56 1.81 0.46 2.44 1.17 7.21
2 0.25 0.22 23.82 10.46 0.31 1.03 1.38 22.09 5.58 1.54 0.81 2.10 8.30 1.84 0.44 2.55 1.17 8.17
4 0.31 0.23 23.74 10.78 0.39 1.00 1.35 21.63 5.63 1.59 0.85 2.05 8.24 1.90 0.45 2.42 1.01 8.65
8 0.45 0.25 23.78 10.74 0.59 1.04 1.37 21.95 5.84 1.80 0.96 2.15 8.57 1.97 0.52 1.73 0.74 7.70
12 0.55 0.28 23.67 10.48 0.78 1.11 1.43 22.47 6.05 1.91 1.05 2.29 8.87 2.03 0.58 1.31 0.62 6.50
20 0.71 0.31 23.45 9.90 1.03 1.24 1.50 23.17 6.32 2.10 1.22 2.41 9.08 2.10 0.66 1.02 0.52 4.93
GERMANY
1 0.28 0.81 19.33 6.69 1.85 1.17 1.25 28.12 10.61 1.08 1.26 0.80 3.85 1.58 0.57 2.05 1.30 6.69
2 0.37 1.08 18.42 7.18 1.75 1.21 1.24 27.24 10.95 1.05 1.20 0.76 4.01 1.74 0.55 2.49 1.58 6.53
4 0.54 1.36 18.02 7.62 1.63 1.26 1.27 26.41 10.96 1.05 1.16 0.73 4.27 1.89 0.58 2.92 1.80 5.99
8 0.89 1.68 18.50 8.25 1.53 1.31 1.34 25.85 10.42 1.12 1.13 0.75 4.73 1.99 0.63 2.61 1.63 4.74
12 1.16 1.84 19.10 8.58 1.52 1.39 1.35 25.53 9.94 1.21 1.15 0.81 5.03 2.02 0.68 2.20 1.46 3.77
20 1.39 1.98 19.96 9.02 1.61 1.44 1.37 25.36 9.38 1.31 1.15 0.87 5.36 2.02 0.72 1.64 1.28 2.73
ITALY
1 0.05 2.26 10.45 1.92 0.17 1.96 1.51 22.50 12.80 0.78 0.95 0.94 8.37 2.42 0.46 7.32 5.19 13.68
2 0.06 2.06 9.73 1.93 0.21 1.97 1.68 21.66 12.90 0.81 0.92 0.90 8.08 2.48 0.45 8.38 5.54 13.89
4 0.09 1.90 9.65 2.01 0.32 2.00 1.95 20.76 12.72 0.88 0.96 0.86 8.15 2.58 0.50 9.09 5.41 13.78
8 0.17 2.02 10.99 2.14 0.61 2.16 2.29 20.03 11.85 1.02 1.15 0.95 9.31 2.92 0.66 8.30 4.75 12.21
12 0.24 2.21 12.38 2.19 0.98 2.31 2.54 19.68 11.15 1.17 1.31 1.06 10.43 3.26 0.81 7.07 4.11 10.49
20 0.38 2.49 14.24 2.24 1.45 2.56 2.83 19.37 10.07 1.38 1.55 1.19 11.98 3.74 1.07 5.35 3.22 8.02
UK
1 0.45 0.30 19.66 1.92 0.59 1.43 1.31 20.33 9.35 1.59 0.74 0.89 5.45 1.61 0.70 7.62 5.05 13.02
2 0.89 0.30 14.80 1.36 0.94 1.66 1.45 16.80 8.89 1.94 0.85 0.87 4.28 1.73 0.81 11.26 6.08 16.96
4 2.25 0.34 9.57 1.00 1.68 2.03 1.74 12.37 7.66 2.72 1.10 0.92 3.14 1.96 1.13 15.02 6.04 20.75
8 5.16 0.59 6.56 1.47 3.21 2.66 2.30 9.94 6.47 4.65 1.66 1.07 2.61 2.20 1.94 13.92 5.01 18.62
12 7.19 0.75 5.56 1.97 4.28 3.28 2.68 9.96 6.60 6.20 2.06 1.15 2.44 2.14 2.41 10.72 5.43 14.06
20 8.97 0.85 4.42 2.33 5.50 3.91 2.79 10.77 7.29 7.82 2.29 1.09 2.17 1.83 2.73 7.50 5.98 9.84
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Table 4.9: Generalised Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Sovereign Banking Sector Equity Returns (seq)
Table 4.9 reports the generalised forecast error variance decomposition for sovereign banking sector equity returns by shocks from other
variables at a given horizon. GFEVD values are normalised to 100. Shocks from other variables are categorised into variables of the country
itself, variables of other countries in “core” country group or “distressed” country group. The specific country is excluded from the country
group (core/distressed) that it belongs to.
Horizon Panel [A]: Self Panel [B]: Core Panel [C]: Distressed Panel [D]: Global
debt r scds seq y debt r scds seq y debt r scds seq y baa euribor-ois vdax
FRANCE
1 0.21 0.28 12.74 28.04 1.04 1.14 1.08 7.83 10.83 1.99 0.39 1.47 3.05 9.31 0.39 1.81 1.71 9.73
2 0.24 0.30 13.08 27.19 1.16 1.13 1.10 7.96 10.56 2.11 0.40 1.53 3.04 8.78 0.40 1.91 1.64 10.43
4 0.30 0.31 13.32 26.73 1.41 1.12 1.12 8.02 10.54 2.28 0.43 1.55 3.02 8.52 0.44 1.78 1.45 10.58
8 0.48 0.33 13.27 26.55 1.92 1.16 1.19 8.08 10.88 2.64 0.54 1.61 3.03 8.63 0.56 1.25 1.07 9.61
12 0.66 0.35 13.08 26.26 2.39 1.27 1.24 8.15 11.35 2.96 0.67 1.66 3.06 8.71 0.66 0.94 0.84 8.35
GERMANY
1 0.12 0.26 5.41 18.90 1.92 1.25 1.04 15.47 18.15 1.39 0.89 0.44 2.17 3.22 0.50 3.13 4.67 13.54
2 0.14 0.32 5.51 18.56 1.57 1.30 1.11 15.34 17.47 1.34 0.93 0.44 2.20 3.22 0.50 4.15 5.52 12.62
4 0.19 0.40 5.52 18.57 1.20 1.34 1.26 14.98 16.62 1.38 1.02 0.47 2.28 3.28 0.57 5.24 5.81 11.86
8 0.37 0.49 5.55 19.85 0.99 1.45 1.39 14.50 15.98 1.66 1.12 0.53 2.66 3.55 0.82 5.26 5.22 10.27
12 0.62 0.54 5.60 21.28 0.94 1.54 1.46 14.15 15.54 1.91 1.17 0.59 3.04 3.86 1.05 4.57 4.67 8.86
GREECE
1 1.65 0.37 - 26.34 0.65 1.59 2.24 12.24 16.65 2.60 0.97 2.13 4.01 5.31 1.26 4.99 1.67 9.10
2 1.44 0.37 - 24.73 0.88 1.70 2.21 11.83 16.16 2.81 0.93 2.04 4.05 5.36 1.12 6.00 1.82 10.16
4 1.27 0.38 - 24.37 1.33 1.83 2.21 10.73 15.29 3.27 0.96 1.94 4.09 5.54 1.06 6.77 1.72 10.60
8 1.28 0.51 - 26.55 2.41 1.98 2.54 9.31 13.58 4.07 1.15 2.01 4.16 6.01 1.15 5.69 1.62 8.89
12 1.34 0.63 - 28.51 3.29 2.08 2.84 8.22 12.13 4.74 1.36 2.08 4.11 6.16 1.32 4.74 1.76 7.00
ITALY
1 0.12 1.19 1.22 12.49 0.19 1.64 0.99 14.87 26.19 4.00 0.33 2.12 3.42 7.80 0.46 3.48 2.55 10.39
2 0.18 1.19 1.18 12.18 0.20 1.68 1.04 14.61 25.57 4.13 0.34 2.09 3.39 7.69 0.47 4.22 2.85 10.24
4 0.30 1.18 1.17 12.39 0.24 1.83 1.11 13.82 24.83 4.38 0.38 2.02 3.36 7.73 0.53 4.99 2.93 9.76
8 0.52 1.23 1.22 13.62 0.40 2.15 1.16 12.62 24.00 5.14 0.45 2.17 3.48 8.26 0.67 4.71 2.61 8.30
12 0.68 1.31 1.24 14.66 0.62 2.44 1.22 11.72 23.47 6.02 0.50 2.33 3.51 8.78 0.83 4.07 2.26 6.88
UK
1 0.37 0.20 1.07 13.40 1.51 2.11 2.69 5.68 10.48 2.89 0.58 0.60 0.50 1.44 0.89 13.73 11.94 17.85
2 0.55 0.20 0.68 9.77 1.75 2.25 2.44 4.83 9.65 2.71 0.59 0.60 0.50 1.43 0.76 16.94 12.41 20.44
4 0.90 0.23 0.77 6.42 2.21 2.34 2.29 4.08 8.32 2.69 0.68 0.65 0.64 1.46 0.80 19.51 11.80 23.17
8 1.82 0.36 2.02 4.47 3.25 2.50 2.42 4.35 6.87 3.02 0.93 0.76 1.37 1.52 1.12 19.42 9.99 22.28








































Figure 4.17: GFEVDs: +1 se shock to sovereign bond yields
The figure illustrates the relative contribution of each variables listed to the variable of interest in respective countries. Values are normalised
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Figure 4.18: GFEVDs: +1 se shock to sovereign CDS spreads
The figure illustrates the relative contribution of each variables listed to the variable of interest in respective countries. Values are normalised








































Figure 4.19: GFEVDs: -1 se shock to banking sector equity returns
The figure illustrates the relative contribution of each variables listed to the variable of interest in respective countries. Values are normalised
to sum up to 100.
124
4.7 Conclusions
In this study we examine the implications of sovereign distress to the three markets:
the sovereign bond markets, the sovereign CDS markets, and the national banking
sector. The Global Vector-Autoregressive model (GVAR) allows us to model the
dynamics among different domestic markets inside a supranational framework.
We investigate the impact to the three markets of interest, of sovereign distress
represented by macroeconomic shocks of fiscal burden and economic slowdowns as
well as financial shocks of credit risk, liquidity risk and market volatility. We also
examine the origins of shocks in these markets that can be attributed to the influences
from the domestic/foreign markets and global factors.
To what extent are the sovereign risk spillover effects and how do the effects
affect the financial markets? In Chapter 3 we discuss the effects of risk spillovers
from sovereign countries, whereas in this chapter we further discuss the roles of risk
originators and receptors. Among the “distressed countries” that are often regarded
as originators of sovereign risk spillovers which impose systemic risk to the financial
markets, we find the results are heterogenous by each country. Specifically, the
scenarios of macroeconomic shocks originated from Germany, Portugal and Italy have
strong spillover effects that contribute to the sovereign risk of other countries, as well
as the financial markets in most countries. In the case of Greece, our results show that
as an originator of risk its impact is modest and it is more under the influence of other
distressed countries, which is in line with the general findings in Chapter 3.
Our results on the roles of countries in the risk spillovers scenarios are also gen-
erally in line with the findings in previous literature. In a similar GVAR framework,
Gray (2013) simulates the adverse shocks to other countries from the GIIPS9 country
group and show that Greece is among the highest affected financial markets from
9 Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
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outside influence, resulting in a 1.4% drop in its GDP and also in a 0.5% drop during
the simulation horizon. In the study of price discovery mechanisms of Palladini and
Portes (2011), the authors also show that the fundamental default risk as revealed in
the bond spreads of the Greek government bonds is exacerbated by the influences
from its CDS spreads, implying the receptor status of risk spillovers. The results
in the static ∆CoVaR analysis in Fong and Wong (2012) also find that Greece and
Portugal are the two most affected countries from risk spillovers, while their spillovers
to other countries are relatively moderate. In general, our results are in line with the
previous findings in the sovereign risk contagion literature and we believe our results
are robust.
As for the implications to the financial sectors, our results regarding the banking
sector returns show that the impact from weak economic growth is generally greater
than impact from debt shocks, and there are strong effects to the financial sectors
following the economic slowdowns of the EU economic powerhouses of Germany,
France and UK. In addition, comparing to the banking sector returns of other
countries which are influenced by EU cross-border sources, the returns of UK financial
institutions are under greater influences of global financial factors.
From the perspective of policy-makers, providing support to countries of risk
originations is crucial in terms of preventing the realisation of systemic events. In
addition, how the sources of risk spillovers and the levels of relevant impact are
identified influence the decisions regarding the timings and degrees of intervention
policies. Our findings in terms of the dynamics of sovereign risk spillovers help
contribute to the understanding of sovereign risk impact and provide information
regarding the safeguarding of financial markets from sovereign risk impact.
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Appendix 4.A Appendix
Table 4.10: Variable Definitions and Constructions
This table reports the definitions and constructions of variables used in this study. Constructed variables
are denoted in lowercase letters and their raw forms are denoted in capital letters.
Variable Definition Explanation Source
y y = ∆ln( NOMINAL GDPGDP DEFLATOR ) Real GDP growth. In the cases of non-
Euro economies of Denmark, Sweden
and UK, exchange rates wrt. Euro are
taken into account.
OECD
debt debt = 100× GOVT.DEBTNOMINALGDP Ratio of government debt to GDP Eurostat
r r = ln(1 + GOVT. BOND YIELD100 ) Log of long term government bond yield,
in gross interest rate form
Datastream
scds scds = ln(1 + SOV. CDS100 ) Log of 5 year sovereign credit default
swap spreads, in gross interest rate form
Datastream
seq seq = ln(1 + SOV. BANK EQUITY RETURNHICP ) Log of real banking sector equity returns* Thomson One
vdax vdax = ln(VDAX NEW) Log of the implied volatility of the
German stock index DAX
Datastream
euribor-ois euribor− ois = ln(1 + EURIBOR−EONIA100 ) Log of the spreads between 3 month
EURIBOR rate and EONIA, in gross
interest rate form
ECB
baa baa = ln(BAA− AAA) Log of the spreads between moody’s
BAA and AAA indices
Datastream
* The banking sector return for each country is calculated from the return of a banking sector index, which is
constructed as the index of equity prices of commercial banks listed in their home country stock exchanges,
weighted by their total assets.
Table 4.11: Entities for Sovereign Banking Sector Equity
Entity Name Quote Symbol Sedol Country Exchange
BKS Bank AG BKS-VI 4082480 AUT XWBO
Osterreichische Volksbanken AG VBPS-VI 4664565 AUT XWBO
Oberbank AG OBS-VI 4081294 AUT XWBO
Bank FUR Tirol Und Vorarlberg AG BTS-VI 4082491 AUT XWBO
Volksbank Vorarlberg VVPS-VI 4932961 AUT XWBO
Erste Group Bank AG EBS-VI 5289837 AUT XWBO
KBC Groep NV KBC-BT 4497749 BEL XBRU
Dexia DEXB-BT 7147610 BEL XBRU
Continued on next page
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Table 4.11 – Continued from previous page
Entity Name Quote Symbol Sedol Country Exchange
DVB Bank SE DVB-FF 4270489 DEU XFRA
MLP AG MLP-FF 5720273 DEU XFRA
Merkur Bank Kgaa MBK-FF 5641084 DEU XFRA
Oldenburgische Landesbank AG OLB-FF 4657855 DEU XFRA
Deutsche Bank AG DBK-FF 5750355 DEU XFRA
Comdirect Bank AG COM-FF 5975266 DEU XFRA
Aareal Bank AG ARL-FF 7380062 DEU XFRA
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG IKB-FF 5169865 DEU XFRA
Salling Bank A/S SALB-KO 4771799 DNK XCSE
Norresundby Bank A/S NRSU-KO 4645399 DNK XCSE
Ostjydsk Bank A/S OJBA-KO 4660767 DNK XCSE
Vestjysk Bank A/S VJBA-KO B00HQS0 DNK XCSE
Kreditbanken A/S KRE-KO 5712021 DNK XCSE
Skjern Bank A/S SKJE-KO 7454439 DNK XCSE
Totalbanken A/S TOTA-KO B1W3ZK8 DNK XCSE
Lan & Spar Bank A/S LASP-KO 4529363 DNK XCSE
Djurslands Bank A/S DJUR-KO B013KC9 DNK XCSE
Mons Bank A/S MNBA-KO 4601744 DNK XCSE
Hvidbjerg Bank A/S HVID-KO 4449610 DNK XCSE
Nordfyns Bank A/S NRDF-KO 4644998 DNK XCSE
Lollands Bank A/S LOLB-KO B0773F9 DNK XCSE
Sydbank A/S SYDB-KO B06JSP1 DNK XCSE
Nordjyske Bank A/S NORDJB-KO B134MD2 DNK XCSE
Gronlandsbanken A/S GRLA-KO 4391090 DNK XCSE
Spar Nord Bank A/S SPNO-KO B14LS01 DNK XCSE
Ringkjobing Landbobank RILBA-KO B105JH1 DNK XCSE
Fynske Bank AS SVEND-KO 7207019 DNK XCSE
Danske Bank A/S DANSKE-KO 4588825 DNK XCSE
Jyske Bank AS JYSK-KO B0386J1 DNK XCSE
Banco Santander SA SAN-MC 5705946 ESP XMCE
Banco Popular Espanol SA POP-MC BBHXPN6 ESP XMCE
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA BBVA-MC 5501906 ESP XMCE
Banco De Sabadell SA SAB-MC B1X8QN2 ESP XMCE
Bankinter SA BKT-MC 5474008 ESP XMCE
Alandsbanken ABP ALBAV-HE 4019927 FIN XHEL
Continued on next page
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Table 4.11 – Continued from previous page
Entity Name Quote Symbol Sedol Country Exchange
Credit Industriel Et Commercial CC-FR 5487471 FRA XPAR
Banque Reunion BQRE-FR 5286173 FRA XPAR
Credit Agricole Ile De France CAF-FR 7110463 FRA XPAR
Societe Generale GLE-FR 5966516 FRA XPAR
Viel Et CIE VIL-FR 5962417 FRA XPAR
Natixis KN-FR B1HDJL2 FRA XPAR
Credit Agricole Toulouse CAT31-FR 4230171 FRA XPAR
BNP Paribas BNP-FR 7309681 FRA XPAR
Crcam Ille-Village CCI CIV-FR 4202448 FRA XPAR
Crcam Normandie Seine CCN-FR 7121153 FRA XPAR
Credit Agricole Morbihan CMO-FR 4230449 FRA XPAR
Crcam Nord De France CCI CNF-FR B0VTSP6 FRA XPAR
Crcam Atlantique Vendee CRAV-FR 7397879 FRA XPAR
Credit Agricole Alpes Provences CRAP-FR 5585148 FRA XPAR
Credit Agricole SUD Rhone Alpes CRSU-FR 5082304 FRA XPAR
Credit Agricole Loire-H-Loire CRLO-FR 4253736 FRA XPAR
Credit Agricole SA ACA-FR 7262610 FRA XPAR
Credit Agricole Touraine CRTO-FR 4426624 FRA XPAR
Credit Foncier De Monaco MLCFM-FR BFTW6M5 FRA XPAR
Royal Bank Of Scotland Group PLC RBS-LN B7T7721 GBR XLON
Arbuthnot Banking Group PLC ARBB-LN 792233 GBR XLON
Close Brothers Group PLC CBG-LN 766807 GBR XLON
Lloyds Banking Group PLC LLOY-LN 870612 GBR XLON
Barclays PLC BARC-LN 3134865 GBR XLON
HSBC Holdings PLC HSBA-LN 540528 GBR XLON
Standard Chartered PLC STAN-LN 408284 GBR XLON
Alpha Bank SA ALPHA-AT 4235864 GRC XATH
Attica Bank SA TATT-AT BBG9VR1 GRC XATH
Eurobank Ergasias SA EUROB-AT BBL58B7 GRC XATH
National Bank Of Greece SA ETE-AT BB36BJ7 GRC XATH
Bank Of Piraeus SA TPEIR-AT BBFL4S0 GRC XATH
Allied Irish Banks PLC AIB-DB 4020684 IRL XDUB
Bank Of Ireland BIR-DB 3070732 IRL XDUB
Continued on next page
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Table 4.11 – Continued from previous page
Entity Name Quote Symbol Sedol Country Exchange
Mediobanca Banca DI Credito Fin SA MB-MI 4574813 ITA MTAA
Banca Popolare Emilia Romagna BPE-MI 4116099 ITA MTAA
Banca Intermobiliare BIM-MI 4446398 ITA MTAA
Banco DI Sardegna BSRP-MI 4072533 ITA MTAA
Unicredit UCG-MI B5M1SM3 ITA MTAA
Banca Popolare DI Sondrio BPSO-MI 4115223 ITA MTAA
Unione DI Banche Italian UBI-MI 7622225 ITA MTAA
Banca Popolare DI Milano PMI-MI 4072168 ITA MTAA
Intesa Sanpaolo ISP-MI 4076836 ITA MTAA
Banca Carige CRG-MI 7277528 ITA MTAA
Banca Profilo PRO-MI 5724587 ITA MTAA
Credito Emiliano CE-MI 7135251 ITA MTAA
Banca Monte DEI Paschi BMPS-MI BM7SBM9 ITA MTAA
Banco DI Desio E Brianza BDB-MI 4115740 ITA MTAA
Banca Popolare Etruria Lazio PEL-MI B8DPTG6 ITA MTAA
Banco Popolare BP-MI BKJ9QS7 ITA MTAA
ING Groep NV INGA-AE 7154182 NLD XAMS
Van Lanschot NV LANS-AE 5716302 NLD XAMS
Banco Comercial Portugues BCP-LB 5812493 PRT XLIS
Banco Espirito Santo SA BES-LB 4058061 PRT XLIS
Banco BPI SA BPI-LB 5721759 PRT XLIS
Swedbank AB SWED’A-SK 4846523 SWE XOME
Nordea Bank AB NDA’SEK-SK 5380031 SWE XOME
SEB ’A’ SA SEB’A-SK 4813345 SWE XOME
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHB’A-SK 5703661 SWE XOME
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Chapter 5
Systemic Risk Spillovers in
Tail-Dependence Network
5.1 Introduction
A network representation of the financial system depict individual market participants
represented as nodes and various linkages from different channels are represented as
edges. Similar to the network representation of other concepts of interconnectedness,
from social networks to the contagion of epidemics, the outcomes of risk propagation
are dependent on the structure of how financial network is formulated, and the
fragility of the system is also dependent on the location where the initial shocks
occurs (Allen and Babus, 2008). Early theory on the risk sharing aspect of network
formulation suggests that an incomplete network structure where most entities
are distant from each other is more prone to contagion and network resilience
improves with more complete structures (Allen and Gale, 2000). However, empirical
evidence document the contagion effects during the recent episodes of financial
crises including the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 and the Eurozone Sovereign
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Crisis of 2010-2012 which suggests the existence of the high spillovers of systemic
risk (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; Acharya et al., 2012) and the rapid surges
of network interconnectedness (Billio, Getmansky, Lo and Pelizzon, 2012). In the
context of an increasingly globalised financial integration, further studies regarding
interconnectedness of financial institutions from a global perspective is required to
provide insights into how financial stability can be maintained.
Traditional approaches in macro-prudential regulation in systemic risk rely on
market data of asset prices and equity values, as well as the balance sheet data
of financial institutions. The ∆CoVaR measure by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011,
2016), along the other measures such as the marginal expected shortfall of Acharya
et al. (2010, 2012) has been widely adopted in academia for the study of systemic
risk. Regulators also adopt these systemic risk measures in their tool sets to monitor
the stability of the financial market. The European Central Bank provides its own
estimates of ∆CoVaR for the banking sector and insurance sector as indicators
for risk monitoring purposes. However, traditional systemic risk measures suffer
from two drawbacks. Firstly, estimates of an individual institution’s risk aggregate
contributions and exposures to the “system” might not reflect the actual risk positions
as it often ignores or averages the connectedness of the individual in the system,
regardless of the heterogeneity of the individual’s linkages. Financial institutions
with similar aggregated exposures to the system might have different set of directly
connected neighbours and thus different realised outcomes of impact given their
respective routes of risk propagation. Secondly, as connectedness structures are
ignored, these risk measures are not able to examine the microscopic dynamics of
contagion occurring the system in multi-stage scenarios, which could underestimate
the severity of negative externality during the times of market distress or financial
crisis. Therefore a multidimensional approach to examine the risk contributions of
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individual institutions to the system, as well as the overall stability of the financial
system is warranted.
The global financial system is not a centralised market but rather a complex
network structure of multiple layers and clusters formed by the bilateral relationships
of individual market participants. The interconnectedness of financial institutions
can be attributed to different types of linkages which in turn could stem from
counterparty risk of unsecured debt contracts (Furfine, 2003), indirect balance-sheet
linkages and fire sales distress (Lagunoff and Schreft, 2001; De Vries, 2005), or the
withdrawal of funding liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Distress of one
market participant not only imposes credit risk to its counterparties, but also lead
to fire-sales of mark-to-market assets and the tightening of margins which result in
further crowded trade and system-wide instability. On one hand, the risk sharing
nature of financial network helps diversify idiosyncratic shocks, but on the other
hand it facilitates the amplification of the externality of individual distress which
contributes to the fragility of the system. In addition, the interconnectedness of
financial institutions creates a moral hazard problem where they will be incentivised to
increase their mutual linkages and benefit from them, and they will be deemed as “too-
interconnected-to-fail” to financial regulators in order to prevent greater damages
to financial stability. Therefore, finding ways to measure and monitor the financial
interconnectedness remain an important task for regulators and policy-makers.
This study seeks to examine the impact of interconnectedness risk in a financial
network that is formulated by the tail dependency of market returns. We define
interconnectedness risk as the economic losses induced by the interconnectedness
of financial institutions, when the impact initial shocks of market distress could be
amplified by the propagation of stresses from one institution to another, resulting
in greater market distress than the initial systemic risk spillovers. We extend the
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framework of systemic risk spillovers of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) to measure
the pairwise systemic risk spillovers between two financial institutions and construct
a global tail-dependence network formulated by the propagation of tail risk spillovers,
using a globalised sample of financial institutions of commercial banks, broker-
dealers, and insurance companies. We explore the network topology characteristics
of the tail-dependence network, i.e. the level of interconnectedness of individual
institutions represented by network centrality measures, as well as the distribution
of connections. We then examine the impact of interconnectedness risk to the financial
network system by assessing the network stresses induced by the propagation of
systemic risk spillovers in the tail dependency network. Lastly, we examine the
contributions of initial impact and interconnectedness measures to the realisation of
network stresses.
We contribute to the strand of network analysis on financial systemic risk in several
ways:
Firstly, we extend the aggregated systemic risk spillovers analytical framework
to a pairwise level, where the individual-to-individual dynamics of risk spillovers
are better captured. From the analytical framework of ∆CoVaR in Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2016) on the aggregate risk spillovers relationship between individual
entity and the system, we extend this approach to the pairwise risk spillovers
relationship between financial institutions. The tail-dependence in market returns
of financial institutions, estimated from the ∆CoVaR risk spillovers, is then used to
construct the tail-dependence network.
Secondly, previous studies regarding entity interactions limit their scope at the top
market participants, which also limit the validity of their research as small impact in
the system can have greater consequences due to interlinkage. We greatly expand
the scope of network interactions in market entities by allowing for the pairwise
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interactions of over 1,300 financial institutions in a dynamic rolling window fashion,
which is larger than most empirical studies in this field (Billio, Getmansky, Lo and
Pelizzon, 2012; Hautsch et al., 2012; Betz et al., 2015; Härdle et al., 2016). This large
scope of analysis allows us to capture more subtle interactions among smaller market
players that are typically identified by previous studies, and make the discussions on
network interconnectedness and topological structure more applicable in real world
scenarios.
Thirdly, we contribute to the understanding of the potential market collapse
scenarios as discussed in the theoretical studies of Elliott et al. (2014) and Acemoglu
et al. (2015), from the empirical perspective of the consequences of tail risk intercon-
nectedness, by using the analytical framework of DebtRank in Battiston, Caldarelli,
Puliga, Gabrielli et al. (2012); Bardoscia, Battiston, Caccioli and Caldarelli (2015) on
the risk propagation of initial risk spillovers.
The following sections are organised as follows: In Section 5.2 we discuss the
previous studies of financial network and our contributions. In Section 5.3 we discuss
our methods in constructing tail-dependence network and assessing interconnected-
ness risk. In Section 5.4 we discuss our empirical strategy in data collection and
variable construction. In Section 5.5 we discuss the characteristics of tail-dependence
network and in Section 5.6 we discuss network stresses from interconnectedness risk.
In Section 5.7 we provide the general conclusions of this study.
5.2 Related Literature
Our study can be related to the literature on systemic risk measures revealed by market
series. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011, 2016) propose a measure of the systemic risk
spillovers of financial institutions from market series indicators, including market-
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valued asset returns and equity returns. The ∆CoVaR measure calculates the level
of spillovers transferred to other market participants in the process when a financial
institution experiences a distress event. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) examines
the case of the systemic risk spillovers from an individual institution to the system
as represented by a systemic portfolio series, but leaves open the research question
of bilateral risk spillovers from one individual institution to another institution. We
extend their study by investigating the pairwise risk spillover relationships of financial
institutions.
Our study is also closely related to the study of a tail-dependence network.
Hautsch et al. (2012) proposes a measure of the tail-dependence of financial institu-
tions where the value-at-risk of one institution is co-dependent on the values-at-risk of
other institutions. The tail-dependence is identified from a pool of potential candidate
risk drivers of the series of other financial institutions, as well as common macro-
financial variables, using a feature selection mechanism based on the LASSO method
(Tibshirani, 1996). This approach is also adopted by Bonaldi et al. (2015), Demirer et al.
(2015), and Härdle et al. (2016) with feature selection variants including elastic net
and adaptive LASSO methods. Although variable shrinkage methods provide a way
to identify tail-dependence among many financial institutions via feature selection,
these studies are still limited by the feature size of their samples with about 100-
200 financial institutions. Extending Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016)’s approach
we construct the tail-dependence network by iteratively examine the risk spillover
relationship between any two financial institutions in the sample, with the help of
high performance computer clusters which enables us to build a larger sample pool of
financial institutions.
Our study investigates the network topology structure regarding how the linkage
patterns of individual nodes influence the overall behaviour of the network, where the
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theoretical and methodological foundations have been laid by previous studies by the
various strands of financial network literature. Elliott et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al.
(2015) provide theoretical ground on how the interdependence of financial institutions
and the diversification of shocks will determine the ultimate impact of an original
shock to the system. Clauset, Shalizi and Newman (2009) proposes a tail power-
law distribution which characterises the existence of highly interconnected nodes
in real world network examples, and Cont et al. (2013) confirms that this network
interconnectedness pattern is also observed in the interbank lending network. Billio,
Getmansky, Lo and Pelizzon (2012) provides several centrality measures to capture
the interconnectedness of financial institutions. Battiston, Puliga, Kaushik, Tasca and
Caldarelli (2012) and Bardoscia et al. (2015) propose the DebtRank method to study the
impact and stresses of network interconnectedness. Our study and results on network
interconnectedness contribute to this literature on network characteristics.
We seek to provide empirical evidence of global financial cross-sector and cross-
border linkages for regulators and policy-makers and provide justifications for their
coordinated efforts in global financial stability. Billio, Getmansky, Lo and Pelizzon
(2012) constructs a pairwise Granger Causality network of equity prices for United
States financial sectors of commercial banks, broker-dealers, insurance companies and
hedge funds. Betz et al. (2015) examines the risk spillovers of European banks and
European sovereign states using CDS series. Demirer et al. (2015) studies the network
volatility spillovers of large global banks. Our study is also related to these studies on
financial institutions with cross-sector and cross-border market linkages.
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5.3 Methodology
5.3.1 Constructing Tail-Dependence Network
Network ∆CoVaR
The “∆CoVaR” concept of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011, 2016) is a measure of
directional tail dependence. “Systemic ∆CoVaR” treats one financial institution as
the originator of risk spillovers and the system (as represented by a systemic index
or a systemic portfolio) as the receiver of risk, with the purpose of analysing the
systemic risk contribution of the distress of one institution to the whole system. We
extend the original framework to measure the pairwise directional tail dependence
between two financial institutions, i.e. the “Network ∆CoVaR” discussed in Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2016, p. 1714).
Let Xi denotes the equity return of financial institution i and VaRiq denotes the qth−
quantile Value-at-Risk of institution i. We refer to CoVaRj|iq as the qth − quantile Value-
at-Risk of institution j’s equity return conditional on the event of institution i’s equity
return taking the value of VaRiq, and ∆CoVaR
j|i
q as the VaR difference conditional on
i’s VaR quantile shift1:
Pr(X j|C(Xi = VaRiq) ≤ CoVaR
j|i






We use quantile regression models for the series estimates of VaRiq,t, CoVaR
j|i
q,t and
∆CoVaRj|iq,t, which are modelled as the linear quantile estimates
2 based on lagged state
1We discuss the methodology of ∆CoVaR in Section 2.2.3.
2For the formulation of VaR and CoVaR quantile regression models, please refer to the discussion
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Note that from the empirical relationship between i and j in (5.6) and (5.8), when
β̂
j|i
q = 0, CoVaR
j|i
q,t falls back to VaR
j
q,t since there is no significant influence to j from
the distress event of i, and naturally ∆CoVaRj|iq,t = 0 when there is no risk spillovers
from i to j. Therefore we denote (i → j) = 1 as the existence of risk spillovers from
i to j when we could not reject Pr(> |t(β̂j|iq )|) ≤ α, which confirms the presence of
a significant βj|iq . For the inference of t-statistics we use the Huber Sandwich method
for the heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of standard errors3 with a significance
level of α = 1%.
Tail-Dependence Network and Centrality Measures
In order to construct the tail-dependence network we need to map out the con-
tributions of the pairwise risk spillovers within the whole systemic spillovers that
institution i imposes on the system. We first calculate ∆CoVaRsys|iq , the systemic
risk spillovers of institution i against the value-weighted systemic portfolio of the
institutions in the sample, as well as the i − j pairwise spillovers of institutions





q . Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016)’s discussions regarding
systemic risk portfolio, we calculate ∆CoVaRj|iq as the ∆C̃oVaR
j|i
q rescaled by value




∆CoVaRsys|iq , vl = ∆C̃oVaR
j|i
q (5.9)
Given the risk spillover relationship calculated by ∆CoVaRj|iq between institutions
i and j, we can then map out the tail dependency network of the financial system
from the initial pairwise direct risk spillovers. We construct a N× N adjacency matrix
A(ai,j ∈ {0, 1}) where ai,j = 1 if (i → j) = 1 to denote the adjacency of two nodes,
and a N × N spillover impact matrix W(wi,j ∈ [0, 1]) where wi,j = −∆CoVaR
j|i
q . We
then construct the following two node centrality measures to describe the network
topology structure: degree centrality and closeness centrality.









Degree centrality measures the direct connectedness of nodes. A node i with high
degree not only means that more nodes are affected by i’s distress or i is exposed to
the distress events of more nodes, but also that node i is now more interconnected
by serving as a hub node linking the spillovers of more nodes. Therefore, a financial
network system with high degree centrality is more susceptible to the outbreak of
systemic risk within a small group of individual institutions.
4For simplicity we refer to total-degree centrality for “degree” centrality in this context. Degree
measures can be divided into two sub-measures: out-degree refers to the number of links with node i
as the originator, and in-degree refers to the number of links with node i as the receiver. Total-degree
that is the sum of out-degree and in-degree.
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Closeness centrality refers to average steps it takes for the influence from node
i to reach any other nodes in the network. The distress of i affects its directly
linked neighbours, which then travels through the subsequent direct linkages of i’s
neighbours to other nodes, as long as there are direct routes to these nodes. Following
Billio, Getmansky, Gray, Lo, Merton and Pelizzon (2012) we define (i C−→ j) as a route
from i to j with C steps, if there exists a unique C-step links from node i to node j via
nodes k1, k2 to kC−1:
(i C−→ j) = (i→ k1)× (k1 → k2) · · · × (kC−1 → j) (5.11)
Define Cij as the minimum5 of all possible (i
C−→ j) links, which is the shortest
possible path for the influence of i to reach j:
Cij = min
C
{C ∈ [1, N − 1] : (i C−→ j)} (5.12)
As the measure for the overall connectedness or centrality of node i, closenessi
denotes the average length of links from node i to all other nodes in the network:
closenessi =
1
N − 1 ∑i 6=j
Cij(i
C−→ j) (5.13)
5.3.2 Measuring Interconnectedness Risk
Our study tries to examine the resilience of the global financial network regarding
network-specific risks when facing severe distress. To do so, we need to evaluate
the stresses induced by the network system due to the propagation of risk spillovers
from the initial failures of individual institutions. Here we employ the “DebtRank”
5We use Dijkstra’s Shortest Path algorithm for the calculation for Cij, which iteratively eliminates
inferior alternative routes until the shortest path is picked (Dijkstra, 1959).
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method6 of Battiston, Puliga, Kaushik, Tasca and Caldarelli (2012) and Bardoscia et al.
(2015) as a measure to examine the impact of interconnectedness risk. DebtRank
calculates the stresses (loss of economic values) to the financial network induced by
the network structures due to the propagation of first failures, and the contributions
of such stresses by financial institutions. In the context of our study, we use the
term “network stresses” to specifically represent the losses of economic value induced
by interconnectedness and risk propagation, and use the term “network impact”
in a generalised sense to denote the interconnectedness impact, measured either as
economic losses or as defaults.
Each node j, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} in the network is associated with two state variables:
hj ∈ [0, 1] and sj ∈ {U, D, I}. hj records the current stress level of node j (represented
as percentage equity losses), with hj = 0 meaning no loss and hj = 1 meaning a
complete loss of economic value. sj records the current state of the node, where sj = U
meaning “undistressed”, sj = D meaning “distressed” and sj = I meaning “inactive”.
In order to examine the network stresses caused by the distress of node i, we define
the event Xit = VaR
i
q,t = −ψ, ψ ∈ [0, 1] as the triggering event of systemic risk
spillovers, meaning the distress event makes institution i suffer the realised VaR losses
and its risk spillovers to other institutions are thus ∆CoVaRj|iq . The impact matrix
W, as discussed in Section 5.3.1, then serves the routes of risk spillovers following
i’s distress. Therefore, the initial conditions for all nodes are as follows: hi(1) = ψ;
hj(1) = 0 ∀j 6= i; si(1) = D; sj(1) = U ∀j 6= i.
6DebtRank is originally proposed by Battiston, Puliga, Kaushik, Tasca and Caldarelli (2012) for the
study of network impact of the US interbank debt holding market (hence its name), which borrows the












Figure 5.1: Propagation of Risk Spillovers
The impact of systemic risk spillovers from a node to other nodes in a financial network. The distress
of node 0 is propgated to its directly connected neighbours 1, 2, 3, then the stresses of these nodes are
then propagated to other nodes in the network in subsequent rounds.
The state variables of the nodes are then updated as follows:











Wi,j, sj(t) = D
0, sj(t) 6= D
(5.15)
si(t + 1) =

D, hi(t + 1) > 0; si(t) 6= I
I, si(t) = D
si(t), otherwise
(5.16)
In other words, the stress level of an institution at the current period is cumulated
by the sum of the intra-temporal cumulated shocks from its distressed neighbours.
The risk propagation stops when all institutions in the system are either as unaffected
or as inactive (in bankruptcy or finished passing over shocks). Note that banks
that passed over shocks in previous periods (being in distress in that period) will
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stay as inactive for the remainder rounds, meaning that there is a unique route of
shock propagation from a distressed note to its successor. This condition removes
the possibility of multiple reverberations of shocks back to a distress node, which
would potentially causing the shock to grow bigger and bigger. Nevertheless it is
expected that a minor initial shock with relative small economic losses will cause a
greater impact to the financial system, if the distressed origin node is linked to other
nodes that are also interlinked deeper into the system.
ri measures the network stresses by node i, which is the sum of the final cumulated
stresses to all other nodes, weighted by their respective economic values in the system.











We condition the shocks being propagated via the routes revealed by pairwise risk
spillovers, which is a counterfactual analysis suitable for regulators to assess the initial
or immediate impact of individual institutions’ failures or the resilience of the system.
5.4 Data and Variable Specifications
5.4.1 Data and Variables for Financial Institutions
The equity market value returns for financial institutions are the focus of our study.
As the focus of this study is on the financial network spillovers in the global
financial system, we collect world-wide stock market data (in weekly frequency) and
accounting data (in quarterly frequency) of publicly listed financial institutions that is
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available from Datastream and Thomson One, from January 2002 to June 2015. The
financial institutions in our sample originate not only from major financial centres:
United States, United Kingdom, the Eurozone (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the
Netherlands, etc.), Switzerland, Japan, and China, but also from other economies
where large financial institutions could potentially be a triggering source of systemic
risk. The availability of data on world-wide publicly-listed financial institutions
allows us to capture the interconnectedness of individual financial institutions in a
globalised system, as well as the interconnectedness clusters that are naturally formed
by market relationships in financial zones. As for the types of financial institutions,
we examine three financial sectors: commercial banks, broker dealers, and insurers,
which is classified by the institutions’ primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes7.
The data filtering criteria is as follows:
1. they should be at least operational from 2006, and should at least have on
average 1.5 quarterly observations per year for accounting data, and 30 weekly
observations per year for stock market data, till the end of the sample period;
2. they should have at least 500 million USD of assets as of 2007;
3. they should be classified either as commercial banks (primary SIC 6000-6199),
broker-dealers (primary SIC 6200-6299), or insurers (primary SIC 6300-6499);
4. the affiliated stock exchanges of their stock series should match the home
countries in which they are registered, which means for multinational financial
institutions we their home country firms.
As for data cleaning procedures, we use spline interpolation from the first non-
7 For the classification of financial sectors we follow the definitions used in Billio, Getmansky, Lo
and Pelizzon (2012).
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missing observations to the last non-missing observations for accounting data, and
then use spline interpolation to construct a size weighting matrix that is compatible
with the weekly stock market data. Our sample consists of 1338 financial institutions
with 705 weekly observations for each series from January 2002 to June 2015, which
covers four periods of crisis: the early 2000s stock market crash (the dot-com bubble
crash), 2007 Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis, and 2010-
2012 Eurozone Sovereign Crisis, all of which affect the globalised financial network to
different extents. Summary statistics for the market value returns, broken down by
market segments and economies, are reported in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics - Market Value Returns (Weekly)
Table 5.1 reports the summary statistics for market value returns for the top 10 countries with largest
financial markets by size, and the rest of the world. The financial sectors are broken into three categories
by primary SIC classifications.
Country Obs. Mean (%) Median (%) Std. (%) Min (%) Max (%)
Commercial Banks
Canada 8,460 0.22 0.06 3.31 -14.66 14.13
China 7,050 0.36 0.00 5.02 -18.98 22.55
France 11,280 0.16 0.08 4.16 -16.96 24.36
Germany 8,460 0.13 0.00 4.67 -18.96 29.11
Italy 13,395 0.15 0.05 5.15 -17.54 28.65
Japan 68,385 0.14 0.00 4.50 -25.87 44.33
Spain 3,525 0.21 0.19 4.99 -15.18 19.37
Switzerland 14,100 0.17 0.09 3.30 -17.88 22.69
United Kingdom 10,575 0.23 0.00 4.60 -19.19 24.58
United States 240,405 0.20 0.00 5.10 -48.16 56.25
Rest 285,525 0.34 0.00 5.52 -42.31 79.54
Broker-Dealers
Canada 2,820 0.24 0.00 4.87 -17.67 18.03
France 4,230 0.29 0.11 4.25 -13.35 19.37
Germany 4,230 0.00 0.00 6.15 -27.49 34.78
Italy 2,820 0.17 0.00 4.28 -13.70 20.70
Japan 21,150 0.29 0.00 6.91 -25.97 43.63
Spain 705 0.07 0.00 3.78 -11.14 11.73
Switzerland 6,345 0.18 0.00 4.30 -16.20 17.07
United Kingdom 16,215 0.25 0.00 4.98 -18.39 30.92
United States 21,150 0.36 0.00 5.36 -28.45 42.01
Rest 64,860 0.34 0.00 6.71 -43.49 81.37
Insurers
Canada 4,935 0.20 0.22 4.41 -29.33 27.22
China 1,410 0.53 0.00 5.68 -17.15 20.56
France 2,820 0.23 0.32 5.04 -18.10 18.65
Germany 2,820 0.07 0.00 4.70 -22.51 26.16
Italy 705 0.05 0.20 4.20 -12.63 12.18
Japan 2,820 0.26 0.00 5.94 -21.74 35.12
Spain 705 0.37 0.30 4.65 -11.75 15.33
Switzerland 2,820 0.22 0.23 5.00 -21.50 21.86
United Kingdom 7,755 0.24 0.12 4.43 -16.58 19.25
United States 49,350 0.30 0.04 5.47 -49.89 100.00
Rest 51,465 0.31 0.00 5.53 -38.35 58.00
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5.4.2 State Variables for Quantile Regression Models
For state variables used in quantile regression models in Eq (5.5) and Eq (5.6) we
follow the definition of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) for a small set of variable
categories which capture the time variations in the mean and the volatility of market
value returns and used in other quantile-based CoVaR studies (Fong and Wong,
2012; Lopez-Espinosa et al., 2012; Sharifova, 2012). State variables are common
conditioning variables which influence both originators and receivers of the risk
spillover relationships, and given the predominance of the United State financial
market in the globalised financial industry we select the set of marco-financial
indicators from the US market. The variable definitions are listed as follows:
1. mkt return: equity market return proxied by the returns of S&P 500 index;
2. vix: equity market volatility proxied by the Volatility Index (VIX) of the Chicago
Board Options Exchange (CBOE);
3. credit spread: credit risk spread proxied by the spread of Moody’s Baa-rated
bonds and the ten-year US Treasury Bond rate;
4. liquidity spread: liquidity risk spread proxied by the spread between three-
month US repo rate and three-month US Treasury Bill rate;
5. term spread: term structure spread (change in the slope of the yield curve) as the
difference between ten-year US Treasury Bond rate and three-month US Treasury
Bill rate;
6. bond3m d: changes in the three-month US Treasury bill rate;
7. financial stress d: changes in the Financial Stress Index by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics - State Variables (Weekly)
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Min Max
mkt return 705 0.0011 0.0032 0.0241 -0.1459 0.1317
vix 705 20.0300 17.4200 9.3566 10.0200 79.1300
credit spread 705 -0.7958 -0.6300 1.5773 -3.5100 3.6800
liquidity spread 705 0.1178 0.0500 0.2112 -0.2400 1.1800
term spread d 705 -0.0016 0.0000 0.1139 -0.9500 0.6700
bond3m d 705 -0.0023 0.0000 0.0796 -0.8600 0.4400
financial stress d 705 -0.0027 -0.0090 0.1364 -0.8570 1.3550
5.5 Tail-Dependence Networks




We construct ∆CoVaR using quantile regression models, and to evaluate the overall
adequacy of our choice of state variables, here we implement three specification
tests to examine the variable specification: unconditional coverage test of Kupiec
(1995), conditional coverage test of Christoffersen et al. (2001), and duration test of
Christoffersen and Pelletier (2004).
If the estimated series of Value-at-Risk is correctly specified, we would expect that
the proportion of observed “hits” (VaR violations) should not be different from the
specified VaR tail. The unconditional coverage test of Kupiec (1995) (proportion of
failures test) examines whether the number of hits is consistent with the confidence
level. The null hypothesis states that the proposed hit rate should not be significantly
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different from the observed hit rate:
H0 : p = p̂ =
x
T
The conditional coverage test of Christoffersen et al. (2001) improves the uncondi-
tional coverage test by taking into account the independence of hits. Assuming that










n00 + n01 + n10 + n11
,
where ni j is the number of days when event j (1 if a hit occurs, otherwise 0)
occurred under the condition that event i occurred on the previous day. The null
hypothesis of the independence of violations states that π0 and pi1 should not be
statistically different, and therefore the proportion of hit events preceded by non-hit
events is equal to the proportion of hit events preceded by hit events.
The duration test of Christoffersen and Pelletier (2004) provides an augmented
approach to examining the independence of Value-at-Risk violations, that the time
lapses between hits should be independent of the time lapses since the last hit. Given
the coverage rate/quantile q, the expected conditional duration of no hits should be
1
q periods and has no presence of memory effect. The authors show that the general
duration process can be modelled as a Weibull process, and a memory-free duration
process (as an exponential process) is a special case of the Weibull distributions with
the memory parameter equalling 1.
We implement the three tests discussed above to our Value-at-Risk specifications.
All three tests provide null hypotheses of specifications being adequate, therefore
we report the proportions of individual p-values that are above significance levels.
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As shown from Table 5.3, we confirm that our VaR specification based on quantile
regression models is adequate.
Table 5.3: Summary of Value-at-Risk Specification Tests
Test Unconditioanl Coverage Test Conditional Coverage Test Duration Test
ratio(p− value ≥ 0.01) 1.00 0.88 0.91
ratio(p− value ≥ 0.05) 1.00 0.85 0.83
ratio(p− value ≥ 0.10) 1.00 0.81 0.76
mean(p− value) 0.88 0.66 0.40
No. of tests 1338
Rolling Window Implementation
We account for the time variations in the network interconnectedness structure by
using a rolling window implementation similar to Betz et al. (2015) over our sample
period. For our sample period of T = 705 weeks, we construct a sub sample window
of W = 78 weeks (on average 1.5 years) with the first H = 8 weeks as step length,
which gives us Q = dT−W+1H e = 79 windows spanning from January 2002 to January
2007. In each window, we examine the pairwise spillover relationships of N = 1, 338
institutions in quantile-based ∆CoVaR models forming N2− N = 1, 708, 906 potential
pairs. Therefore our rolling window implementation allows us to obtain results of
network spillovers and interconnectedness structure as N × N × Q cubes of pairwise
adjacency and impact positions.
5.5.2 Network Topology Structures
General Overview
The tail dependency network (as a weighted network plot) is constructed by the
∆CoVaR risk spillovers between two neighbouring financial institutions. A heavily
interconnected institution is represented in the network as a node widely to other
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nodes, which will be placed in the center of the network graph when compared to
other nodes whose linkages are more sparse. Nodes that have close direct/indirect
connections with each other will also be clustered together to represent the relative
“hubs” emerged in the network. In this way, a network that is densely connected
and contains large number of nodes widely linked to other “central” as well as
“periphery” nodes represents a heavily interconnected financial market, which is
potentially synchronised and vulnerable to external shocks. On the contrary, a more
sparsely linked financial network will be more resistant to a large external shock
originated from a single source.
Figure 5.2 shows the general overview of the network structure in different periods,
from the early stages of the 2007 Subprime Mortgage Crisis to the aftermath of the 2009
- 2010 Eurozone Crisis8. Since risk spillovers from the originator institution to the
receiver institution are jointly determined by the risk positions of market returns of
both institutions, when they face downturn pressures during times of financial stress,
we observe widespread strong risk spillovers within the tail dependency network
during crisis periods. When market recovers from systemic downturn pressures, risk
positions of participants become less synchronised with common market shocks. The
plots show that during crisis periods greater numbers of institutions are affected by the
systematic intensification of individual pairwise risk spillovers resulting in potential
systemic collapse of the financial network should external shocks realise. The subplots
also show the clustering of nodes, that in moderate times financial institutions tend to
be clustered by their economy zones, with the US and Japan being the most visible
clusters. In contrast, cross-border financial downturns during crisis periods would
remove the visible network clusters, and most of the individual market participants
8We define the start and end of crisis periods by certain major events relating to the crises, since
market fluctuations tend to be around the occurrence of these events. For a brief list of events to be
examined in this study, please refer to Table A.1.
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are collectively under the dominating influence of crises.
(a) August, 2007 (b) September, 2008 (c) April, 2009
(d) May, 2010 (e) November, 2011 (f) July, 2013
Figure 5.2: Tail-Dependence Network Structure
Figure 5.2 plots the pairwise linkage routes between two financial institutions, drawn in network plots
using the multidimensional scaling algorithm which is scaled according to the relative distance between
nodes. Each link represents risk spillovers as measured by network ∆CoVaR.Nodes are colored by
country groups, and links are colored according to the corresponding origin nodes: blue – United States,
brown – Eurozone, purple – China, red – Japan, green – rest of the world.Individual plots are available
in Figures 5.13-5.18.
Evolution of Topology Measures
How the global tail dependency network structure evolves over time is measured by
network centrality measures of degree and closeness. Figure 5.3 plots these measures
in the sample period by country and measure type and Table 5.4 reports the summary
of values averaged in different phases in the sample periods. Degree denotes the total
number of links both originating from a node and received by a node, which represents
the overall connectedness of an institution. Closeness denotes the average length of
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steps for a node to reach a random node in the network, and lower levels of closeness
implies contagion effects are propagated more rapidly throughout the network from
originator node to a random node. These two measures complement each other as
degree measures to what extent a node is directly connected and closeness represents
the centrality of a node with its direct and indirect connections.
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Figure 5.3: Network Topology Measures – Top: Degree Centrality, Bottom: Closeness
Centrality
155
Table 5.4: Entities for Sovereign Banking Sector Equity
Table 5.4 reports network topology measures of degree centrality, and closeness centrality, grouped by countries, financial sectors, and time
periods. Degree refers to the total number of links a node has both as an originator and as a receiver, and closeness denotes the average steps
for a node to reach a random node in the network. For degree, the “Others” columns are formatted as “X, Y” where X denotes the proportion
of connections with respect to nodes in other countries, and Y denotes the proportion of connections with respect to nodes in the United States.
Country







Total Others Total Others Total Others
Whole Sample Period
CHE 277.62 0.97, 0.30 1.91 306.55 0.96, 0.33 1.91 330.60 0.96, 0.28 1.89
CHN - - - 263.63 0.98, 0.31 1.91 295.25 0.99, 0.30 1.91
DEU 288.73 0.98, 0.31 1.91 277.66 0.98, 0.29 1.91 323.48 0.98, 0.31 1.90
FRA 276.66 0.98, 0.29 1.91 293.14 0.96, 0.29 1.90 339.27 0.97, 0.28 1.89
GBR 298.35 0.95, 0.31 1.90 292.63 0.95, 0.31 1.91 303.64 0.95, 0.31 1.90
JPN 267.12 0.82, 0.29 1.90 281.22 0.81, 0.29 1.90 278.44 0.82, 0.29 1.90
USA 318.50 0.61, 0.39 1.90 290.16 0.62, 0.37 1.91 285.51 0.61, 0.38 1.90
Rest 272.54 0.98, 0.31 1.91 275.76 0.97, 0.31 1.91 275.87 0.98, 0.31 1.91
June, 2007 - September, 2008
CHE 259.67 0.97, 0.28 1.92 282.61 0.97, 0.35 1.91 261.41 0.97, 0.23 1.91
CHN - - - 264.82 0.98, 0.31 1.89 248.19 0.99, 0.28 1.91
DEU 268.60 0.98, 0.26 1.91 266.65 0.98, 0.28 1.92 312.91 0.98, 0.27 1.92
FRA 219.38 0.98, 0.27 1.91 239.00 0.97, 0.31 1.92 292.09 0.98, 0.27 1.90
GBR 262.28 0.95, 0.28 1.92 249.30 0.94, 0.30 1.92 274.91 0.94, 0.28 1.92
JPN 234.87 0.86, 0.29 1.92 248.58 0.83, 0.30 1.92 236.72 0.87, 0.27 1.92
USA 268.16 0.61, 0.38 1.91 255.43 0.63, 0.36 1.92 251.16 0.61, 0.38 1.91
Rest 252.37 0.97, 0.30 1.92 256.80 0.97, 0.29 1.92 251.02 0.98, 0.31 1.92
Continued on next page
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Country







Total Others Total Others Total Others
September, 2008 - December, 2009
CHE 249.97 0.96, 0.27 1.92 287.91 0.96, 0.31 1.91 348.66 0.96, 0.25 1.90
CHN - - - 220.68 0.98, 0.31 1.91 269.75 0.99, 0.31 1.93
DEU 261.98 0.98, 0.31 1.92 282.15 0.98, 0.29 1.92 335.59 0.98, 0.33 1.90
FRA 283.71 0.98, 0.29 1.92 290.88 0.96, 0.26 1.91 377.62 0.96, 0.25 1.88
GBR 280.45 0.95, 0.29 1.91 265.98 0.95, 0.30 1.91 264.01 0.95, 0.28 1.91
JPN 269.92 0.87, 0.33 1.91 275.72 0.86, 0.33 1.90 265.06 0.87, 0.30 1.91
USA 294.61 0.66, 0.34 1.91 262.05 0.66, 0.33 1.92 273.36 0.65, 0.35 1.92
Rest 267.19 0.98, 0.30 1.91 264.45 0.97, 0.30 1.91 273.71 0.98, 0.30 1.91
December, 2009 - May, 2010
CHE 280.83 0.96, 0.28 1.91 329.45 0.96, 0.34 1.90 394.62 0.96, 0.25 1.88
CHN - - - 224.65 0.98, 0.33 1.95 223.00 1.00, 0.26 1.91
DEU 290.08 0.98, 0.33 1.92 291.50 0.99, 0.30 1.91 323.88 0.99, 0.34 1.90
FRA 341.42 0.97, 0.29 1.91 326.25 0.96, 0.28 1.91 400.50 0.96, 0.27 1.88
GBR 317.48 0.94, 0.32 1.91 305.40 0.94, 0.34 1.91 314.36 0.93, 0.30 1.90
JPN 213.67 0.68, 0.26 1.90 236.22 0.69, 0.25 1.89 204.12 0.69, 0.23 1.89
USA 305.83 0.59, 0.40 1.90 297.23 0.62, 0.37 1.92 273.91 0.60, 0.39 1.91
Rest 282.49 0.98, 0.32 1.92 265.50 0.97, 0.32 1.92 271.85 0.98, 0.32 1.91
Continued on next page
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Total Others Total Others Total Others
May, 2010 - March, 2012
CHE 317.47 0.96, 0.30 1.89 342.68 0.96, 0.31 1.89 453.50 0.96, 0.30 1.85
CHN - - - 265.08 0.98, 0.32 1.92 353.29 0.99, 0.33 1.89
DEU 307.44 0.98, 0.34 1.90 292.54 0.98, 0.28 1.90 337.81 0.98, 0.30 1.87
FRA 329.38 0.97, 0.29 1.89 360.74 0.95, 0.27 1.89 411.50 0.96, 0.27 1.87
GBR 351.04 0.95, 0.32 1.89 340.35 0.94, 0.32 1.89 374.86 0.94, 0.32 1.88
JPN 274.34 0.77, 0.28 1.90 282.16 0.77, 0.27 1.90 302.02 0.77, 0.29 1.89
USA 388.45 0.59, 0.41 1.87 321.12 0.60, 0.39 1.90 320.61 0.59, 0.40 1.89
Rest 288.92 0.98, 0.32 1.90 292.65 0.97, 0.31 1.90 295.29 0.98, 0.33 1.90
March, 2012 - February, 2014
CHE 271.36 0.98, 0.32 1.90 299.62 0.97, 0.34 1.91 242.12 0.97, 0.30 1.91
CHN - - - 299.70 0.98, 0.31 1.92 301.08 0.98, 0.28 1.92
DEU 302.40 0.99, 0.32 1.91 266.53 0.99, 0.32 1.91 314.13 0.99, 0.32 1.91
FRA 254.17 0.98, 0.31 1.91 265.21 0.98, 0.32 1.91 268.23 0.98, 0.33 1.91
GBR 283.89 0.96, 0.32 1.91 293.53 0.96, 0.32 1.91 282.83 0.95, 0.32 1.91
JPN 289.53 0.83, 0.28 1.89 315.05 0.81, 0.28 1.90 306.71 0.83, 0.30 1.91
USA 305.32 0.60, 0.40 1.90 304.08 0.62, 0.37 1.90 286.44 0.62, 0.38 1.90
Rest 274.67 0.98, 0.31 1.91 283.18 0.97, 0.31 1.91 277.71 0.98, 0.31 1.91
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From the results we can observe that nodes become more connected during crisis
phases, and the topology measures reach their peak values9 not at the outbreak of
the crises but towards the mid stages of the crisis which reflects the accumulation
of market co-movement, though this behaviour varies by country and by financial
sectors. The observed behaviour implies that the shifting of network structures are
the consequences of extraordinary market movements by severe systemic distresses.
Despite cyclical fluctuations and sector differences, there is a steady trend for greater
interconnectedness in the global financial network, signifying deeper cross-border
financial integration and greater globalised dependence among markets and sectors.
On average, nodes would have about 300 direct connections with other nodes and
the overall closeness in the network fluctuates around the value of 1.90 over different
phases, suggesting that for nodes that are not directly connected (about 80% out of
all nodes for our sample size), their relative distance is usually expected to be 1 step
away from an immediate node. An external shock given such a level of closeness are
expected to complete its propagation rapidly within 2 rounds, meaning that in order
to prevent the damage of a large negative external shock from causing widespread
damage in the global financial network, coordinated swift action from regulatory
authorities are warranted.
For world average pattern excluding the specific countries in Figure 5.3, there are
no clear distinctions among sectors, suggesting that from a world average perspective
sector-wise differences of financial institutions are blurred from institutions providing
cross-sector financial services. For countries with highly integrated financial markets,
such as the United Kingdom (GBR) and the United States (USA), we also observe sim-
ilar coordinated behaviour among sectors. In contrast, centrality measures of China
(CHN) shift in greater span (especially for closeness) and the financial sectors have
9For closeness, peak values are represented as the “troughs” in the time series plot.
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dissimilar behaviour. In addition, although there is a steady trend in the increase of
direct connections, the trend for overall interconnectedness of institutions as measured
by closeness stays relatively stable, whereas other countries have downward trending
closeness measure. These results suggest that China’s financial sectors are relatively
less integrated to others than those in other countries such as the UK or the US,
resulting in greater individual level heterogeneity and sector level heterogeneity. Since
closeness is an overall indicator of interconnectedness by taking into account indirect
connections, China’s less integrated financial market is yet to reach the same level of
interconnectedness as those in other markets.
For country-specific and sector-specific patterns, we observe that for Switzerland
(CHE), China (CHN), and Japan (JPN), the insurance sectors have greater responses to
crisis episodes, which is in line with the findings of Billio, Getmansky, Lo and Pelizzon
(2012) and Ahelegbey (2015) that insurance sector could be more important sources
of interconnectedness than other sectors. However, this is not the case for United
States (USA) where commercial banks and insurers behave in similar patterns, but
Broker-Dealers are more sensitive during the Eurozone Crisis period. This could be
attributed to the fact that since the initial triggering events for Global Financial Crisis
occur within the broker-dealer sector (the distress of Bear Sterns, Merrill Lynch, and
Lehman Brothers), the sector as a whole is more sensitive to negative market sentiment
in later periods. The patterns from specific countries and world average show that
markets become more sensitive during the Eurozone Crisis episode when compared
to earlier periods. Compared with earlier crises, there were several waves of negative
shocks about sovereign countries fiscal distress spanning over a longer time horizon,
resulting in markets stay in high volatility status without being able to start recovering
before another distress signal was triggered, whereas in earlier crises, distress signals
usually clustered around a shorter time horizon. In addition, Table 5.4 shows that for
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nodes in the United States and Japan, their foreign connections are lower than that of
the nodes in other countries and world average level, which supports the evidence
from 5.2 where nodes from these two countries have less foreign influence (both
as originators and receivers) and form their distinctive clusters within the financial
network. In the context of financial interconnectedness, we provide evidence of the
US financial system as a dominating source of external influence for other markets,
and the Japanese financial system as an example of a relative close system.
Overall we find that financial institutions become more connected to each other
directly or indirectly during financial crises, whether this increase of connectedness
will strengthen the robustness of the financial network through diversification or will
destabilise the financial network remains to be examined in Section 5.6.
Distributions of Node Degrees
A small-world network is a type of network which has a fat tailed degree distribution,
so that “hubs” exist in the structure providing connections to most of the nodes, and
nodes are typically not directly linked but indirectly connected via these “hubs”.
Scale-free networks whose degree distributions follow power-law distributions are
typical examples of small-world. The existence of scale-free network are found in
large and complex network structures from social networks and web page cross-links
(Muchnik, Pei, Parra, Reis, Andrade Jr, Havlin and Makse, 2013), to interbank markets
in different countries (Boss, Elsinger, Summer and Thurner, 2004; Bech and Atalay,
2010; Cont et al., 2013). This phenomenon of linkage distributions could potentially
exist only in a range of the overall distribution. The study of Clauset et al. (2009)
shows that, in real world examples, there often exists a range of the data distributions
that follows a power-law distribution (usually above the lower tail), and when such a
behaviour exists, fitting the entire distribution with a least-square linear fit would fail
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to detect the existence of the power-law distribution, and simply reject the tail power-
law distribution would lead to an inaccurate representation of the data. Following
Clauset et al. (2009), we examine whether the degree distributions could potentially
follow a power-law distribution in the form of







where kmin is the lower bound minimum degree above which the empirical sample
will be included in the fitting process. The lower bound is iteratively determined to
provide the best fit from a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) goodness-of-fit test, against the
null hypothesis that the empirical distribution comes from the reference distribution
(in this case, a power-law distribution).
In Figure 5.4 we plot the distributions of degrees in different time periods in
a log-log scale, as well as the power-law fits suggested by the KS tests, with the
summarised results in Table 5.5. In Table 5.5, KS tests consistently yield p-values
above 0.1 in all periods considered, suggesting that the hypothesis of the empirical
distribution coming from the proposed distribution cannot be rejected, which confirms
the existence of power-law distributions in the tail-dependence networks. The general
findings regarding the distribution of degrees show that, although the existence of
pairwise links between individual institutions may vary in different time periods,
the overall statistical topology of tail dependency network structure remains stable
over time, which is that among the highly interconnected institutions, the top most
interconnected institutions contribute to most of the linkages.
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Figure 5.4: Degree Centrality Distributions
Table 5.5: Summary of Degree Distribution Statistics
Table 5.5 reports centrality measures and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test statistics, summarised by
average over the different time periods. For definitions of density and centrality measures, please refer
to Section 5.3.1. Statistic α is the fitted scaling parameter in power-law distribution denoting the rarity
of events, statistic D is the two-sample KS test statistic with the null hypothesis of identical distribution
for the two samples.
Period Density
Centrality Measures KS test statistics
Eigenvector Degree α̂ D p P(p ≥ 0.1)
June, 2007 - September, 2008 0.09 0.39 249.2 10.80 0.04 0.96 1.00
September, 2008 - December, 2009 0.10 0.41 261.1 9.62 0.05 0.82 1.00
December, 2009 - May, 2010 0.10 0.37 272.5 9.13 0.05 0.96 1.00
May, 2010 - March, 2012 0.11 0.41 301.6 14.09 0.06 0.93 1.00
March, 2012 - February, 2014 0.10 0.45 279.8 10.93 0.05 0.91 1.00
We observe that the structures of the tail-dependence network exhibit the scale-
free small-world network property, as the distributions of degrees follow power-
law distributions in the upper tails. The lower bounds for degree to be included in
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power-law is distributions in the upper tail of the empirical distributions, and that the
scaling parameter α is around 10, suggesting that for a two-fold increase in degree,
the large event is (1/2)10 as likely as the smaller event, implying the existence of
heavy upper tails far from the means of the whole distribution sample, and these
upper tails typically follow power-law distributions. These findings in constructed
tail-dependence networks are similar to the findings in previous studies regarding
interbank lending markets in Cont et al. (2013) with the Brazilian data, and Boss
et al. (2004) with the Austrian data, however in our case the power-law behaviour
exists only deeper into the tails with a heavier decaying parameter. In this kind
of networks, linkages are typically clustered within a few nodes, and two random
nodes are usually connected to each other by indirect links via the most interconnected
nodes. In the context of financial markets, contagion of the initial local distresses are
typically propagated by the interconnection routes in the network structure, causing
amplified losses spread to a wider range of institutions.
5.6 Network Impact from Interconnectedness Risk
In order to study the impact of network interconnectedness to the resilience of the
financial system, we assess the counterfactual economic losses as well as additional
defaults caused by the subsequent risk propagation following the initial distress of
an institution, using the DebtRank method described in Section 5.3.2. Specifically,
for each adjacency matrix and impact matrix constructed for the rolling window
snapshots, we calculate the network stresses induced by institution i’s failure ri as
well as the weighted aggregate network stresses of random failures R, so that we
can obtain a holistic view regarding the resilience of tail dependency network from
interconnectedness impact.
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5.6.1 Systemic Spillovers and Network Impact
Figure 5.5 plots the distributions of network stresses and defaults over the sample
period, and Table 5.6 reports the network impact results aggregated over different
crisis periods. Our results depict the surges of network stresses during the height
of financial crises and the subsequent declines afterwards, which fit well with the
major events occurred during the four crisis periods recorded in Table A.1. Financial
crises lead tail dependence of the returns of financial institutions to become highly
synchronised, with the evidence that the distributions of realised network impact
become narrower in the peak periods of crises. Whereas in other periods, the
distributions of network impact contain more idiosyncrasy of individual institutions
in the form of outliers. Before the crisis periods in the later half of the sample period,
network impact is generally low among institutions, and does not induce widespread
defaults in the financial network. However, it is worth noting that although stresses
induced by the failure of individual market participants are similar, the amount of
potential defaults (the economic values of node drop to zero) vary significantly from
individual basis. It is plausible that similar levels of stresses are realised in two
scenarios: a more interconnected origin node inflicting less initial systemic spillovers,
or a less interconnected origin node inflicting more initial systemic spillovers, with
the latter case resulting in more defaults than the first case. This evidence supports
the argument in Acemoglu et al. (2015) that whether network interconnectedness can
serve as a mechanism for risk diversification depends on whether the initial impact is













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.5: Aggregated Network impact
Figure 5.5 plots the distributions of individual network impact in box plots. Graph (a) plots the
distributions of network stresses (proportional to the economic value of the financial network) whereas
Graph (b) plots the distributions of the number of network defaults originated from an individual stress
events. Different crisis periods (as shown in shaded areas) and dates of major events are marked on the
plots. Please refer to Table A.1 for specific definitions.
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Table 5.6: Evolution of Network Impact – Aggregated
Table 5.6 reports the evolution of network induced impact, as measured by the overall losses of
economic values, and the number of defaults of financial institutions. Values of mean, first quartile
and third quartile are provided. Please refer to Figure 5.6 for a complete overview of the evolution of
value distributions over time.
Period
Stress Defaults
Mean Range Mean Range
Subprime Crisis
January, 2007 - March, 2007 0.48 (0.41 - 0.54) 117.86 (59.00 - 152.00)
May, 2007 - July, 2007 0.46 (0.37 - 0.53) 105.85 (39.25 - 150.00)
December, 2007 - February, 2008 0.93 (0.91 - 0.96) 720.23 (599.00 - 852.75)
June, 2008 - August, 2008 0.90 (0.87 - 0.94) 700.92 (565.25 - 837.00)
Global Financial Crisis
August, 2008 - September, 2008 0.86 (0.83 - 0.90) 544.86 (398.25 - 689.00)
March, 2009 - May, 2009 0.86 (0.84 - 0.87) 893.02 (820.00 - 959.75)
May, 2009 - July, 2009 0.73 (0.68 - 0.78) 485.32 (371.00 - 591.75)
October, 2009 - December, 2009 0.62 (0.56 - 0.68) 238.25 (140.00 - 324.75)
Crisis Aftermath
December, 2009 - February, 2010 0.61 (0.54 - 0.67) 221.17 (138.00 - 292.00)
February, 2010 - April, 2010 0.67 (0.60 - 0.75) 287.47 (165.00 - 401.00)
Eurozone Crisis
June, 2010 - August, 2010 0.83 (0.79 - 0.87) 605.70 (470.00 - 754.75)
January, 2011 - March, 2011 0.90 (0.87 - 0.93) 796.89 (656.00 - 949.75)
December, 2011 - February, 2012 0.63 (0.57 - 0.70) 352.26 (227.00 - 484.00)
Crisis Aftermath
April, 2012 - June, 2012 0.60 (0.55 - 0.65) 283.38 (205.00 - 362.00)
July, 2013 - August, 2013 0.31 (0.26 - 0.34) 47.96 (21.00 - 64.00)
December, 2013 - February, 2014 0.17 (0.14 - 0.20) 1.88 (0.00 - 2.00)
Figure 5.6 plots the comparison among the initial risk spillovers, additional
systemic stresses, and the amount of defaults over time, as averaged by institution’s
weights (total market value in the context of our study) at the time period. As
shown in the Figure 5.6, the network impact is amplified tremendously by the initial
impact due the failure of individual entities, with each of the affected institutions
suffering the partial impact of the originator. The crisis periods are characterised by
heavy losses of equity values and high number of default. It is only until when the
Eurozone Sovereign Crisis coming to its end with the resolution of the second bailout
package for Greece does the network stresses starts to fully decline and revert to the
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pre-2007 level. The results from the impact analysis show that network impact to
the system is largely influenced by three factors: the size of the initial impact, the
interconnectedness of nodes that are potentially affected, and the specific routes via
which the risk propagation is realised.
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Figure 5.6: Aggregated Network impact
Figure 5.6 plots the evolutions of aggregated initial risk spillovers (measured as systemic ∆CoVaR) and
the subsequent network stresses (measured as DebtRank stresses). Series are averaged by individual
weights in the system. Values are proportional to the total economic value of the financial system.
Weighted average numbers of total defaults of financial institutions are shown as shaded bars.
Firstly, high initial severity from crises results in greater number of subsequent
defaults. The three greatest levels systemic risk spillovers occur during Global
Financial Crisis (November 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and Merrill
Lynch) and Eurozone Financial Crisis (May 2010 first bailout of Greece, December
2011 distress for Italian Government Bond), and all of three events are accompanied by
high levels of counterfactual defaults. With spillover impact at its highest levels, more
institutions are prone to default due to the size of the impact. Since level of spillover
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impact during the peak periods of financial crisis is often accompanied by the increase
in interconnectedness and clustering behaviour of nodes, network stresses are also at
highest levels.
Secondly, network impact during crisis periods is characterised by the fact that it
generally peaks some time after the starting point of crisis, but not immediately after
the greatest impact. The Systemic spillovers peaked at the beginning of the Global
Financial Crisis in November 2009, whereas the network stresses start to climb up and
peak around April 2009. It can be attributed to that continuing increase in common
interconnectedness as documented by the results of network centrality measures in
Figure 5.3 in the previous section. With the crisis signal triggered in the United States,
equity markets in other countries were also affected within a short time span of weeks
and this cross-border contagion resulted in more institutions prone to negative market
sentiment which increased the interconnectedness within and between sectors and
markets. Greater common interconnectedness makes it more likely for the shock of
initial impact to be transmitted to more directly connected neighbours, and easier for
the shock to reach more indirectly connected nodes in shorter steps, which results in
heavy losses to the system.
Thirdly, contrasting with two other crises, although its impact being severe, the
severity duration of Global Financial Crisis is relatively short, as the increase in
tail-dependence interconnectedness is temporary. It can be argued that during the
Subprime Crisis the negative market sentiment is consistently concentrated in the
credit risk of the individual institutions that engage in the subprime mortgage market
in the US and the UK, therefore the risk spillover relationships are stable and so are
the network stresses. The Eurozone Sovereign Crisis is characterised by the fact that
market sentiment is shocked by several waves of negative signals from different area
in the network about fiscal unsustainability of Eurozone countries. Market sentiment
169
barely starts to recover before another wave of distress is realised, which further
increases the connectedness level in all sectors and countries as evidenced in Figure 5.3
in the previous section, and it results in the highly severe and volatile network stresses
during the Eurozone Crisis. In contrast, in Global Financial Crisis, there is arguably
a single negative event with widespread influence but it is mitigated by the bailout
programs of governments of major economies and their coordinated effort (such as
the US Troubled Asset Relief Program and the UK Bank Rescue Package in 2008, and
the G20 stimulus package in April 2009) to support economic recoveries and distress
alleviation. Therefore there is only a short term temporary additional increase in
network interconnectedness during the Global Financial Crisis.
5.6.2 Network Stresses and Vulnerability of Individual Institutions
Evidence in the previous section demonstrates that the aggregate network impact of
institutions correspond closely to the general market conditions. Here we discuss the
evidence from the perspective of individual institutions.
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Individual Contributions of Interconnectedness Risk
AIG: (a) round 1 (b) round 2 (c) final cumulated impact
BNP Paribas: (a) round 1 (b) round 2 (c) final cumulated impact
Bank of China: (a) round 1 (b) round 2 (c) final cumulated impact
Figure 5.7: Propagation of Network Stresses – April 2009
Figure 5.7 plots the pairwise stress impact as 1) in initial risk spillovers, 2) in subsequent round, 3)
final cumulated impact. Links in black represents initial risk spillovers as measured by ∆CoVaR, and
subsequent colored links represent the stresses induced by risk propagation. Nodes and links is colored
by the country group of origin institutions.
Figure 5.7 plots the propagation dynamics of network stresses of three financial
institutions: American International Group (AIG), BNP Paribas and Bank of China,
and their individual network stresses are reported in Figures 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10.
Previous results in Figure 5.3 and Table 5.4 show a general closeness centrality of
1.9 meaning that on average risk spillovers will complete propagation within less
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than one more round after the occurrence of the initial risk spillovers. Evidence in
Figure 5.7 shows the network stresses under strong interconnectedness and rapid
propagation of risk spillovers. In the initial state, distress from the origin node i is
transmitted to i’s direct neighbours in the form of risk spillovers, then the network
stresses are transmitted from i’s neighbours to other indirectly connected nodes down
the transmission routes, and given a highly interconnected tail dependency network,
most of the nodes are affected, resulting in severe economic losses and defaults, as
shown in the previous results of Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.8, Figure 5.9, and Figure 5.10 plot the coverage of stress impact from
each of the aforementioned three institutions to their neighbouring institutions over
specific time periods. Each plot places the institution of risk origin in the center while
the rest of the institutions are placed in the periphery as a star graph, with each
links measuring the existence and the strength of network stresses from the origin
institution. A dense plot means the institution of interest will cause a high level of
stresses among other institutions either directly or indirectly, whereas a scarce plot
would mean a low level of impact.
AIG faced a series of market stresses during the late Subprime Crisis to the early
Financial Crisis period and was bailed out by US government in late 2008, the risk
profile of which is also reflected in our results. Contrasting with the peaking of
system-wide network stresses after the outbreak of Global Financial Crisis as shown
in Figure 5.6, In Figure 5.8 AIG’s network stresses peak in the first half of 2008,
and our results show the evidence of alleviation of its market conditions over the
Global Financial Crisis period. And AIG would be also less involved in the Eurozone
Crisis when compared to the other two aforementioned banks. Network impact from
BNP would peak at around early 2011 when market fear about the sustainability of
Eurozone member states begin to spread from Greece to Italy and France. However as
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shown from earlier discussions, when market confidence began to restore, network
impact steadily declines as both the severity of spillovers and the potential co-
movement linkages begin to drop. It is also worth noting that for markets that are
relatively less closely integrated to the central global financial markets, such as China
in the early periods, network impact is also relatively smaller. However when the
markets become more integrated by cross-border investment, international financial
services, and counterparty transactions, individual institutions become more heavily
influenced by market co-movement resulting in more integrated network structure,
which in turn, might pose high network stress impact. The patterns of network
stresses by other institutions also generally reflect the overall risk climate in the
financial market, with their own minor idiosyncrasy in stresses and direct neighbours.
Table 5.7 reports the top risk originators and receptors with regard to selected SIFIs,
and their characteristics of size and network interconnectedness. We find that for these
top risk originators and receptors, the measures of their sizes and interconnectedness
are also in the highest percentiles, implying there is a clear connection between the
network stress and the underlying sizes and interconnectedness. Table 5.14 reports
the network stresses for other SIFIs over different periods in the study.
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(a) February - April, 2002 (b) August - October, 2002 (c) May - July, 2007
(d) January - February, 2008 (e) June - August, 2008 (f) March - May, 2009
(g) June - August, 2010 (h) January - March, 2011 (i) December, 2011 - Februrary 2012
Figure 5.8: Individual Network Stresses, Origin: American International Group
(AIG)
Figure 5.8 plots the directional network impact from an origin node to all other nodes that are affected
by the origin, in a star graph layout. Each line depicts the network impact from the origin node to the
target node, and the density of the plot represents the impact coverage and severity of the network
impact from the origin node.
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(a) February - April, 2002 (b) August - October, 2002 (c) May - July, 2007
(d) January - February, 2008 (e) June - August, 2008 (f) March - May, 2009
(g) June - August, 2010 (h) January - March, 2011 (i) December, 2011 - Februrary 2012
Figure 5.9: Individual Network Stresses, Origin: BNP Paribas
Figure 5.9 plots the directional network impact from an origin node to all other nodes that are affected
by the origin, in a star graph layout. Each line depicts the network impact from the origin node to the
target node, and the density of the plot represents the impact coverage and severity of the network
impact from the origin node.
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(a) May - July, 2007 (b) June - August, 2008 (c) March - May, 2009
(g) June - August, 2010 (h) January - March, 2011 (i) December, 2011 - Februrary 2012
Figure 5.10: Individual Network Stresses, Origin: Bank of China
Figure 5.10 plots the directional network impact from an origin node to all other nodes that are affected
by the origin, in a star graph layout. Each line depicts the network impact from the origin node to the
target node, and the density of the plot represents the impact coverage and severity of the network
impact from the origin node.
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Table 5.7: Top Risk Originators/Receptors to/from Financial Institutions
Table 5.7 reports the top 3 risk originators that contribute most to the distress of the specified financial
institutions as well as top 3 risk receptors that are most affected by the distress of the specified financial
institutions.We divide the periods into the Global Financial Crisis period (“period1”) and European
Financial Crisis period (“period2”).Th measures of size, degree and closeness (“cl.”) are reported as
percentiles.
top risk originators to {FI} top risk receptors from {FI}
period from id stress size degree cl. to id stress size degree cl.
FI: 601988-SH (Bank of China)
period1 INVE’B-SK 0.37 89 95 99 AGN-AE 1.00 93 94 100
PKSVF-5 0.35 92 95 98 BNP-FR 1.00 100 97 100
GBLB-BT 0.33 94 96 98 CS-FR 1.00 99 99 100
period2 AEL-N 0.30 54 99 49 ACA-FR 1.00 96 100 80
INVE’B-SK 0.29 89 100 49 ALV-FF 1.00 99 100 92
STB-OS 0.29 77 98 48 MS-N 1.00 97 100 89
FI: AIG-N (American International Group, Inc.)
period1 GBLB-BT 0.96 94 96 98 ACA-FR 1.00 98 99 100
L-N 0.96 93 90 97 AGN-AE 1.00 93 94 100
MS-N 0.96 98 99 100 ALV-FF 1.00 99 97 100
period2 PWF-T 0.42 94 90 49 ACA-FR 1.00 96 100 80
INVE’B-SK 0.40 89 100 49 ALV-FF 1.00 99 100 92
STAN-LN 0.40 99 84 86 BAC-N 1.00 100 100 57
FI: BNP-FR (BNP Paribas)
period1 2318-HK 1.00 96 85 99 ACA-FR 1.00 98 99 100
601398-SH 1.00 100 18 99 AGN-AE 1.00 93 94 100
601988-SH 1.00 100 15 100 ALV-FF 1.00 99 97 100
period2 2318-HK 1.00 96 94 56 2318-HK 1.00 96 94 56
8306-TO 1.00 100 91 65 ACA-FR 1.00 96 100 80
8316-TO 1.00 98 89 67 AGN-AE 1.00 91 100 79
FI: HSBA-LN (HSBC)
period1 ACA-FR 1.00 98 99 100 ACA-FR 1.00 98 99 100
AGN-AE 1.00 93 94 100 AGN-AE 1.00 93 94 100
ALV-FF 1.00 99 97 100 ALV-FF 1.00 99 97 100
period2 8411-TO 1.00 97 70 63 2318-HK 1.00 96 94 56
ACA-FR 1.00 96 100 80 ACA-FR 1.00 96 100 80
AGN-AE 1.00 91 100 79 AGN-AE 1.00 91 100 79
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Individual Vulnerability from Network Stresses
Figure 5.11 compares the network stresses that the Systemically Important Financial
Institutions (SIFIs) impose on the network system with their vulnerabilities, i.e. the
levels of network stresses that they receive from the defaults of other institutions.
From the perspective of individual institutions, Figure 5.11 shows how the dis-
tress of the network system affects market participants during different stages of
crisis periods. Before the outbreak of Subprime Mortgage Crisis, the stresses and
vulnerabilities of institutions are in relatively low levels as compared to the crisis
periods where institution-wise individual defaults can impose significant impact to
the systems. Figure 5.11 also supports the previous findings in Figure 5.2 regarding
the disaggregation of certain node groups to exposures of network impact, from the
perspective of individual nodes. The several episodes of crisis impose heavy pressure
to the risk positions of the SIFIs, especially to institutions in the western markets.
However, market participants in China and Japan form their own node clusters as
shown in Figure 5.2, so that they are less involved in the several crises originated from
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Figure 5.11: Vulnerability vs. Stresses of SIFIs
Figure 5.11 plots the relative reverse ranks of initial spillovers (y-axis) and subsequent network stress
(x-axis) of financial institutions.
Figure 5.12 plots the relationship of the initial risk spillovers and network stresses.
Data points are grouped by stages of crisis in colour then by interconnectedness in
subplots. The risk patterns of institutions correspond closely to the stages of crisis
theory are in, suggesting the existence of the influence of a strong homogenous market
co-movement force to the market participants, especially in the middle stages of crisis
when market distress is most severe. This market force is more obvious in the Global
Financial Crisis plots than the Eurozone Crisis plots with a greater clustering of data
points. For institutions that are most interconnected (subplots 3 and 4), their linear
fitted slopes are usually highly positive where a single increase in risk spillovers
would result in large increase in network stresses, and this pattern is less clear for
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institutions that are least interconnected (subplots 1) which imply that the low linkages
inhibit the propagation of risk spillovers. In addition, for Eurozone Crisis, there are
greater distinctions between data points in different crisis stages, which supports the
previous evidence in Figure 5.6, where there are at least two visible cycles of distress,
which corresponds with the first round bailout of Greece and the later distress in
Italy. Despite distinct features in risk patterns between the two crises, we observe
a strong relationship between risk spillovers and network stresses when conditioning
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(b) Eurozone Sovereign Crisis
Figure 5.12: Initial Spillovers vs. Network Stresses
Figure 5.12 plots the relative reverse ranks of initial spillovers (x-axis) and network stress (y-axis)
of financial institutions. Data points are colored acccording to the contemporaneous stages of the
sample period. Plots are grouped by the quartiles of quartiles of closeness centraity with subplot 1
containing institutions that are least interconnected and subplot 4 containing institutions that are most
interconnected.
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5.6.3 Contributions of Systemic Risk Spillovers and Interconnected-
ness to Network Stresses
We examine to what extent can network stresses induced by the failure of a institution
be attributed to various factors representing the risk characteristics of financial
institutions. We construct a panel regression model where the institution’s network
stresses is treated as the dependent variable. For explanatory variables we include
the institution’s size (of its market value), leverage level (book liability to equity
ratio), and network centrality measures of closeness and degree. We further di-
vide degree measures into the amount of outward, inward, and total connections
(in connections, out connections, and in out connections), and the measures with
respect to institutions in other financial sectors (in from other, out to other, and
in out other). As for initial risk spillovers (spillovers), we also include its quadratic
form (spillovers2), as well as the interaction term between spillovers and a dummy
variable representing non-crisis periods (spillovers non crisis). The dependent
variables and explanatory variables are log transformed so the fitted coefficients
represent elasticities.
Table 5.15 reports the correlation matrix table for the variables used in the
regressions in Table 5.8 to Table 5.11. As shown in Table 5.15, there are generally
high correlations (ρi,j ≥ 0.7) among the degree measures, and since the regressions
are specified in a panel manner, the collinearity of degree measures in sub-groups is
higher than the general pooled group, which leads to a multi-collinearity problem.
We avoid the problem of multi-collinearity by using one form of degree measures at a
time. Table 5.8 reports the main regression model results, where each model represents
one form of degree measures. To account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation,
we use Newey-West standard error estimates (up to 4 lags) for statistical tests.
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Main Panel Model Results
Table 5.8: Panel Regression Results on Network Stresses - Full Sample
Table 5.8 reports the panel regression results for network stresses as the dependent variable. Variables
are in log forms, so that fitted coefficients represent elasticities. The models use twoway fixed effect
method and Newey-West heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent standard error estimates are
reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable: network stresses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
spillovers −0.394∗∗∗ −0.394∗∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.383∗∗∗ −0.395∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.383∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044) (0.040) (0.044)
spillovers2 −0.046∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
spillovers non crisis 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014)
size 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
lev 0.001 0.001 −0.003 0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
closeness 4.019∗∗∗ 4.013∗∗∗ 0.032 3.867∗∗∗ 4.014∗∗∗ 2.015∗∗∗ 3.876∗∗∗





in out connections 0.026∗∗∗
(0.006)
in from other −0.003∗∗
(0.001)
out to other 0.184∗∗∗
(0.011)
in out other 0.023∗∗∗
(0.005)
Observations 70,914 70,914 70,914 70,914 70,914 70,914 70,914
R2 0.193 0.193 0.320 0.195 0.193 0.257 0.195
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.189 0.314 0.192 0.189 0.252 0.191
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The results show that there is a non-linear concave down decreasing relationship
between risk spillovers and network stresses, as the first order term and the second
order term having both significant negative slopes. This suggests that the contempo-
rary measures in network stress and risk spillovers exhibit a negative relationship,
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which is supported from their time series changes in Figure 5.6 where there are
lagged responses in network stress from risk spillovers in general, except in peak
crisis periods where the two measures move more synchronised10. We use a dummy
representing non-crisis state (periods other than the crisis periods defined in Table A.1)
to represent the severity of risk spillovers that is below a crisis state level. The
interaction term between spillovers and non-crisis state shows also supports that as
long as the severity of spillovers is in non-crisis state, increase in its severity will
cause greater losses to other institutions in the network. However, when such severity
surpasses the critical threshold, a very severe initial impact of risk spillovers by node
i will cause outright defaults to some of i’s direct neighbours. Although the defaults
of some of i’s neighbours create impact on their own, they will also prevent these
nodes acting as intermediate “hubs” of risk propagation, which, since the nodes
are only 1-2 steps away in the tail dependency network, reduces the impact from
interconnectedness.
As for interconnectedness measures, the results show a high explanatory power for
closeness, which represents the overall interconnectedness in the network. Closeness
has the largest elasticity effect among all significant explanatory variables, as a 1%
change in closeness can explain about 4% change in network stresses, in 4 out of
6 model formulations, suggesting that network stresses are very sensitive to the
institutions’ interconnectedness level. The explanatory power is partially shifted away
from closeness when we use direct outward degree measures (model 3 and model 6),
which is inline with the fact that direct connectedness plays an important role in the
overall interconnectedness of nodes. In addition, the institutions’ market-valued sizes
are also accountable to network stresses, with elasticity effects of 0.011 - 0.017 across
all formulations. As for other variables, there are minor negative effects for inward
10 We discuss the explanatory powers of variables to the forward risk measures in Table 5.19.
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degree measures (model 2 and model 5) but their fitted coefficients are close to zero,
and we find no significant effects from the institutions’ leverage levels and the fitted
coefficient values are also close to zero.
Sub-samples and Forward Samples
Table 5.9: Panel Regression Results on Network Stresses - Subprime and Global
Financial Crises
Table 5.9 reports the panel regression results for network stresses as the dependent variable. Variables
are in log forms, so that fitted coefficients represent elasticities. The models use twoway fixed effect
method and Newey-West heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent standard error estimates are
reported in parentheses. The sub-sample period is from September 2007 to July 2009.
Dependent variable: network stresses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
spillovers −0.133∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.079∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.045) (0.050) (0.051) (0.046) (0.050)
spillovers2 −0.026∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
size −0.001 −0.001 0.002 0.00002 −0.001 0.0002 −0.0002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
lev −0.005 −0.005 0.003 −0.004 −0.005 −0.001 −0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
closeness 1.940∗∗∗ 1.935∗∗∗ −0.744∗∗∗ 1.795∗∗∗ 1.938∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 1.774∗∗∗





in out connections 0.027∗∗∗
(0.005)
in from other −0.002∗
(0.001)
out to other 0.137∗∗∗
(0.006)
in out other 0.028∗∗∗
(0.004)
Observations 16,056 16,056 16,056 16,056 16,056 16,056 16,056
R2 0.102 0.103 0.269 0.109 0.103 0.204 0.111
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.094 0.246 0.100 0.094 0.186 0.102
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.10: Panel Regression Results on Network Stresses - Eurozone Sovereign
Crisis
Table 5.10 reports the panel regression results for network stresses as the dependent variable. Variables
are in log forms, so that fitted coefficients represent elasticities. The models use twoway fixed effect
method and Newey-West heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent standard error estimates are
reported in parentheses. The sub-sample period is from May 2010 to May 2012.
Dependent variable: network stresses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
spillovers 0.307∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.048) (0.049) (0.045) (0.048)
spillovers2 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
size 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
lev −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
closeness 1.559∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 1.515∗∗∗ 1.545∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 1.511∗∗∗





in out connections 0.012∗∗∗
(0.004)
in from other −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
out to other 0.107∗∗∗
(0.006)
in out other 0.012∗∗∗
(0.004)
Observations 17,394 17,394 17,394 17,394 17,394 17,394 17,394
R2 0.115 0.116 0.245 0.117 0.116 0.209 0.118
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.107 0.226 0.108 0.107 0.193 0.108
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 report the regression results on the sample subsets11 during
the Subprime and Global Financial Crises (subset 1, September 2007 to July 2009)
and the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis (subset 2, May 2010 to May 2012). The results
11We exclude risk spillovers’ interaction term with non-crisis state in the crisis sub samples.
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on subset 1 in Table 5.9 have similar pattern with our main results, where there is
a non-linear concave down decreasing relationship between spillovers and network
stresses. However, the network stresses are less sensitive to the changes in explanatory
variables, as the marginal effects of these variables are dwarfed by the crisis state per se.
In addition, size loses its explanatory powers in both periods of crisis. The distinctive
results for subset 2 in Table 5.10 show that the slopes for risk spillovers are now
concave upward increasing with greater elasticity coefficients than their equivalents
in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9, implying that network stresses increase with risk spillovers
throughout the sub-sample period in the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis. As discussed in
Section 5.6.1, while the severity of the realised network stress around the Eurozone
Sovereign Crisis is not as high as that during the outbreak of the Global Financial
Crisis, the duration of market distress is longer since there are two major outbreaks in
market distress (May 2010 and November 2011), which prevents the market recovering
from a crisis state, and makes the financial institutions to respond to spikes in risk
spillovers faster (which is typically a lagged response, as shown in Table 5.11).
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Table 5.11: Panel Regression Results on Network Stresses - Forward Measures
Table 5.11 reports the panel regression results for network stresses (forward one quarter/year leads) as the dependent variable. Variables are
in log forms, so that fitted coefficients represent elasticities. The models use twoway fixed effect method and Newey-West heteroskedasticity-
autocorrelation-consistent standard error estimates are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable: network stresses
full sample subset 1 subset 2
present 1 quarter 1 year present 1 quarter 1 year present 1 quarter 1 year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
spillovers −0.652∗∗∗ −0.601∗∗∗ −0.314∗∗∗ −0.079∗ 0.043∗∗ −0.070∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ −0.370∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.036) (0.039) (0.045) (0.021) (0.029) (0.044) (0.054) (0.063)
spillovers2 −0.100∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗ 0.006 −0.010∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
size 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.002 0.006∗ −0.0002 0.005 0.001 −0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
lev −0.002 −0.004 0.001 0.003 −0.003 0.0002 −0.001 −0.003 −0.008∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
closeness −0.044 0.042 0.016 −0.753∗∗∗ −0.037 0.181∗ 0.175∗ −0.018 0.170∗∗
(0.077) (0.080) (0.011) (0.271) (0.069) (0.100) (0.101) (0.055) (0.079)
in connections −0.010∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
out connections 0.379∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.015) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 70,914 70,914 70,914 16,056 16,056 16,056 17,394 17,394 17,394
R2 0.318 0.129 0.004 0.269 0.087 0.017 0.247 0.135 0.007
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.111 −0.016 0.202 0.002 −0.074 0.184 0.062 −0.077
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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In order to examine the forward explanatory powers of variables, we compare the
contemporary specifications with forward specifications that are one quarter and one
year in advance to the contemporary measures of the explanatory variables, for the
full sample model as well as two subset sample models. Comparing Table 5.11 with
previous results in Tables 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10, the one quarter models show comparable
results with their contemporary models, but there are notable differences for the
one-year model. Although the spillovers-stresses and interconnectedness-stresses
relationships are stable for the full sample models, we find that during crisis periods,
network topology for individual nodes changes frequently, resulting in the reversal
of the relationships of spillovers/interconnectedness to network stresses between the
one quarter model and the one-year model. In other words, the top contributors
of systemic risk changes constantly, with each of these institutions imposing heavy
systemic risk within a short time frame. This is reinforced by the evidence that
closeness centrality in the previous periods has little power in explaining network
stresses. In addition, we show that as crisis sub-samples, there is an evidence of lagged
(about one quarter) responses from spillover effects to network stresses.
As robustness checks, we use the proportions of counterfactual defaults (network default)
as an alternative measure for network impact, where the results for contemporary
models, subset models and forward models are shown in Tables 5.16 - 5.19. The
variable coefficients and explanatory powers are similar to those in the main models,
with the exception that the absolute values of the coefficients for risk spillovers are
larger than those in the main models, which is not surprising given the previous
results that the most severe impacts of risk spillovers make direct neighbours also
default but eliminate their roles as network hubs as well. We believe our results of
explaining network impact (defined by either counterfactual losses or defaults) using
institutions’ risk spillovers, interconnectedness are robust.
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5.7 Conclusions
We study the tail-dependency network of the global financial system and explore its
characteristics including the topological structures, and examine the network impact
from the inherent interconnectedness risk. tail-dependence network is formed by
the linkages of the tail distress events of financial institutions, which provides a
propagation mechanism of systemic risk spillovers, and the interconnectedness of
financial institutions is therefore an important source of systemic risk. Our results
show that interconnectedness risk can inflict heavy losses to the financial system
when the risk propagation can be fully realised. Therefore, regulators and policy-
makers need to take into consideration the interconnectedness risk among financial
institutions as a destabilising factor of financial stability as well as the network stresses
when assessing the impact of a systemic event.
In terms of core results, we find that spillovers of the distress of one finan-
cial institution can be propagated to many institutions resulting in high level of
interconnectedness among financial institutions, and the risk propagation due to
interconnectedness results in greater level of losses than what is realised by the
systemic impact of the initial distress. Adverse common market conditions of crisis not
only exacerbate the impact of the initial distress, but create greater tail-dependence for
the asset returns of financial institutions, making them vulnerable for the propagation
of risk spillover effects. Therefore, network effect and interconnectedness risk lead to
potential scenarios of market crash, if its effect can be fully realised. Our evidence
regarding the tightening of interconnectedness during crisis periods is inline with
the evidence documented in other studies regarding the interconnectedness of market
series, such as Augustin (2012), Wang and Moore (2012) and Alter and Schüler (2012)
for the CDS series and Billio, Getmansky, Lo and Pelizzon (2012) for the Granger-
causality relationships of stock prices. Our results show that the heavy losses implied
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by the interconnectedness risk start to revert to the pre Subprime Crisis level after the
second bailout package for Greece in March 2012. In this sense, our results justify
the bailout packages and the efforts to restore market confidence and liquidity by the
national and international authorities.
In addition, the impact of initial spillovers are shown to have a non-linear relation-
ship with respect to network stresses, when initial impact increases above a threshold
it leads to less realised network stresses as the defaults of some institutions, despite
the impact of their own defaults, make them no longer able to propagate network
stresses in the subsequent rounds. Our results also show that more heterogenous
substructures inside the tail-dependency network are more resilient to adverse market
conditions and network stresses, such as the financial markets of China and Japan. In
this sense, our results are in favour of promoting a more diversified sector structure
in the financial market and ring-fencing business exposures as it leads to a network
structure with less interconnectedness and greater financial resilience.
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Appendix 5.A Appendix
Table 5.12: List of Global Systemically Important Banks
Table 5.12 reports the definition of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) referenced in this
study. The G-SIBs definition and list of included institutions is provided by the 2015 update of Financial
Stability Board (Financial Stability Board, 2015a). SEDOL (Stock Exchange Daily Official List) and One
Banker Quote Symbol are the two symbols to identify institutions.
Name SEDOL Quote Symbol Home Country
Agricultural Bank of China B620Y41 601288-SH China
BNP Paribas 7309681 BNP-FR France
Bank of America 2295677 BAC-N United States
Bank of China B180B49 601988-SH China
Bank of New York Mellon B1Z77F6 BK-N United States
Barclays 3134865 BARC-LN United Kingdom
China Construction Bank B0LMTQ3 939-HK China
Citigroup 2297907 C-N United States
Credit Suisse 7171589 CSGN-VX Switzerland
Deutsche Bank 5750355 DBK-FF Germany
Goldman Sachs 2407966 GS-N United States
Groupe BPCE1 - - France
Groupe Crédit Agricole 7262610 ACA-FR France
HSBC 0540528 HSBA-LN United Kingdom
ING Bank 7154182 INGA-AE Netherlands
Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China Limited
B1G2JY3 601398-SH China
JP Morgan Chase 2190385 JPM-N United States
Mitsubishi UFJ FG 6335171 8306-TO Japan
Mizuho FG 6591014 8411-TO Japan
Morgan Stanley 2262314 MS-N United States
Nordea 5380031 NDA’SEK-SK Sweden
Royal Bank of Scotland B7T7721 RBS-LN United Kingdom
Santander 5705946 SAN-MC Spain
Société Générale 5966516 GLE-FR France
Standard Chartered 0408284 STAN-LN United Kingdom
State Street 2842040 STT-N United States
Sumitomo Mitsui FG 6563024 8316-TO Japan
UBS BRTR118 UBS-N United States
Unicredit Group B5M1SM3 UCG-MI Italy
Wells Fargo 2649100 WFC-N United States
1 Groupe BPCE is not a public listed firm and so is not available in our study.
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Table 5.13: List of Global Systemically Important Insurers
Table 5.13 reports the definition of Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs) referenced in this
study. The G-SIBs definition and list of included institutions is provided by the 2015 update of Financial
Stability Board (Financial Stability Board, 2015b). SEDOL (Stock Exchange Daily Official List) and One
Banker Quote Symbol are the two symbols to identify institutions.
Name SEDOL Quote Symbol Home Country
Aegon N.V. 5927375 AGN-AE Netherlands
Allianz SE 5231485 ALV-FF Germany
American International Group, Inc. 2027342 AIG-N United States
Aviva plc 0216238 AV.-LN United Kingdom
Axa S.A. 7088429 CS-FR France
MetLife, Inc. 2573209 MET-N United States
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd. B01FLR7 2318-HK China
Prudential Financial, Inc. 2819118 PRU-N United States
Prudential plc 0709954 PRU-LN United Kingdom
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Table 5.14: Evolution of Network Impact - Individual Financial Institutions
Table 5.14 reports the evolution of network induced impacts, as measured by the overall losses of economic values. The reported values are
the averaged weekly values over an eight-week window around the specified months. For firm names of respective firm code please refer to
Table 5.12 and Table 5.13.
Country Firm Code Feb, 07 Jan, 08 Jul, 08 Sep, 08 Apr, 09 Jun, 09 Jan, 10 Mar, 10 Jul, 10 Feb, 11 May, 12 Jul, 13
Switzerland CSGN-VX 0.64 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.88 0.80 0.69 0.81 0.90 0.93 0.68 0.33
UBS-N 0.58 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.88 0.81 0.74 0.80 0.88 0.93 0.70 0.34
China 2318-HK 0.68 0.96 0.89 0.84 0.87 0.77 0.75 0.77 0.87 0.94 0.62 0.26
601988-SH 0.37 0.87 0.81 0.77 0.85 0.64 0.50 0.53 0.79 0.92 0.49 0.30
Germany ALV-FF 0.60 0.95 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.83 0.75 0.79 0.89 0.95 0.76 0.32
DBK-FF 0.66 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.88 0.79 0.66 0.75 0.85 0.94 0.71 0.37
France ACA-FR 0.65 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.83 0.71 0.80 0.88 0.94 0.70 0.29
BNP-FR 0.57 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.88 0.84 0.71 0.76 0.87 0.93 0.69 0.31
CS-FR 0.66 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.76 0.80 0.88 0.94 0.71 0.40
United HSBA-LN 0.57 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.87 0.82 0.66 0.74 0.85 0.92 0.70 0.29
Kingdom PRU-LN 0.67 0.97 0.95 0.91 0.88 0.82 0.76 0.84 0.90 0.95 0.55 0.34
STAN-LN 0.66 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.87 0.77 0.74 0.83 0.90 0.94 0.69 0.23
Japan 8306-TO 0.48 0.96 0.93 0.85 0.86 0.75 0.64 0.76 0.86 0.94 0.59 0.39
8411-TO 0.57 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.60 0.64 0.64 0.84 0.94 0.69 0.38
United AIG-N 0.61 0.96 0.91 0.87 0.86 0.77 0.55 0.65 0.82 0.88 0.58 0.39
States BAC-N 0.60 0.95 0.95 0.90 0.87 0.76 0.63 0.69 0.86 0.90 0.67 0.37
C-N 0.64 0.95 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.73 0.70 0.81 0.89 0.93 0.74 0.35
MS-N 0.62 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.87 0.82 0.73 0.78 0.89 0.94 0.72 0.37
PRU-N 0.65 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.87 0.81 0.66 0.75 0.86 0.94 0.78 0.37
Rest AGN-AE 0.60 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.90 0.87 0.74 0.82 0.90 0.95 0.72 0.34
NDA’SEK-SK 0.74 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.74 0.82 0.88 0.94 0.74 0.27
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Table 5.15: Variable Correlations
Table 5.15 reports the correlation tables for the variables used in the panel regressions in Section 5.6. Variable symbols are listed below:
A: network stress; B: sys spillovers; C: size; D: lev; E: closeness; F1: in connections; F2: out connections; F3: in out connections; F4:
in from other; F5: out to other; F6: in out other.
A B C D E F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
A 1 0.362 0.043 0.207 0.604 0.555 0.765 0.736 0.441 0.608 0.617
B 0.362 1 0.157 0.121 0.006 0.020 -0.030 -0.010 0.042 0.003 0.019
C 0.043 0.157 1 -0.114 0.022 0.071 0.014 0.035 0.093 0.044 0.063
D 0.207 0.121 -0.114 1 0.112 0.179 0.187 0.195 -0.034 -0.085 -0.043
E 0.604 0.006 0.022 0.112 1 0.349 0.462 0.448 0.280 0.370 0.378
F1 0.555 0.020 0.071 0.179 0.349 1 0.692 0.872 0.864 0.525 0.744
F2 0.765 -0.030 0.014 0.187 0.462 0.692 1 0.947 0.542 0.785 0.784
F3 0.736 -0.010 0.035 0.195 0.448 0.872 0.947 1 0.718 0.734 0.838
F4 0.441 0.042 0.093 -0.034 0.280 0.864 0.542 0.718 1 0.690 0.877
F5 0.608 0.003 0.044 -0.085 0.370 0.525 0.785 0.734 0.690 1 0.939
F6 0.617 0.019 0.063 -0.043 0.378 0.744 0.784 0.838 0.877 0.939 1195
Table 5.16: Panel Regression Results on Network Defaults - Full Sample
Table 5.16 reports the panel regression results for network defaults as the dependent variable. Variables
are in log forms, so that fitted coefficients represent elasticities. The models use twoway fixed effect
method for the models and Newey-West heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent standard error
estimates are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable: network default
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
spillovers −1.620∗∗∗ −1.602∗∗∗ −1.072∗∗∗ −1.554∗∗∗ −1.604∗∗∗ −1.333∗∗∗ −1.551∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.186) (0.162) (0.183) (0.186) (0.168) (0.183)
spillovers2 −0.208∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.032)
spillovers non crisis 0.260∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.045) (0.057) (0.059) (0.047) (0.056)
size 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013)
lev −0.0001 −0.00002 −0.017∗ −0.003 0.0001 −0.010 −0.002
(0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
closeness 16.360∗∗∗ 16.360∗∗∗ −0.297 15.650∗∗∗ 16.360∗∗∗ 7.852∗∗∗ 15.670∗∗∗





in out connections 0.122∗∗∗
(0.022)
in from other −0.005
(0.005)
out to other 0.782∗∗∗
(0.041)
in out other 0.112∗∗∗
(0.019)
Observations 70,914 70,914 70,914 70,914 70,914 70,914 70,914
R2 0.181 0.181 0.308 0.184 0.181 0.247 0.184
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.177 0.302 0.181 0.177 0.243 0.181
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.17: Panel Regression Results on Network Defaults - Subprime and Global
Financial Crises
Table 5.17 reports the panel regression results for network defaults as the dependent variable. Variables
are in log forms, so that fitted coefficients represent elasticities. The models use twoway fixed effect
method and Newey-West heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent standard error estimates are
reported in parentheses. The sub-sample period is from September 2007 to July 2009.
Dependent variable: network default
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
spillovers −0.471∗∗ −0.470∗∗ −0.229 −0.463∗∗ −0.471∗∗ −0.400∗∗ −0.464∗∗
(0.198) (0.199) (0.171) (0.196) (0.198) (0.176) (0.195)
spillovers2 −0.091∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.056∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.034)
size −0.001 −0.001 0.012 0.004 −0.001 0.005 0.003
(0.028) (0.028) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028) (0.016) (0.026)
lev −0.022 −0.022 0.013 −0.019 −0.022 −0.006 −0.019
(0.031) (0.031) (0.019) (0.030) (0.031) (0.017) (0.030)
closeness 9.039∗∗∗ 9.028∗∗∗ −3.035∗∗∗ 8.321∗∗∗ 9.035∗∗∗ 2.602∗∗∗ 8.232∗∗∗





in out connections 0.131∗∗∗
(0.023)
in from other −0.005
(0.005)
out to other 0.617∗∗∗
(0.026)
in out other 0.137∗∗∗
(0.019)
Observations 16,056 16,056 16,056 16,056 16,056 16,056 16,056
R2 0.137 0.137 0.345 0.147 0.137 0.264 0.150
Adjusted R2 0.125 0.126 0.316 0.134 0.126 0.242 0.137
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
197
Table 5.18: Panel Regression Results on Network Defaults - Eurozone Sovereign
Crisis
Table 5.18 reports the panel regression results for network defaults as the dependent variable. Variables
are in log forms, so that fitted coefficients represent elasticities. The models use twoway fixed effect
method and Newey-West heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent standard error estimates are
reported in parentheses. The sub-sample period is from May 2010 to May 2012.
Dependent variable: network default
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
spillovers 0.505∗∗ 0.502∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗ 0.501∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗
(0.214) (0.214) (0.197) (0.213) (0.214) (0.196) (0.212)
spillovers2 0.116∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036)
size 0.022 0.022 0.018 0.021 0.022 0.013 0.020
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
lev −0.012 −0.012 −0.011 −0.014 −0.011 −0.015 −0.015
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
closeness 6.976∗∗∗ 6.956∗∗∗ 0.782∗ 6.692∗∗∗ 6.954∗∗∗ 3.036∗∗∗ 6.665∗∗∗





in out connections 0.077∗∗∗
(0.018)
in from other −0.005
(0.004)
out to other 0.499∗∗∗
(0.027)
in out other 0.076∗∗∗
(0.015)
Observations 17,394 17,394 17,394 17,394 17,394 17,394 17,394
R2 0.127 0.127 0.281 0.131 0.127 0.240 0.133
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.117 0.259 0.121 0.117 0.221 0.123
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.19: Panel Regression Results on Network Defaults - Forward Measures
Table 5.19 reports the panel regression results for network defaults (forward one quarter/year leads) as the dependent variable. Variables are
in log forms, so that fitted coefficients represent elasticities. The models use twoway fixed effect method and Newey-West heteroskedasticity-
autocorrelation-consistent standard error estimates are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable: network default
full sample subset 1 subset 2
present 1 quarter 1 year present 1 quarter 1 year present 1 quarter 1 year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
spillovers −2.343∗∗∗ −2.188∗∗∗ −1.113∗∗∗ −0.228 0.131 −0.314∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 2.225∗∗∗ −0.657∗∗
(0.156) (0.143) (0.165) (0.171) (0.094) (0.126) (0.196) (0.205) (0.258)
spillovers2 −0.361∗∗∗ −0.332∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.056∗ 0.016 −0.046∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗
(0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.030) (0.017) (0.019) (0.033) (0.034) (0.043)
size 0.035∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.012 0.046∗∗∗ 0.006 0.019 0.006 −0.040∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019)
lev −0.014 −0.019∗ −0.001 0.013 0.006 0.0004 −0.009 −0.016 −0.038∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018)
closeness −0.576∗∗ 0.019 0.045 −3.066∗∗∗ −0.576∗∗∗ 0.680 0.645 0.096 0.548∗
(0.286) (0.317) (0.042) (1.091) (0.211) (0.429) (0.400) (0.252) (0.331)
in connections −0.037∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.010∗∗ −0.009∗ 0.011∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
out connections 1.584∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.059) (0.019) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024)
Observations 70,914 70,914 70,914 16,056 16,056 16,056 17,394 17,394 17,394
R2 0.307 0.131 0.002 0.346 0.110 0.023 0.283 0.131 0.010
Adjusted R2 0.293 0.114 −0.018 0.286 0.028 −0.068 0.222 0.057 −0.074
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 5.13: Tail-Dependence Network Structure: August, 2007
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Figure 5.14: Tail-Dependence Network Structure: September, 2008
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Figure 5.15: Tail-Dependence Network Structure: April, 2009
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Figure 5.16: Tail-Dependence Network Structure: May, 2010
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Figure 5.17: Tail-Dependence Network Structure: November, 2011
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6.1 Main Findings and Policy Implications
Primary to our interest, we investigate the risk spillovers from different sources of
systemic risk and assess the impact of these risk spillovers to the stability of the
financial system. In our research we carry out several studies with advanced empirical
frameworks to address our research questions and objectives.
In Chapter 3, we study the risk spillover effects from sovereign credit risk to
financial institutions, using sovereign CDS spreads and financial CDS spreads as
indicators of credit risk in the two markets. We use the ∆CoVaR spillovers from a
sovereign country to the systemically important financial institutions as the sovereign
country’s systemic risk contributions. The ∆CoVaR risk measure is estimated from
quantile regression models, where we also examine the structural stability of the
risk estimates. In terms of the systemic risk contributions from sovereign credit
risk, we find there are several waves of drastic increase in risk spillovers from the
distress of sovereign countries, each related to the events of declines in the market
confidence regarding the fiscal health in sovereign countries, which is transferred to
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the market concern about the solvency of financial institutions from their exposure
to sovereign credit risk. Our investigation regarding the factors which influence the
spillover effects from sovereign countries to financial institutions also confirms that
the variables representing the fiscal sustainability and government interventions to
the financial markets contribute to the increase in risk spillovers in various degrees,
which is inline with other theoretical/empirical findings regarding the sovereign risk
spillovers (Drechsler et al., 2011; De Bruyckere et al., 2013).
In order to have a more comprehensive view regarding the impact of sovereign risk
spillovers, in Chapter 4, we extend the scope of analysis to sovereign bond markets,
sovereign CDS markets, and national banking sector. The GVAR model allows us
to examine the impact of sovereign risk shocks from increase in debt burden and
the slowdown of economic growth to the markets by methods of impulse response
analysis and forecast error variance decompositions. We find strong contributions
from the influence of other countries and other markets to the sovereign risk levels
as well as financial market returns. In addition, our results support the findings in
Chapter 3 and we show that sovereign risk shocks from Portugal and Italy in the
distressed country groups and Germany in the core country groups impose greater
impact to the overall level sovereign risk in the European Union as well as the national
banking sectors.
In Chapter 5, we focus on the risk spillovers among financial institutions and
investigate the implications of financial interconnectedness on the impact of systemic
risk spillovers. We study the network interconnectedness from the pairwise tail-
dependence of financial market returns from the network extensions of the ∆CoVaR
approach. Our analysis on the tail-dependence network encompasses a greater range
of global financial institutions than previous studies (Hautsch et al., 2012; Billio,
Getmansky, Lo and Pelizzon, 2012; Betz et al., 2015) which allows us to have a
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broader view on the impact of financial interconnectedness and market distress on
the stability of the financial system. In order to analyse the topological characteristics
of network interconnectedness, we construct several centrality measures and examine
the evolution of the interconnectedness characteristics over the recent crisis episodes.
In addition, we examine the propagation of risk spillovers via the dependence
structure of market returns to examine the resilience of the financial system from in-
terconnectedness risk and crisis distress. The tail-dependence of financial institutions
exhibit a clustering behaviour within their economic zones, which is swiftly blurred
by the strong market distress of financial crises. Our study shows that market distress
greatly contributes to the drastic increase in tail-dependence which in turn impose
great interconnectedness risk to the financial stability.
The findings in our research lead to several policy implications. Firstly, the
spillover impact of systemic risk from various sources warrants the further en-
hancement in the joint efforts of national and supranational authorities in providing
financial stability at a greater level, and the establishment of a unified financial
resilience framework. We provide empirical evidence regarding the strong risk
spillovers either from sovereign credit risk or financial credit risk, as the distress of
market participants quickly lead to the transmission of risk to other entities in the
financial system. Such phenomenon leads to the further collapse in market confidence
and risk sentiment which in turn leads to the sudden drying up of asset liquidity
and funding liquidity in the market. In the face of a systemic event that endangers
the widely interlinked financial system, individual sovereign country’s efforts in
stabilising the national financial sector would likely be ineffective given the strong
external influence and risk spillovers, and might exacerbate market distress when the
capability and resolve of the national authority are put in question. Our results also
show that the market sentiment of systemic risk decline substantially after the unifying
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efforts of market stabilisation schemes from supranational authorities. Therefore, from
the perspective of policy-makers, the monitoring and the assessment of system risk
need to take into account the globalised interactions of systemic risk spillovers and its
impact, and the policy-making regarding financial stability and resilience should also
be undertaken in this context. In addition, evidence from the recent crises shows that
the establishment of a well-prepared financial resilience facility with clear mandates is
most effective way in curbing market contagion and mitigating the impact of systemic
risk.
Secondly, greater transparency in market exposures and better availability in
measurement data are needed for the monitoring of systemic risk. As discussed in
our studies, market participants have no knowledge regarding the market exposures
other than their direct counterparties, and regulators also rely on the periodic financial
reports and market reports to monitor the stability of the financial system. Regulators
and market participants both rely on either direct institutional reports or their own
risk measurement models for risk assessment, and the evidence from the recent
episodes of financial crises put the effectiveness of the current reporting standards
of risk exposures in doubt. While systemic risk measurements based on market series
such as interbank interest rates, credit and liquidity spreads allows researchers and
regulators to gain the holistic views of the overall market situation, and we expect new
generations of market-based risk measures with greater accuracy, the existence of risk
spillover effects mean that they are not the perfect substitutes of institutional financial
reports and market surveys, and should help policy-makers in laying out foundations
of the next generation of financial reporting standards. With the greater integration of
markets, new unifying standards in financial reports and market reports with higher
frequency and more detailed risk categories that can better reflect the timely risk status
in the financial system will be welcomed by both regulators and market participants
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for a more stable and more resilient financial system.
Thirdly, evidence from our research calls for a more robust market structure with
greater heterogeneity in the business models in financial institutions. Homogeneity
in business models in market participants leads to them being particularly susceptible
to shocks from individual origins of risk, and provide the opportunity to upgrade
idiosyncratic shocks to systematic shocks and further to systemic events and financial
instability. In other words, “homogeneity breeds fragility” (Haldane and May,
2011). The results from our research show that for national financial sectors as well
as individual financial institutions that are less dependent from external sources,
especially from a single dominant external influence are less susceptible to spillover
impact and recover sooner from the devastations of market collapse. Therefore, from
the perspective of mechanism designs, regulators and policy-makers should seek to
promote a robust market structure where the impact of risk spillovers could ideally be
self-contained within a modular design of market mechanism, in addition, they need
to provide incentives for market participants to pursue more heterogenous business
models and limit the presence of all-encompassing financial institutions which would
be “too-interconnected-to-fail”.
6.2 Limitations and Future Research
Our research seeks to provide a deeper understanding of systemic risk spillovers
from various perspective, however there are limitations in our studies and further
research opportunities based on our studies as well as the relevant studies from
the literature strands. Regarding the study in Chapter 3, our empirical evidence is
limited by the availability of the measures of the involvement of sovereign countries in
terms of fiscal and monetary support to the financial institutions. The data regarding
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state interventions is collected from official source, which is aggregated to country
level and is limited within the European Union member states. An alternative and
more robust approach would be to collect the state intervention information from
the perspective of individual financial institutions as the bailout or the financial
support package they receive. This would involve collecting valid information
regarding financial support from financial news and institutional financial report. The
most challenging tasks in this approach is collecting an unbiased data population,
considering privacy issues and the case of missing information from small financial
institutions. To our knowledge, although there are efforts (Gerhardt and Vennet,
2016; Cabrera, Dwyer and Samartı́n-Saénz, 2016), the absence of unified official data
makes the efforts of these studies difficult to validate. Therefore in order to justify
for state interventions in the context of supporting financial institutions through crisis
episodes, a unified collection of state intervention data in greater details should be
provided by national/supranational authorities.
In terms of the choice of measurement models, while our method in measuring the
systemic risk contributions of sovereign distress is based on prominent methodology
framework that is widely adapted in various studies, one of the limitations in our
method is that it is a reduced form empirical measure of systemic risk spillovers. A
structural form method based on reasonable and extensible economic models would
be of interest from the point of view of policy-makers. However, as discussed
from the systemic risk surveys (Bisias et al., 2011; Benoit et al., 2016), reduced form
measures or the empirical elements from prominent structural models are more
than often favoured by applications in measuring systemic risk due to their succinct
nature. While the accuracy in measuring credit risk, liquidity risk, or systemic risk
improves substantially from the development in the literature, comparing reduced
form market-based measures with studies on the balance sheet characteristics of
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financial institutions, they contribute not as much to the specific policy decisions
regarding how the markets and market participants should be regulated. Therefore it
is also in our research interest to assess the actual effectiveness of relevant regulation
policies from the empirical evidence of financial markets with the help of structural
economic models.
Regarding the study in Chapter 4, our modelling of sovereign risk spillovers is
limited by the scope of the VAR system, where we only consider the case of countries
in the European Union to accommodate the theoretical justifications of the GVAR
model. To evaluate the impact of spillover dynamics of sovereign distress in a more
globalised setting, where the dominant influence of the financial markets of United
States could be considered within the accommodation of the GVAR model or other
types of high dimensional models of economic system, we will have to construct
a greater modelling system where most of the economic sub-systems retain their
granular presence in the model. In other words, in order to understand the regional
spillover dynamics between the European sovereign countries while also considering
the influence of the financial markets of the United States, other economic zones will
also need to be included in the model and their effects accounted for. Nevertheless,
the globalised interaction of various financial markets within a VAR system will be of
interest to the regulators and policy-makers with a unified view on the global impact
of systemic risk spillovers, which we will leave for future studies.
In addition, as is also noted in other studies regarding high dimensional infor-
mation system (Dees et al., 2007; Chudik and Pesaran, 2014), given the vast amount
of parameters of domestic, regional and global interactions, there is currently no full
macroeconomic identification guidance for a high dimensional GVAR model, which
means that there is no convincing ways to structurally identify the structural shocks
to the error components or to justify the variable orderings used in the Cholesky
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Decompositions. However this is surely in the research interest of economists given a
globalised financial system of capital flows and economic policies. A closed system
way to model the impact of one or several financial markets without considering
the influence and impact from / to the external and global environment will be
less validated and supported by the empirical evidence. We gladly welcome the
development in the theoretical and empirical frameworks of more globalised financial
market models, and will perhaps contribute to such development in the future course
of our research.
Regarding the study in Chapter 5, we have shown there are varying structures
of interconnectedness of financial institutions; for example, financial institutions that
share certain commonalities (affiliations in the same economy or financial sector,
similarities in risk exposures and contributions, etc.) tend to be clustered together.
In our study, as well as other economic studies on financial network, the centrality
of individual nodes is the primary focus of the topological structure of the network
system, which means the measurement of network interconnectedness is from the
individual nodes per se. However, the clusters of nodes would also be an important
source of systemic risk. For example, it will be from the interest of regulators to
investigate the potential scenario of distress of a cluster of several financial institutions
which are characterised by their deep involvement in a specific niche market. The
investigation to the network clusters inevitably involves the identification of a network
cluster in a certain form, or in other words, what kind of relationship among nodes
qualifies as a “cluster” while others do not, which is a research interest worth
addressing. In addition, evaluating the effect of the clustering formation and other
topological properties of network systems in the context of financial stability in a
suitable theoretical and empirical framework will also be an area of research interest.
While our study focuses on the understanding of the tail-dependence of risk
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spillovers of financial institutions from empirical evidence, an examination of the
possible scenarios of tail-dependence under different simulated parametric settings
would also be of interest to regulators. Specifically from the perspective of tail-
dependence of the market series, for example, to what extent should the policy-makers
promote the heterogeneity in the tail-dependence as revealed by the parameters of
network characteristics can provide a better market condition, and how robust can
the policies be in the likely event of another market crisis? Extending this issue to
a wider range of the financial network formulations, such as contractual links, what
kind of interbank market structure should the policy-makers promote in order to let
banks and other financial institutions enjoy the benefit of risk diversification through
interconnectedness while at the same time limit the impact of initial distress from
spreading.
While some of these issues would be formidable to address, they will be crucial to
the deeper understanding of systemic risk in the financial markets and the responses
from market participants, policy-makers, and individual investors. We will be
wholeheartedly excited to witness the development in economic research to promote
financial stability and resilience, and we will seek to address some of these issues in
the future course of our research.
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Table A.1: Crisis Events
Table A.1 reports events that signify the various stages in the crises discussed in the study.
Source: collected by authors.
Code Date Description
01 09 October 2002 NASDAQ and NYSE crash
02 14 September 2007 Bank run on Northern Rock
03 11 November 2007 S&P mass downgrades of securities backed by subprime
mortgages
04 14 March 2008 Bear Stearn collapses
05 15 September 2008 Lehman Brothers bankrupts, start of Global Financial Crisis
06 02 April 2009 G20 stimulus package
07 02 May 2010 Greece bailout, 1st round
08 18 November 2010 Ireland bailout
09 05 May 2011 Portugal bailout
10 21 June 2011 Greece bailout, 2nd round early draft
11 11 November 2011 Italy approves austerity measures and changes government
12 21 Februrary 2012 Greece “technical defaults” with finalised 2nd round bailout
package
13 06 May 2012 Market fear resurges due to election impasse in Greece
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